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Who Can Refinance? The Possibilities and 
Limitations of Market-based Refinancing in 
the Case of Mortgages with a Variable Interest 
Rate*
Bálint Dancsik – Nedim Márton El-Meouch
In our study we examine what portion of variable interest rate mortgages can be 
profitably and realistically refinanced on a market basis, in the light of remaining 
maturity, the current one-off costs of refinancing and the prevailing interest rate 
spread. To that end, relying on microdata we applied various methods (from using 
the simple banking sector average spread to applying a linear regression model) 
to estimate the interest rate spread at which debtors would be able to take out 
a new, variable-rate loan. If the estimated spread of the new loan is adequately low, 
refinancing may be a financially rewarding option for the debtor. According to our 
results, 22–31 per cent of the variable interest rate mortgage loans disbursed prior 
to 2015 could be refinanced in this way assuming conservative lending conditions. 
Although we focused on the refinancing of variable-rate loans with other variable-
rate loans directly, our results also indicate that on a market basis, there may be 
limited room for refinancing variable-rate loans with fixed-rate loans and hence, for 
mitigating the interest rate risk of the household sector. In our opinion, by easing 
the obstacles to loan refinancing, the recommendation of the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank on interest rate risk may considerably raise the share of debtors switching to 
fixed-rate loans. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: D14, E43, G21, G41
Keywords: mortgage loan, variable interest rate, interest rate risk, loan refinancing
1. Introduction and motivation
The post-crisis history of the Hungarian financial system demonstrates that a rise 
in borrowers’ debt service can stretch debtors’ financial position and this can 
easily become a problem for the banking sector as well via the increase in credit 
risk. Although the conversion of FX-denominated retail mortgages to HUF in the 
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Bálint Dancsik is a Senior Economist at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: dancsikb@mnb.hu
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first quarter of 2015 eliminated debtors’ exchange rate risk, under the relevant 
legislation lending rates were tied to the 3-month interbank rate; consequently, 
instalments remained volatile in many cases.1 Apart from FX loans converted to 
HUF, there are also other loans outstanding with variable interest rates: a significant 
portion of the housing loans disbursed in the first few years following the demise of 
foreign currency lending was extended with an interest rate fixation of less than 1 
year up until 2018, after which the expansion of loans with an interest rate fixation 
of over 1 year became unquestionable.2 Between 2010 and 2018, loans extended 
by credit institutions with an interest rate fixation of less than 1 year amounted to 
HUF 1,369 billion, and banks’ on-balance sheet stock of loans converted to HUF 
1  While in this way the Conversion Act exposed debtors to interest rate risk, had it provided otherwise – i.e. 
had it prescribed a fixed rate – the conversion would have caused a shock-like surge in banks’ interest 
rate risk. The hedging requirement of this conversion would have induced a large-scale, simultaneous, 
same-direction demand in the interest rate derivative market, which would have also raised the price of 
interest rate swaps. The Act, however, enabled debtors to refinance their debt at reduced costs (even with 
fixed-rate loans), although only a marginal percentage of borrowers (around 1.5 per cent) took advantage 
of this opportunity.
2  While the share of variable-rate loans in new contracts ranged between 40 and 45 per cent in the period 
of 2015–2017, this ratio shrank to 15 per cent in 2018 as a whole. By December 2018, 95 per cent of newly 
disbursed housing loans had an initial interest rate fixation of over 1 year. Contracts with an initial interest 
rate fixation of 1–5 years represented 26 per cent, while 57 per cent and 12 per cent of new housing loans 
were disbursed with an initial interest rate fixation of 5–10 years and over 10 years, respectively.
Figure 1
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Note: Shares are calculated on the basis of volume. In the case of new contracts, shares were calculated 
based on newly disbursed housing loans, while for loans outstanding it was based on all mortgage loans 




still exceeds HUF 1,200 billion. Therefore, although loans extended with an interest 
rate fixation of over 1 year now account for a considerable share of newly disbursed 
mortgages, with a stock of HUF 2,500 billion and a share of nearly 60 per cent, the 
outstanding portfolio is still dominated by variable-rate loans (Figure 1).
In the case of variable-interest loans indexed to the short-term reference interest 
rate, a rise in the interest rate environment will quickly increase the amount of the 
debt service as well. The percentage of this increase depends primarily on remaining 
maturity: the longer the remaining maturity, the larger the rise in the instalment in 
response to one unit of interest rate increase. An interest rate increase of 100 basis 
points raises instalments by around 3 per cent in the case of a loan with a remaining 
maturity of 5 years, whereas this increment reaches 5 per cent for a 10-year loan 
and almost 9 per cent for a loan with a remaining maturity of 20 years. The effect of 
an interest rate increase also depends on the current interest rate level (the lower 
the current interest rate, the larger the effect of a unit increase in the rate), but its 
impact is far less significant than that of the remaining maturity.3
A considerable portion of the variable interest rate mortgage portfolio is still 
characterised by relatively long remaining maturities. More than half of the 
loans have a remaining maturity of over 10 years (Figure 2). Consequently, the 
normalisation of monetary policy – that is, departure from the near-zero interest 
environment – may raise the debt service of many households in the period ahead. 
This risk can be reduced significantly by the long-term fixation of interest rates, but 
this comes at a price: in the light of the normal yield curve, the current value of the 
long-term fixed interest rate is higher than the value of floating interest rates indexed 
to the reference rate, which are subject to short-term adjustments.4 The customer 
primarily pays for the hedging cost of banks’ interest rate risk – in other words, the 
difference between the short-term interbank interest rate and the interest rate swap 
corresponding to the duration of the interest rate fixation and reflecting market 
expectations about rate changes – assuming that the spread applied by the bank 
does not differ significantly in the case of these two product types.5
3  Obviously, loans with an interest rate fixation for longer periods – but not for the entire term of the loan – 
also involve an interest rate risk, as the loan is repriced at the end of the interest period. With an interest 
rate hike like this the debtor may even face a potentially greater shock because, as opposed to floating-
rate loans, the rate increase takes place in a concentrated, rather than a gradual, manner. Rate-sensitivity, 
however, is mitigated by the fact that, on the one hand, the transaction’s remaining maturity can decrease 
significantly by the end of the interest period and, on the other hand, in the event of interest rate changes 
detrimental to the debtor, the customer is entitled to early prepayment free of charge.
4  Based on data for new contracts as at December 2018, weighted by contracted amount the Annual 
Percentage Rate of Charge (APRC) of housing loans with an interest rate fixation of less than 1 year was 
3.33 per cent. The APRC was 4.49 per cent for loans with an interest rate fixation of 1–5 years, 5.22 per cent 
in the case of 5–10 year fixation and 5.66 per cent over 10 years.
5  Based on the data, however, banks set substantially different spreads for these two product types for a long 
time; in other words, the spreads on loans with an initial interest rate fixation of over 1 year were higher 
than justified (Aczél et al. 2016; MNB 2017). This discrepancy could be observed up until 2018, when the 
two spreads converged (MNB 2018b).
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As a method of averting interest rate risk, debtors can opt to refinance their 
variable-rate debt with fixed-rate loans. The focal question of our research is to 
determine the extent to which the share of fixed-rate loans in loans outstanding 
can be increased on a market basis through refinancing. Although the interest rate 
structure of new loans suggests that the portfolio is increasingly shifting to loans 
with a longer-term interest rate fixation virtually “by itself” in any event, in terms 
of proportions, this shift can only be a slow and gradual process due to the size 
of the portfolio. Under the current circumstances, the share of loans with interest 
rate fixation of over 1 year in the total portfolio edges upward by 0.5–1 percentage 
point on a monthly basis on average. This rate may accelerate if a larger volume 
of new (fixed-rate) loans was taken out for the purpose of the early repayment of 
previous (variable-rate) loans. Our study is motivated by the following question: 
how much room is available for debtors to replace their variable-rate loans with 
fixed-rate loans on a market basis?
Figure 2
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Whether or not it is worth it for a debtor to refinance a variable-rate mortgage loan 
with a fixed-rate loan is an extremely complex question, which depends, first and 
foremost, on the following:
(1)  the size of the spread over the funding cost corresponding to the interest rate 
fixation in the case of the two products,
(2)  the one-off costs of the refinancing,
(3)  the debtor’s risk sensitivity; i.e. the “utility” attributed by the debtor to constant 
instalments,
(4)  the debtor’s interest rate expectations which may differ from the market 
expectations reflected in the price of interest rate swaps,
(5)  the debtor’s financial awareness or lack thereof, which may deter the debtor 
from loan refinancing even if the debtor has the necessary financial means.
The data at our disposal do not allow us to address all of these aspects. Our study 
is focused primarily on the first and second aspects, and attempts to assess loan 
refinancing options from a pricing point of view. Our specific research question is 
the following: how many variable-rate mortgage contracts could be replaced by 
another variable-rate mortgage contract in such a way that the gain stemming from 
the lower interest rate spread offsets the one-off costs of the refinancing during 
the remaining maturity? Although we rely on the database of variable-rate loans 
for our estimation with spreads being the main focus of the estimate, the ratio thus 
received may also serve as an indication of the breadth available for refinancing 
debts with fixed-rate loans on a market basis. Of course, by extending our results we 
implicitly assume that (1) the debtor’s interest rate expectations are identical with 
market expectations; in other words, (2) the debtor is willing to pay the difference 
in funding costs, and (3) the bank is willing to disburse variable-rate and fixed-rate 
refinancing loans at the same spread.
Our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the main 
findings of the relevant literature. In Section 3, we discuss in detail the way in which 
the profitability of loan refinancing can be determined; in Section 4 we describe 
the data and methodology used, while the results of our estimates are presented 
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary of our conclusions.
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2. Findings of the relevant literature
The literature on this topic raises a number of questions. Some of these focus on the 
decision-making situation of households, while the rest explore the macroeconomic 
consequences of the interest rate risk and the interest type. From the perspective of 
households, the present value of refinancing is determined by four factors (Follain 
– Tzang 1988): (1) the one-off costs of refinancing, i.e. the early repayment fee of 
the old loan and the administrative costs of the new loan, (2) the duration for which 
the debtor wishes to hold his mortgage loan (for practical purposes, the remaining 
maturity), (3) the difference between the interest rates of the old and the new loan, 
and (4) the tax implications of the early repayment fee and the interest payments.6 
In making their decision, households need to weigh two questions: firstly, whether 
the present value of the gain to be achieved by refinancing is positive (i.e. whether 
the lower cash flows of the refinancing loan will compensate for the costs of 
refinancing) and secondly, whether, at the given moment, this present value is at 
its maximum, or they are better off waiting somewhat longer before they refinance 
(Agarwal et al. 2016). The latter aspect is important because even if the present 
value of the refinancing is positive, by opting for refinancing the borrower loses the 
option of refinancing at a more optimal rate after waiting longer. Several studies 
pointed out that borrowers do not make rational decisions in refinancing situations 
and are prone to making both potential mistakes: on the one hand, they may miss 
refinancing opportunities even though they could gain from the transaction (Bajo 
– Barbi 2018); on the other hand, they often choose to refinance at a sub-optimal 
time (Chang – Yavas 2009; Agarwal et al. 2016).7
It is important to stress that the earlier literature typically attempts to gauge the 
optimal time at which it is worthwhile to refinance a fixed-rate loan with another 
fixed-rate loan. This question raises far fewer problems than trying to determine the 
optimal time for refinancing a variable-rate transaction with a fixed-rate transaction, 
as the borrower’s risk sensitivity plays a prominent role in the latter case, but this is 
a hard-to-observe variable. In the case of new loans, households’ choice between 
variable and fixed rates typically reveals the bounded rationality of the participants. 
The literature found that households do not act prudently when assessing risks, 
and their decisions are far more likely to be determined by the prevailing interest 
6  In some countries, interest payments and the early repayment fee can be deducted from the taxes paid 
by the debtor, which may influence the decision-making situation. In Hungary, however, interest payment 
has no such tax implications.
7  Numerous studies have been published on the calculation of the optimal refinancing rate; however, they have 
less relevance for our research question which is more of an economic policy nature. For a comprehensive 
overview of the theoretical models, see the studies by Agarwal et al. (2013) and Agarwal et al. (2016).
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rate differential between the two product types8 (Koijen et al. 2009; Ehrmann – 
Ziegelmayer 2014; Badarinza et al. 2018; Basten et al. 2018), rather than by the size 
of the cash flows expected throughout the loan term. However, as mentioned in the 
introduction, we refrain from addressing these questions in this specific estimate.
The issue of interest type is all the more relevant as the interest type typical of 
mortgage loans has a significant impact on the balance sheet of the banking sector. 
For instance, euro area banks operating in countries with predominantly fixed-
rate mortgages banks typically undertake higher interest risks; i.e. they do not 
fully hedge their interest rate risk exposures (ECB 2018; Hoffmann et al. 2018). 
Therefore, although households are protected from the effects of interest rate 
hikes in these countries, for banks, an interest rate increase entails a decline in 
the profits generated by mortgage loans. Albertazzi et al. (2018) also highlight the 
importance of the level of development of the capital market: the share of fixed-rate 
loans is typically higher in countries with a more advanced institutional structure 
for long-term, fixed-rate borrowing. Basten et al. (2018), in turn, found that banks’ 
pre-existing interest rate risk exposure also strongly influences the lending rates of 
fixed and variable-rate loans: when banks see their target level of interest rate risk 
reached or exceeded, they try to steer their customers to product types that allow 
the banks to reduce their risks, either by adjusting their lending rates or offering 
shorter (or longer) fixation periods than those preferred by the customer.
The interest rate structure of loans also affects the functioning of monetary policy 
transmission (Calza et al. 2013). In countries characterised by a higher share 
of variable rates, monetary policy exerts a stronger influence on real economic 
developments. Ippolito et al. (2018) confirm this by demonstrating, through 
outstanding corporate loans, that owing to the floating rates, monetary policy-
induced changes affect firms’ investment decisions and liquidity faster. The study 
refers to this phenomenon as the floating rate channel.
3. Estimating the gain achievable by refinancing
In this study, our goal is to select loans from outstanding variable-rate mortgages 
where refinancing could be a financially rewarding and realistic option. In 
constructing our model for refinancing, we examined the refinancing of loans with 
another, variable-rate mortgage in the light of the data available. In our analysis, 
we weighed and compared against each other two main criteria:
8  This trend may also reflect the fact that – for the lack of certainty regarding future information – upon the 
calculation of the annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) it is assumed in the case of variable-rate products 
that the initial borrowing rate remains unchanged throughout the whole lifespan of the loan, which is almost 
certain to underestimate the actual costs when the yield curve is normal (Berlinger 2017).
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•  firstly, the debtor bears one-off costs, which are charged in relation to the new 
borrowing and to the early repayment of the old loan,
•  secondly, the future expected cash flows of the new loan are different from the 
expected cash flows of the old loan. The difference between the present value 
of the two cash flows shows the debtor’s gain (or potential loss) stemming from 
refinancing.
The above can be summed up as follows:
 





where PV is the present value of refinancing, Crefinancing is the initial costs, Ct,old 
and Ct,new are the cash flows stemming from the old and the new loan at date t, 
respectively, rt is the discount rate prevailing in period t (which equals the product of 
forward yields between period 1 and t), and n denotes the number of the remaining 
periods.
If the gain stemming from the difference between the cash flows (instalments) 
exceeds the one-off costs of refinancing, the present value of the transaction will 
be positive.
The positive difference can be primarily explained by the spread decline achievable 
during the term of the loan by way of the refinancing loan. If the refinancing loan 
has a lower spread, the longer the remaining maturity of the loan, the greater 
the gain thus received. In the case of loans with short remaining maturities, the 
gain realised by the customer from the difference in debt services is insufficient 
to “cover” the one-off costs. Therefore, remaining maturity and the gains from 
refinancing are positively correlated.
Obviously, the gain achievable depends on the one-off costs of refinancing. If the 
refinancing process is free of charge,9 even the smallest spread decline will make 
the refinancing profitable; by contrast, high one-off costs would require a greater 
spread decline for the transaction to be profitable. In other words, the level of 
one-off costs and the potential gain are negatively correlated.
9  Of course, owing to the non-negligible administrative requirements of refinancing (according to MNB 2018a 
the time requirement of refinancing is around 30–40 days), non-monetary “costs” are incurred even in this 
case, but these are disregarded in our analysis.
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Some of the one-off costs (early repayment fee, disbursement charge, notary fee) 
depend on the amount of the early repayment/new borrowing, while another 
part (land registry fee, lien registration) is independent of it (Table 1). Due to the 
nominally fixed costs, in the case of larger contracted amounts even a smaller 
spread decrease compensates for one-off costs. Accordingly, the amount of the 
outstanding debt and the gain from refinancing are also positively correlated.
Table 1
Cost types incurred in 2019 in Hungary for refinancing
Description of cost Cost amount Bank discount is typical
Submission of sales contract to the land 
registry HUF 11,100 No
Valuation of property HUF 30,000 Yes
Issuance of notarial deed ~HUF 50,000–150,000 Yes
Lien registration HUF 17,100 No
Disbursement 1 per cent of the disbursed amount Yes
Early repayment/Prepayment 1 per cent of the early repayment amount No
Total costs (for a loan of HUF 10 million) HUF 393,000 –
Note: For the issuance of the notarial deed we used individual, contract-level notary fees, but we did not 
detail them in the table due to the complexity of the calculation method (staggered fee charged as 
a function of the basic amount and the contracted amount, lump sum cost). For the purposes of the 
calculations we applied notary fees planned to be effective from 1 July 2019 (after the repeated prolon-
gation of the fee changes).
Source: MNB
In order to illustrate the correlations described above, we constructed a number of 
indifference curves (Figure 3). The indifference curves show by how much should 
the spread decrease at the minimum to make refinancing at various refinancing 
costs and under stipulated credit terms (HUF 10 million outstanding principal 
amount, 2.8 per cent spread) worthwhile for borrowers in the case of loans with 
given maturities. Therefore, the points displayed on the indifference curve by and 
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Calculating the present value or “gain” described above would be far more difficult 
if we were to assess the refinancing of variable-rate loans with fixed-rate loans. 
While in the case of a variable rate–variable rate or fixed-rate–fixed-rate refinancing 
transaction a change in the interest rate exerts a similar impact on the cash flows of 
the old and the new loan and thus the difference remains approximately constant, 
in comparing variable and fixed-rate loans we must reckon with the possibility 
of unexpected interest rate shocks and the level of the debtor’s risk aversion or 
risk appetite, i.e. the extent to which the debtor wishes to avoid the effects of 
unexpected interest rate shocks.10
Since we have no information on debtors’ risk appetite, we did not analyse this 
issue directly. For the purposes of our estimate, we essentially examined whether 
the borrower of a variable-rate loan could refinance his loan with another variable-
10  For instance, in the case of mortgage loans disbursed prior to 2018, the spread of loans with an interest 
rate fixation of over 1 year over the IRS was far higher than the spread of floating-rate loans over the short-
term interbank interest rate. This suggests that Hungarian households were willing to pay a premium in 
exchange for the constancy of the instalments, which may also reflect the negative experiences gained in 
relation to foreign currency borrowing (Dancsik 2017).
Figure 3
Indifferent spread decrease in the case of refinancing a HUF 10 million loan with 
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Note: The vertical axis indicates the spread decrease, while the horizontal axis shows the length of rema-
ining maturity. The lines indicate the size of the spread decrease required to “cover” the one-off cost in 
the case of individual remaining maturities at various refinancing one-off costs.
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rate loan in a financially rewarding way.11 However, in our opinion (and also in 
consideration of the implicit assumptions emphasised in the introductory section), 
the results of our estimates can be also interpreted extensively: if, based on our 
estimate, the borrower can take out such a variable-rate loan, then he can also have 
access to a fixed-rate loan with a similar spread and accordingly, he can potentially 
reduce his interest rate risk by way of refinancing. This extension assumes a neutral 
risk appetite on average, which means that, in exchange for hedging their interest 
rate risk, borrowers are only willing to pay the market price of the hedging (i.e. the 
difference between IRS and BUBOR, the Budapest Interbank Offered Rate). With 
this, if the customers are risk averse we underestimate, and if they are risk-takers 
we overestimate the effective refinancing possibilities. Although the previous high 
spread of fixed-rate loans indicates that customers are willing to pay a premium for 
safety (i.e. they are risk averse), Hungarian financial culture is also prone to overrate 
immediate advantages. The latter inclination suggests that borrowers choose the 
product that comes with a currently lower instalment amount, which may be 
indicative of a – not necessarily conscious – risk-taking attitude. It is therefore 
difficult, overall, to determine the direction of the bias arising from the extension 
of our estimate due to the assumption of risk neutrality.
In view of the above, our estimation strategy is the following:
1.  We calculate the current spreads of the variable-rate loans disbursed between 
2004 and 2014.12 In order to do so, we needed to estimate the handling charges 
applied by banks in the case of loans disbursed in the period 2004–2009;13
2.  On a sample of the variable-rate loans disbursed between 2015 and 2018 we 
estimate the spread that is currently typical for loans with various features. As 
part of this step, we estimate the partial effect exerted on the spread by the 
factors shaping the spread of recently disbursed loans;
11  The previous, excessively high spread set for loans with an interest rate fixation of over a year over the 
funding cost is another reason why we should not include these loans in the estimate. Indeed, if these loans 
were included in our sample, in our estimate the size of the refinancing spreads would be overestimated 
compared with the actual situation.
12  We did not estimate spreads for variable-rate mortgage loans disbursed after 2015 as we assumed that the 
actual spread captures reality better than any value that we could have estimated regarding the specific 
contract.
13  Although we have contract-level data available pertaining to the current interest rates, contracts for the 
loans converted to forint were concluded on the basis of a previous version of the Act on Consumer Credit 
that is no longer effective; therefore, costs over and above the interest rate also constitute a part of the 
debt service. The most important of these are handling charges – a non-negligible item in the practice of 
most banks. In the first step of the estimate, we adjusted the interest rates for the handling charges, for 
which we took into account the service charges specified in the List of Conditions of the ten largest banks 
for the no longer disbursed, FX- (and HUF-) denominated mortgage loans. Inevitably, our estimate reflects 
some bias due to the fact that the actual handling charges may differ for each contract type even within 
the same bank (e.g. normal or preferential handling charges or loans without handling charges). Moreover, 
we also assume that, despite the handling charge categories specified in the List of Conditions, banks may 
have deviated from those values at the transaction level, which gives rise to further bias in our estimate.
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3.  Based on certain features of the loans disbursed between 2004 and 2014 and 
using the coefficients/spreads estimated as described above, we estimate the 
spread at which these loans could be refinanced today;
4.  We examine whether the difference between the current spread and the 
estimated spread of the refinancing loan would be sufficient to compensate for 
the borrower’s one-off refinancing costs during the remaining maturity of the 
transaction;
5.  Finally, we also examine potential grounds for exclusion (previous non-
performance, high age, high loan-to-value ratio, low income) which may prevent 
the refinancing transaction.
It is also important to stress that our calculations show only and exclusively the number 
of contracts worth refinancing from a financial perspective on a market basis under 
the prevailing regulations. This is far from stating that the borrowers concerned (1) are 
even aware of this option, and (2) are willing to take advantage of it. As we mentioned 
in the introduction, after the conversion of foreign currency loans to forint, borrowers 
were given an option to refinance their loans fully exempted from paying the early 
repayment fee, but the value of refinancing contracts only amounted to HUF 45 billion 
at the end of 2015, which accounts for a negligible 1.5 per cent of the potential stock.14 
Thus our estimates by no means reflect our expectations about future refinancing 
volumes; they much rather point out that – given that a considerable portion of the 
variable-rate loans have short remaining maturities, low principal amounts and/or low 
spreads – we cannot expect debtors to switch their contracts to fixed-rate contracts 
without any external incentive for a significant part of the portfolio.
4. Data and methodology
For the purposes of this study, we relied on databases that contain contract level data 
on the household loan contracts carried on the balance sheets of credit institutions. 
We had access to 2018 Q2 data recorded in the Central Credit Information System 
(CCIS), to which we linked anonymised credit risk data from the MNB’s data supply 
coded L11 (payment-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio) and data from the personal 
income tax returns provided by the National Tax and Customs Administration.
Before the analysis, we excluded outliers and presumably inaccurate values from 
our database to prevent significant bias to our estimates. For the exclusion of 
outliers from the database, we used the 1st and 99th percentile as a benchmark 
in the case of most variables. As a result of these exclusions and due to the data 
14  Bajo – Barbi (2018) described a similar phenomenon in Italy: although the one-off costs associated with 
refinancing were practically cancelled in full in 2007, the share of borrowers taking recourse to refinancing 
was only 13 per cent 8.5 years after the modification.
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that were unavailable from the start, our analysis – which did not include income 
and co-debtor statuses – covered 361,252 mortgage loan contracts, while our 
methodologies that also processed the former data categories were developed on 
the basis of 288,893 observations.15 In all cases, we projected our final results to the 
total dataset and accordingly, the results show the refinanceability ratio and other 
distributions relative to a total of 379,852 contracts for variable-rate mortgages 
disbursed in the period 2004–2014.16
We estimated the spread of the refinancing loans on the sample of variable-rate 
mortgage loans disbursed between 2015 Q1 and 2018 Q2, which was constructed 
on the basis of 77,713 contracts in the case of the smallest banking sector sample. In 
Table 2 and Table 3, the descriptive statistics of the variables used are broken down 
by date of disbursement: on the one hand, for the loans disbursed in the period 
2004–2014 – which comprised the dataset analysed – and, on the other hand, for 
the loans disbursed between January 2015 and July 2018, which played a role in 
the determination of the refinancing interest rate spread. In the former case, the 
variable values as at end-June 2018, while in the latter case the values prevailing 
at the contract date bore relevance.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the variables pertaining to the variable-rate mortgage loan 
contracts disbursed in 2004–2014
Variable Number Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Spread* 364,949 4.56 4.36 1.74 0.07 15
Indifference spread 
differential 358,748 4.75 1.47 10.02 0.20 59.25
Outstanding 
principal amount 379,852 4,534,396 3,142,305 4,860,102 1 99,300,000
Remaining maturity 377,095 9.46 8.85 5.62 0.003 31.60
Income by co-debtor 302,749 3,211,436 2,594,197 2,320,615 166,256 25,000,000
Co-debtor 329,557 0.48 0 0.50 0 1
Age** 329,557 46.05 45 8.46 12 89
Contract type*** 381,130 0.48 0 0.50 0 1
*Adjusted for service charges in the case of contracts concluded in the period 2004–2009.
**Where the transaction involved co-debtors, we used the average age of the debtor and the co-debtors 
for our calculations.
***For the purposes of contract type, 0 means housing loan and 1 means home equity loan contracts.
15  In the case of contracts concluded in 2004–2009, the number of contracts included in the analysis was 
reduced further by the fact that we adjusted the spreads for service charges for the ten largest banks only.
16  All this entailed 237,819 and 187,167 observations, respectively, in the individual analyses of loans 
converted to forint; in their case the total dataset under review comprised 250,525 observations, and we 
scaled our results and distributions to this statistical population.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the variables pertaining to the variable-rate mortgage loan 
contracts disbursed between January 2015 and June 2018
Variable Number Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Spread 88,959 3.38 2.91 1.32 0.08 15
Contracted amount 87,751 7,925,319 6,500,000 5,544,318 150,043 30,000,000
Original maturity 89,251 15.85 15.05 6.59 1.02 31.00
Income by co-debtor 79,602 3,984,491 3,124,783 2,956,716 200,105 25,000,000
Co-debtor 83,939 0.53 1 0.50 0 1
Age* 83,939 39.60 39 8.89 16 83
Contract type** 89,510 0.20 0 0.40 0 1
*Average age is used in the case of co-debtors.
**For the purposes of contract type, 0 means housing loan and 1 means home equity loan contracts.
In summary, our estimates were intended to determine – based on the main 
correlations presented above – whether individual debtors would be able to 
take out a refinancing loan that would result in a spread decrease sufficient to 
compensate the debtor for the one-off costs during the remaining term of the loan. 
We needed the following for the estimate:
•  currently charged spread (i.e. the difference between the cost of credit and the 
3-month BUBOR),
•  spread attainable with a new loan,
•  outstanding principal amount,
•  length of the remaining maturity,
•  refinancing costs.
The biggest problem arising during the estimate is our inability to directly observe 
the interest rates at which debtors with pre-existing loans would receive a new 
loan at present. Since without the spread of the refinancing loan it is impossible 
to determine the spread decrease that could be achieved by the debtors by 
refinancing, we applied various statistical methods to estimate refinancing spreads 
for all contracts. That notwithstanding, the information available in the databases at 
our disposal was still far more limited than what is used by banks in making pricing 
decisions; consequently, our estimate is surrounded by significant uncertainty.
We applied four different approaches to mitigate the uncertainties surrounding 
the estimate. On the one hand, this is justified by robustness reasons; on the 
other hand, we sought to compare the results of the individual estimates that 
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complemented one another and had their own advantages and disadvantages. 
In the estimates, we essentially handled the housing loan and home equity loan 
portfolios separately. Progressing from the simple to the complex, in the four 
estimates we approximated the spread of the refinancing loans with the methods 
described below.
4.1. Banking sector average spread method
In the simplest approach, we assigned the average spread of variable-rate mortgage 
loans disbursed between January 2015 and August 2018 by loan category to all 
variable-rate mortgage contracts (separately for housing loan and home equity loan 
products) disbursed between 2004 and 2014, and we took this as the refinancing 
spread. For the sake of simplicity, in this estimate we assumed that at present, all 
borrowers with pre-existing mortgage loans could take out a new loan at the typical 
average spread of the recent period (3 percentage points for housing loans and 
around 4.4 percentage points for home equity loans).
4.2. Spread-based distribution method
Separately for housing loans and home equity loans, we calculated the distribution 
of variable-rate loans disbursed between January 2015 and June 2018 by spread, 
broken down by percentiles. We assigned the spreads thus received to the 
percentiles17 corresponding to the spreads of the variable-rate mortgage contracts in 
each purpose category, separately for the loans disbursed in the period 2004–2009 
and then for those disbursed in 2010–2014, and took this as the refinancing spread. 
Thus, for the purposes of this estimate we assumed that the borrower would reside 
at a similar point of the distribution in the case of newly disbursed loans as in 
the spread-based distribution of previously disbursed loans; in other words, the 
borrower’s relative risk position did not change in the past years.
4.3. Median spread method
In this approach, based on the banks’ List of Conditions we assumed that the 
interest rate/spread is determined primarily by the borrower’s income18 and the 
principal amount. Accordingly, within these two dimensions we set up categories for 
both loan types and examined the median spread of the mortgage loans disbursed 
between January 2015 and June 2018 as a cross-section of these categories (Table 
4 and Table 5). We generated such median values both at the level of the banking 
sector and at individual bank level.
17  In the case of loans disbursed between 2004 and 2009 the percentiles are based on spreads adjusted for 
service charges.
18  The database provided information only on income subject to personal income tax (declared income) 
and as such, our income data do not contain the value of social transfers and pensions, and we have no 
information on potential undeclared incomes.
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Table 4
Median spreads of variable-rate housing loans disbursed between January 2015 and 
June 2018 according to income and contracted amount
Annual income
600,000 –  
2,400,000
2,400,000 –  
4,800,000
4,800,000 –  
7,200,000











0 –  
500,000 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13 4.13
500,000 –  
2,000,000 3.90 3.61 3.48 3.18 3.09
2,000,000 –  
4,000,000 3.09 3.06 2.91 2.91 2.91
4,000,000 –  
6,000,000 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.90 2.65
6,000,000 –  
8,000,000 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.71 2.57
8,000,000 –  
10,000,000 2.91 2.91 2.90 2.65 2.50
10,000,000 – 2.91 2.91 2.66 2.57 2.41
Table 5
Median spreads of variable-rate home equity loans disbursed between January 
2015 and June 2018 according to income and contracted amount
Annual income
600,000 –  
2,400,000
2,400,000 –  
4,800,000
4,800,000 –  
7,200,000
7,200,000 –  










0 –  
500,000 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18 5.18
500,000 –  
2,000,000 5.86 5.39 4.78 4.83 4.26
2,000,000 –  
4,000,000 5.62 5.16 4.76 4.40 4.26
4,000,000 –  
6,000,000 5.31 4.79 4.54 4.34 3.98
6,000,000 –  
8,000,000 4.79 4.72 4.41 4.01 3.87
8,000,000 – 
10,000,000 4.64 4.39 4.18 3.85 3.66
10,000,000 – 4.26 4.10 3.95 3.74 3.58
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Based on the categories set up according to the outstanding principal amount and 
the debtor’s income, we were able to assign “refinancing spreads” to the old loans 
as well. We assigned a total of three spreads to each contract:
1)  for each contract, the median spread achievable at the debtor’s own bank,
2)  the median spread achievable at the debtor’s bank or in the banking sector as 
a whole, whichever is lower,
3)  the median spread applied by the bank that offers the most favourable spread.
With this distinction, we were trying to factor in the often ad hoc nature of loan 
refinancing: in the first version, the customer takes into account the offer of his 
own bank only, in the second version he also considers the offer of “a few other 
banks” – which we approximated by means of the banking sector average – and 
finally, in the third version the borrower makes the banks compete in earnest and 
picks the best spread offered. Our base result is the refinancing ratio which takes the 
more favourable of two estimates: the own bank and total banking sector spread 
estimates (Method 2); accordingly, this result is displayed in the summary tables 
of the results of our estimates (Table 8 and Table 9), while the results of the two 
remaining estimates are shown separately in Table 10.
4.4. Linear regression method
We applied the fourth method to estimate banks’ pricing function by means of 
linear regression. For the purposes of the estimate, we relied on the sample of 
variable-rate mortgages disbursed between January 2015 and June 2018. Our target 
variable was the spread over the 3-month BUBOR, while we took into account, as 
explanatory variables, the log of the contracted amount and the square thereof, 
the maturity and the square thereof, the log of the average income of debtors and 
co-debtors, the average age of debtors and co-debtors and the square thereof; 
moreover, we used binary variables to control for the existence of co-debtors and 
the contract type. We checked the multicollinearity between the variables with 
variance inflating factor and did not find it excessive.
We conducted the estimates at the level of the banking sector and at individual 
bank level by running OLS regressions. We estimated the banking sector model both 
by controlling for disbursing banks with binary variables and without these control 
variables.19 As a result, we estimated a total of 12 models.
19  In the case of regressions run for each individual bank we essentially allow the partial effect exerted on 
the spread by specific contractual features to differ across banks, while in the case of the banking sector 
model estimated with bank fixed effects that is not possible. In the latter model, individual bank features 
are expressed by bank dummies, but the partial effect of the other variables is uniform for all institutions.
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The estimated coefficients of the models of the total banking sector are shown in 
Table 6.20 The direction of the coefficients estimated by the model is consistent with 
the intuition and with the model results estimated by previous studies (Aczél et 
al. 2016; Mérő and Vágó 2018). The explanatory power of the models amounts to 
44 per cent in the case of the banking sector estimate (based on R2 statistics), and 
ranges between 8 per cent and 72 per cent in the case of individual bank estimates. 
At this point, once again we need to draw attention to the uncertainties stemming 
from the estimate (especially regarding the bank-level models), which can be 
primarily attributed to the limited scope of the data available. That notwithstanding, 
for the purposes of our research question we consider the explanatory power of the 
models sufficient overall, especially in light of the fact that our estimation results 
are deemed relevant only at the portfolio level.
Table 6
Output tables of the linear regressions estimated on the banking sector sample
Variables
(1)
Target variable: Spread over 
BUBOR
(2) 
Target variable: Spread over 
BUBOR
Ln(Contracted amount) –1.966*** –2.264***








Home equity loan 1.506*** 1.451***
Bank dummy No Yes
Constant 26.48*** 26.47***
Number of observations 77,713 77,713
R2 0.336 0.441
Note: Banks’ indicator variables are only included in equation (2); their estimated coefficients are not 
displayed in our result table for data protection reasons. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Having estimated the models, using the estimated coefficients and the information 
available on previously disbursed variable-rate loans, we predicted “refinancing 
loan” spreads for the contracts of the old portfolio. Using the results of the various 
estimation methods, in this case as well, we were able to supply, for each borrower, 




his own bank’s “offer”, the banking sector’s “average offer” and the best bank’s 
“offer”. For the purposes of the linear regressions as well, the assumption we 
considered the most realistic was where the borrower considers his own bank’s 
offer and the banking sector’s “average offer”, and chooses the one offering the 
more favourable spread for refinancing his loan. Accordingly, the summary result 
table shows the results calculated with the spreads of the total banking sector 
regression equation thus received.
The advantages and disadvantages of the individual methods are presented in Table 7.
Table 7
Advantages and disadvantages of the methods applied to estimate the spread of the 
refinancing loan




Median spread (based 
on loan amount and 
income)








a reliable way to 
double-check the rest 
of the estimates
easy to interpret, 
intuitive




the most complex and 
comprehensive; 
incorporates into the 
spread as much 


















its point estimate is 
surrounded by a high 
degree of uncertainty; 
influenced by outliers
We compared the “refinancing” spreads estimated in accordance with the above 
methods with the actual spread (adjusted for service charges) of the contract 
and examined whether the difference between the two exceeds the level of 
the indifference spread decrease associated with the given contract. If yes, we 
concluded that refinancing the loan is financially worthwhile for the debtor, and if 
not, then on the contrary, the debt is not worth refinancing.
5. Estimation results
Based on our results, it may be possible to refinance around 38–47 per cent of the 
total portfolio of mortgage loans disbursed prior to 2015 (HUF 651–803 billion) in 
a financially rewarding manner. Based on the number of contracts, this accounts 
for 20–29 per cent of the contracts (Table 8).21 Examining only the loans converted 
21  The stock-based refinancing ratio exceeds the contract-based ratio in the case of all of our results. This is 
because in the case of longer-term loans – where refinancing may be, ceteris paribus, a more rewarding 
option – the outstanding debt is typically also higher.
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to forint, around 40–48 per cent of the portfolio (HUF 499–603 billion) may be 
refinanced with financial gain, which covers 20–29 per cent of these contracts 
(Table 9).
Besides financial considerations, however, it is questionable whether any bank 
would be even willing to extend a loan to the debtor. Obstacles include the debtor’s 
advanced age, insufficient income, the transaction’s excessively high current loan-
to-value ratio or the debtor’s prior delinquency. Filtering the population by these 
criteria22 revealed that refinancing could be a realistic option for 22–31 per cent of 
the variable-rate mortgage loan portfolio disbursed prior to 2015 (accounting for 
13–21 per cent of the contracts), while in the case of loans converted to forint the 
corresponding value is 20–28 per cent (12–19 per cent of the contracts).
The scope of loans that could be effectively refinanced on a market basis may be 
even more limited in view of the significant share of home equity loans in the total 
variable-rate mortgage loan portfolio (in particular, in the total portfolio of loans 
converted to forint). Since the number of home equity loans extended at present is 
insignificant, we have very limited information on the interest rates at which these 
loans would be disbursed. Consequently, our estimates pertaining to the refinancing 
spreads of loans extended in this category are surrounded by greater uncertainty. 
For all practical purposes, in our estimate we already distinguished between these 
two product markets, but it is still important to examine the stock of loans that 
may be refinanced effectively from the aspect of loan type. If we used the extreme 
assumption that, for lack of market supply, home equity loans cannot be refinanced 
at all, we would find that, according to our estimate, refinancing could be a viable 
option for 16–22 per cent of the variable-rate mortgage loan portfolio disbursed 
prior to 2015 (12–15 per cent of the contracts) and for 14–20 per cent of the loan 
portfolio converted to forint (9–13 per cent of the contracts). However, we deem 
this assumption overly excessive; consequently, we consider the ratio of 22–31 per 
cent (including home equity loans) to be our base result.
22  We applied the following filter criteria: age above 60 years, current loan-to-value ratio above 100 per cent, 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to our benchmark results, in the analyses in which we estimated the 
spread based on the median spread and by linear regression, we considered it 
important to examine the change in the portfolio of refinanceable loans (with the 
constraints already considered) generated by the spread that was constructed based 
on the offer of the debtor’s own bank, the average banking sector offer and that of 
the bank with the best offer. The results of these hypothetical models pertaining 
to variable-rate forint loans disbursed prior to 2015 are shown in Table 10. In the 
case of methods where we assumed that the debtor refinances his loan at his own 
bank, the results received were similar to those yielded by the methods that also 
take into account the average banking sector spread and take the best spread of 
the two. 24–31 per cent (HUF 407–527 billion) of the variable-rate loan portfolio 
disbursed prior to 2015 was found to be refinanceable, accounting for 17–21 per 
cent of the contracts. The corresponding ratio for loans converted to HUF is 21–28 
per cent (HUF 263–355 billion) at the stock level, representing 14–19 per cent of 
the loans converted to HUF at the contract level.
If we assume that all debtors refinance their loans at the bank offering the best 
spread, the refinancing ratio significantly exceeds the corresponding values received 
in the other models. Based on the results of these methods, 38–43 per cent (HUF 
656–746 billion) of the pre-2015 portfolio can be refinanced at the stock level, while 
this ratio ranges between 27 and 32 per cent according to the number of contracts. 
Similarly, we received higher refinancing ratios in the case of loans converted to 
HUF: representing 25–30 per cent of the contracts, 35–40 per cent (HUF 442–503 
billion) of the loan portfolio is worth refinancing (and can be refinanced). This 
result demonstrates that enhancing consumer awareness may offer significant value 
added in boosting bank competition and at the same time, in reducing households’ 
interest rate risks.
Table 10
Results of the estimation methods of the spread estimated by the median spread 
method and by linear regression pertaining to refinancing among variable-rate 
forint loans disbursed prior to 2015





Own bank or average banking 




Under the median spread method 
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6. Conclusion
In this study, we attempted to estimate what percentage of the variable-rate 
mortgage loan portfolio could be refinanced on a market basis based on purely 
financial criteria. Our motivation was provided by the fact that the portfolio of 
variable-rate mortgage loans is still substantial and that – through the sharp increase 
in instalments – an extreme interest rate shock would significantly stretch the 
financial position of many vulnerable households. As MNB (2019) pointed out, 
many households are not familiar with the concept and basic terms of variable 
interest rates, which foreshadows that a considerable number of debtors may be 
unprepared in the event of a potential interest rate increase.
Our estimates were intended to quantify the spread at which borrowers with pre-
existing variable-rate mortgage loans would be capable of refinancing their loan 
with a new variable-rate mortgage loan, and to examine whether the difference 
between the spreads would be sufficient to cover the costs of the refinancing. 
According to our results, this ratio is relatively low, accounting for 22–31 per cent 
of the portfolio, with the high level of refinancing costs contributing significantly 
to this. If we accept the hypothesis that debtors are willing to pay the funding 
cost increment arising from the interest rate fixation in exchange for the reduced 
volatility of the instalment amounts, then the estimated ratio may also be indicative 
of the room available for refinancing with fixed-rate loans on a market basis.
The results presented in the previous section reveal that, in view of the costs of 
refinancing and the features of the outstanding portfolio, it cannot be expected 
in the case of a considerable part of the portfolio that the interest rate type will 
switch to interest rate fixation of over 1 year on a market basis, without external 
incentives, through consumers’ financially aware refinancing decisions. In this 
regard, it poses a problem that, owing to their potentially low financial awareness 
and imperfect information, debtors may not necessarily take advantage of the 
option of refinancing even if they could do so with clear financial gains.
To facilitate a shift toward fixed-rate loans, a regulatory measure has been taken by 
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Under the recommendation issued by the MNB in April 
2019, banks are expected to contact vulnerable debtors – i.e. those holding variable-
rate mortgage loans with a remaining maturity of over 10 years – in a targeted way 
and to offer them a switch to fixed interest rates. Based on the recommendation, 
banks may only charge the costs directly arising from the contract modification to 
the debtors and may not offer a higher spread to the customer than the current 
spread specified in the contract.
In our opinion, the MNB’s recommendation tackles several problems that currently 
pose a potential obstacle to refinancing. Firstly, according to the recommendation 
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banks contact vulnerable customers (those with long remaining maturity) in 
a targeted manner and inform them of the phenomenon of interest rate risk. 
Simultaneously, they offer a fixed-rate refinancing option – or more precisely, 
a contract modification – to the customers, thereby enhancing their financial 
awareness in a targeted way. Secondly, by way of the contract modification numerous 
costs associated with refinancing can be avoided, which significantly improves the 
chances of the switchover to fixed rates. Thirdly, according to the recommendation, 
the best practice on banks’ part is to offer a spread to customers that is at most 
identical with the previous spread, and to charge to consumers only the funding 
cost increment of the reference interest rate corresponding to the duration of the 
interest rate fixation after the contract modification. This opens up the opportunity 
for interest rate fixation also for those debtors who would otherwise have access to 
loans only with higher spreads than previously. Fourthly, the contract modification 
also enables those debtors to switch to interest rate fixation who would be otherwise 
unable to take out a new loan due to their age, income or loan-to-value ratio.
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The further development of performance measures has managed to remedy some 
of the problems with earlier solutions, but with regard to the measures used most 
widely today, the issue of performance manipulation still needs to be tackled. This 
article presents the manipulation-proof performance measure (MPPM) developed 
by Ingersoll et al. (2007), which addresses this problem in a general sense. The 
MPPM used by Brown et al. (2010) is also detailed, along with the doubt ratio 
they developed, which can be used as a manipulation-detecting measure assessing 
implied risk aversion. With the calculations included here, this paper is one of the 
first to compare the MPPM and doubt ratio values calculated with the methods of 
the two groups of authors, seeking to explain the differences by using data from 
Hungarian absolute return funds as a sample. The results allow the author to be 
the first to propose the use of the more accurate MPPM formula of Ingersoll et 
al. (2007) both for performance measurement and calculation of the doubt ratio.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G11, G23
Keywords: portfolio selection, investment decisions, investment funds, performance 
assessment
1. Introduction
Although traditional performance measures have eliminated the faults of earlier 
solutions in the course of their development, potential manipulation is still an issue 
in connection with the measures widely cited in the literature and currently used 
by the market. One possible solution to this problem is to use manipulation-proof 
performance measures (hereinafter: MPPM), based on the utility theory well known 
in microeconomics. Due to their structure, these measures are especially suited 
for assessing actively managed funds, since their value can only be increased if 
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the fund manager has actual information or skills. By contrast, it is impossible to 
enhance a fund’s score just by knowing the measure used by the market or the 
performance assessor for performance measurement. This special feature sets apart 
manipulation-proof performance measures from traditional indicators, which can 
be manipulated without extra knowledge or information, simply by knowing the 
indicator.
The article presents the requirements that manipulation-proof measures need to 
meet and how Ingersoll et al. (2007) produced a possible solution to the problem 
and describes the measure defined by Ingersoll et al. (hereinafter: Ingersoll 
measure). The study also touches on the approach used by Brown et al. (2010) 
(hereinafter: Brown approach), which is a linear approximation of the Ingersoll 
formula. The Brown approach allows the measure to be better structured with 
excess return and excess standard deviation, and therefore it can also be used to 
assess implied risk aversion. The new indicator derived in this manner is referred 
to as the doubt ratio, which can indicate the presence of return smoothing or 
performance manipulation in the case of extreme values. As Brown et al. (2010) 
offered several ways to calculate the doubt ratio, including calculation of the MPPM 
with various risk aversion factors, not only the Ingersoll and Brown MPPM values 
were calculated here, but also the doubt ratios based on them.
The article looks at issues previously not discussed: What is the relationship between 
the results of the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM and the doubt ratio (implied risk 
aversion)? What could explain any differences detected? Taking into account the 
results and the practical calculation requirements of the two different methods, 
which method should be used for calculating the MPPM and the doubt ratio? 
Using data from Hungarian absolute return investment funds as a sample, our own 
calculations are used to show that the results of the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM 
and doubt ratio almost completely overlap; however, the difference between them 
and the corresponding reasons are also indicated.
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the characteristics of 
manipulation-proof performance measures, providing Ingersoll’s solution. Section 
3 then outlines the identification of manipulated performance, the Brown approach 
and the doubt ratio defined by them. After that, Section 4 compares the Ingersoll 
and Brown MPPM values and doubt ratios using data from Hungarian absolute 
return investment funds, and determines which method should be used in which 
situation, based on the results and the complexity of the calculations in practice. 
The paper ends with a brief summary and the conclusions.
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2. Manipulation-proof performance measures
Based on the literature, the assessment of actively managed portfolios can be 
approached from several aspects: Amihud et al. (2015) analyse the effect of the 
pricing of illiquidity, Gemmill et al. (2006) assess investment funds taking into 
account loss aversion. When examining fair risk allocation, Csóka and Pintér (2016) 
acknowledge and Balog et al. (2017) clarify that there is no risk allocation method 
that is always applicable, stable and motivating at the same time. Zawadowski 
(2017) presents a disappointing correlation in investment fund managers’ focus 
on commission, because according to his results, the fund managers who demand 
a higher commission cannot generate more excess return than that in exchange: 
on the contrary, 1 percentage point higher fees are coupled with over 1 percentage 
point lower performance on average (Jensen’s alpha) compared to the benchmark 
rate. There is ample literature on measuring the returns and risks of investment 
funds as well as identifying the factors that influence fund performance.1
Traditional performance measures have eliminated the faults of earlier solutions 
during the course of their development. The Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1966) only 
explains whether an investment fund provides adequate excess return for one unit 
of excess risk taken, but it does not show the relationship between the benchmark 
and the investment fund’s performance, in other words it does not break down 
investment fund performance into the performance arising from the change in 
the market/benchmark and the performance arising from the individual decisions 
of the investment fund manager. Therefore, it cannot be used to determine how 
exactly the fund manager was able to underperform or outperform the benchmark.
On the other hand, Jensen’s alpha (Jensen 1969) clearly demonstrates superior 
and inferior performance compared to the benchmark index, and its calculation 
is also fairly simple. The problem with it, however, is that it only shows the return 
achieved by the fund manager relative to the benchmark, but not the additional 
risk taken. The extent to which the portfolio created by the fund manager through 
overweighting is riskier than the benchmark cannot be ascertained.
The information ratio (Treynor and Black 1973) combines the two approaches, as it 
shows the excess return achieved by the fund manager for one unit of risk actively 
taken (Jensen’s alpha divided by its standard deviation). The information ratio is 
basically a modified Sharpe ratio: instead of the risk-free rate, the excess return 
relative to the benchmark is compared to the additional risk taken relative to the 
benchmark index.
1  Blake et al. (1993); Elton et al. (1996a); Carhart (1997); Bóta and Ormos (2016); Erdős and Ormos (2009); 
Bóta (2014)
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However, when assessing absolute return investment funds, the lack of an 
appropriate benchmark index is a huge problem, as these investment funds do 
not track clearly and properly defined indices. Instead, they aim to achieve positive 
returns in all market conditions, coupled with low volatility. The literature offers 
several approaches to manage this problem. These seek to introduce performance 
measures that are independent from benchmarks and able to appropriately assess 
the risk-return combinations even if the return distribution of the investment fund 
is abnormal. One possible solution is to use factors representing investment styles 
to calculate a modified information ratio (Pojarliev and Levich 2013). However, 
using the necessary factors is quite difficult in the case of these investment funds. 
Another issue is manipulation.2 The other possible solution for the problem related 
to the assessment of absolute return investment funds is to use manipulation-proof 
performance measures.
This article does not use the term “manipulation-proof” in the sense of 
non-manipulability from the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem well known in 
microeconomics.3 Here, the focus is not on how vulnerable a social choice function 
is to manipulation. Instead, what is attempted here is to prevent fund managers 
from boosting their own performance-based remuneration and bonuses simply by 
being familiar with the performance measure which is used to assess them. Fund 
managers who have no material extra knowledge or information to base their 
investment decisions on, but are aware of the weaknesses of the measure used 
for assessing them should not be able to make decisions that do not in fact increase 
the utility of the investors holding the investment fund but still raise the value of 
the assessment measure. The goal is to use an assessment system that rewards 
only those investment decisions that truly enhance the utility of investors, those 
that can only be made by fund managers who have more information or better 
skills than the market, and use these to effectively and profitably deviate from the 
market benchmark portfolio’s composition.
It has already been demonstrated that there are trading and reporting techniques 
that boost the value of traditional performance measures without actually 
increasing the investors’ utility on the risk-return spectrum. These methods can 
be best illustrated in the case of the Sharpe ratio, because it has a relatively simple 
structure: it compares the excess return over the risk-free rate to the standard 
deviation of the portfolio. One possible manipulation is so-called return smoothing, 
when fund managers report their losses stretched out and averaged out for a longer 
period, for example by subjectively stating assets that are illiquid, rarely priced and 
difficult to assess (Abdulali 2006). The reported average excess return does not 
change, but the detected standard deviation declines, and therefore ultimately 
2  Abdulali (2006); Bollen and Pool (2009); Ingersoll et al. (2007); Qian and Yu (2015)
3  See, for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Chapter 23
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the risk-adjusted performance appears to improve. There is also so-called dynamic 
manipulation when, for example, after a lucky gain at the beginning of the period 
under review the fund manager protects the profits by resorting to risk-free 
investments for the remaining period, making the risk-adjusted performance 
high, since its standard deviation will be close to zero. However, this choice is still 
suboptimal, and it does not provide the greatest utility to investors, because the 
fund manager should probably hold some risky assets in the remaining period, 
too. Ingersoll et al. (2007) present other investment strategies using options as 
well, which result in unreasonably high Sharpe ratio values. For example, the fund 
manager sells an OTM option with 1-month maturity at the beginning of the period, 
and the money from that as well as the already existing funds are invested in risk-
free assets. If the option expires worthless (the probability of this is strictly positive), 
the fund manager achieves positive returns with zero standard deviation and thus 
an infinite Sharpe ratio. Due to the positive probability, the expected value of this 
strategy also generates an infinite Sharpe ratio.
Nevertheless, it was also shown that there may exist properly constructed 
performance measures that are able to eliminate the above-mentioned problems 
based on a utility approach. The results of manipulation-proof performance 
measures cannot be improved by smoothing in the reports, in other words 
returns reported averaged out, leaving the average return unchanged. Moreover, 
the value of manipulation-proof performance measures can only be increased 
by deviating from the market benchmark portfolio by overweighting certain 
investment elements. These investment decisions are based on fund managers’ 
extra information compared to the market or their ability to create genuine value 
added, thanks to their timing and selection skills. Another advantage is that 
these measures’ assumptions do not include the normal distribution of returns, 
and therefore their results are less distorted in the case of a skewed or fat-tailed 
distribution of returns, in contrast to traditional performance measures that 
typically assume normal distribution and thus are more sensitive to the distortions 
caused by the abnormal distributions seen in real life.
Manipulation-proof performance measures are characterised by the following 
conditions:
1)  They should generate a single valued score for ranking.
2)  The score should not depend upon the portfolio’s monetary value, only the 
return percentage.
3)  Uninformed investors should not achieve a higher estimated score by deviating 
from the benchmark, however, informed investors should be able to do so by 
taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities.
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4)  The measures should be consistent with standard financial market equilibrium 
conditions.
If any of these conditions is not met, there is at least one way for active portfolio 
managers to enhance or manipulate their score by using strategies that result in 
seemingly better risk-return distributions but in reality achieve the higher score 
without genuine performance and without increasing the utility of investors.
The first condition excludes the measures that only make an incomplete ranking 
as well as the useless ones that, for example, merely list the returns. The second 
condition simply states that returns in themselves are sufficient statistics, while 
monetary gains and losses are not. For instance, the absolute net asset value of 
the fund cannot be relevant in ranking. Just because one fund has more assets than 
the other, the former does not necessarily perform better. The third and fourth 
conditions express that uninformed investors cannot profit by deviating from the 
benchmark, for example by trying to change the investment fund’s score on the 
observable data, whereas the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities should be 
reflected in the score. The measure should not be enhanced without value or 
information added by, for example, using simple return smoothing, the manipulated 
reporting of averaged returns or completely shifting to risk-free investments after 
a lucky streak to reduce volatility. At the same time, the measure should detect 
the investment decisions that genuinely increase utility, and consequently assign 
higher and higher scores to these results. The authors show that these conditions 
are fulfilled if the measure is:
•  increasing for the returns (monotonic),
•  concave,
•  time-separable,
•  shaped as a power function.
The first condition ensures that the measure acknowledges arbitrage opportunities. 
The second prevents the achievement of higher scores merely by increasing 
leverage or adding unpriced risk. In other words, not only the returns but also the 
risks taken matter. The third condition prevents dynamic or temporal manipulation. 
The fourth ensures consistency with the financial market equilibrium theory, and 
the different returns should be taken from different times to replace returns from 
different outcomes.
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The Ingersoll measure, which meets these conditions, is the following (1):
 
Θ̂ = 1























where Θ̂ estimates the risk-adjusted return premium of the investment fund. For 
a given Θ̂, the portfolio’s score is the same as the annualised return of a continuously 
compounded risk-free asset, which is higher than the risk-free rate by the value of Θ̂. 
rt is the return of the fund, rft is the risk-free rate and ρ is the relative risk aversion 
ratio. If ρ = 1, then measure (1) is not interpretable. If ρ > 1, then measure (1) usually 
takes a positive value, since the ratio of 1 + rt and 1 + rft is generally greater than 
1, and 1 – ρ is negative in the denominator of the first fraction and the exponent, 
therefore the logarithm is also negative, while the product is positive. And if ρ < 1, 
measure (1) is still expected to take a positive value by the former logic, but in this 
case 1 – ρ has a positive value in both places, and the logarithm is also positive, 
just like the product.
The MPPM can also be identified with the benchmark index. For the uninformed 
investors, the benchmark should be a desirable, ideal investment target with a high 
score. If the lognormal return of the benchmark is 1 + rb, then the parameter ρ is 
the following:
ln E 1+ rb( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦− ln 1+ rf( )
Var ln 1+ rb( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ .
ρ usually has a value between 0.2 and 10, according to empirical evidence from the 
literature. Arrow (1971) argues that it is around 1, the results of Szpiro and Outreville 
(1988) show that it is between 1 and 5, and the average ratio is 2.89. Layard et 
al. (2008) also observed values of roughly 1. It is approximately 2 according to the 
studies by Friend and Blume (1975) and Kydland and Prescott (1982). Gandelman 
and Hernandez-Murillo (2015) claim that it varies across countries, with a typical 
value of 1, and even the values of outlier countries are within the 0–3 range.
Both the Ingersoll and the Brown measure used risk aversion factors between 2 
and 4. Ingersoll et al. (2007) justified this by stating that even though according 
to empirical data it would be theoretically possible to make the calculations with 
a broader range, the relative risk aversion factor of between 2 and 4 corresponds 
to portfolios whose leverage is between 1.75 and 0.75. And this range covers most 
funds to be ranked. The selected Hungarian investment funds exhibit similar values 
based on the portfolio reports: out of 32 funds 23, or 72 per cent of the funds under 
review, belong to this range. Brown et al. (2010) decided to use risk aversion factors 
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between 2 and 4 to facilitate comparability to the results by Ingersoll et al. (2007). 
To ensure comparability here as well, risk aversion factors between 2 and 4 are 
used in the calculations below.
3. Detecting manipulated performance and defining the doubt ratio
According to the Brown formula, the linear approximation of MPPM (1) is:
 
Θ̂ p( )= 1
Δt
x + 1− ρ
2
sx*( )2{ } , (2)
where x  is the average of the excess return and sx*( )2 = sx2 T −1( ) /T  is the variance 
of the excess return calculated from the sample. 
This MPPM version allowed the simple statement of the so-called doubt ratio (DR), 
which deduces the development of implied risk aversion from the measure values 








An extremely high doubt ratio suggests extreme risk aversion, which is a potential 
sign of performance manipulation. Brown et al. (2010) found 34 hedge funds 
with doubt ratios of over 150 at a 5 per cent significance level, representing 2 per 
cent of the total sample under review. 80 per cent of these 34 funds were flagged 
as suspicious by five alternative statistical approaches with respect to return 
manipulation, so the analysis performed with the doubt ratio is consistent with 
the other statistical methods indicating manipulation, and an extremely high doubt 
ratio is a good indicator of potential performance manipulation or return smoothing 
(see Table 1).
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Table 1
Funds with an extremely high doubt ratio
Style Not detected Detected Total
< 1% < 5% % < 1% < 5% %
Convertible arbitrage 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 38
Emerging markets 1 1 1.0% 2 2 2.0% 98
Equity market neutral 0 0 0.0% 3 3 4.6% 65
Event-driven 0 2 1.5% 2 5 3.7% 135
Fixed-income arbitrage 1 1 1.8% 0 2 3.6% 55
Fund of funds 0 0 0.0% 9 11 2.1% 531
Global macro 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 53
Long/short equity hedge 1 1 0.2% 0 1 0.2% 489
Managed futures 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0.0% 125
Multi-strategy 1 2 1.7% 1 3 2.5% 121
Total 4 7 0.4% 17 27 1.6% 1710
Note: Based on Brown et al. (2010:58)
4. Calculating MPPM and the doubt ratio on return data of Hungarian 
absolute return investment funds
The MPPM and doubt ratio values calculated with the two different methods 
are compared here using data on absolute return funds traded in Hungary and 
denominated in HUF. 32 investment funds listed in Table 2 were picked for the 
analysis that are in the category of absolute return investment funds, denominated 
in HUF, public, open-end, and whose return data for the analysis period between 
28 April 2010 and 27 April 2017 were available on the website of the Association of 
Hungarian Investment Fund and Asset Management Companies (BAMOSZ) at the 
time when the data were downloaded, comprising a total of 56,832 daily returns. 
When choosing the analysis period, it was crucial that the sample cover a period 
without structural breaks and contain funds traded continuously until the date of 
download to ensure consistent comparisons. Since the analysis seeks to compare 
the Ingersoll and the Brown approach and not to measure the overall market 
performance in the segment of absolute return investment funds, any potential 
survivorship bias (the bias or overestimation of measured performance arising from 
the fact that only those funds are examined that operated from the beginning to 
the end of the period under review, so the results are not adjusted downwards by 
the poor performance of the funds that ceased operating in the meantime, Elton et 
al. 1996b) probably has a negligible effect on the comparison of the two methods 
on the sample.
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Table 2
The selected absolute return funds
No. Name of fund ISIN code of fund
1 Aberdeen Diversified Growth Fund of Funds Class “B” HU0000704549
2 Aberdeen Diversified Growth Fund of Funds Class “I” HU0000704556
3 Aegon Alfa Absolute Return Investment Fund HU0000703970
4 AEGON MoneyMaxx Expressz HU0000703145
5 Aegon ÓzonMaxx Total Return Investment Fund HU0000705157
6 AEGON Smart Money Investment Fund of Funds HU0000708169
7 Budapest Control Total Return Derivatives Fund HU0000702741
8 Citadella Derivative Investment Fund HU0000707948
9 Concorde Columbus Global Value Derivative Investment Fund HU0000705702
10 Concorde PB2 Fund of Funds HU0000704705
11 Concorde Rubicon Derivative Investment Fund HU0000707252
12 Concorde VM Absolute Derivative Investment Fund HU0000703749
13 Erste DPM Open-ended Alternative Fund of Funds HU0000705314
14 Erste Multistrategy Absolute Return Fund of Funds HU0000705322
15 Generali IPO Absolute Return Fund HU0000706791
16 Generali Spirit Absolute Derivative Fund HU0000706833
17 Generali Titanium Total Return Fund HU0000706817
18 OTP Absolute Return Open-ended Derivative Fund HU0000704457
19 OTP EMDA Derivative Fund HU0000706361
20 OTP G10 Euro Derivative Fund HU0000706221
21 OTP Supra Derivative Investment Fund HU0000706379
22 OTP New Europe Open-ended Securities Fund HU0000705827
23 Platina Alfa Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704648
24 Platina Beta Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704655
25 Platina Delta Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704671
26 Platina Gamma Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704663
27 Platina Pi Derivative Investment Fund HU0000704689
28 Raiffeisen Hozam Premium Derivative Fund HU0000703699
29 Raiffeisen Index Premium Derivative Fund HU0000703707
30 Raiffeisen Private Pannonia Fund of Funds HU0000705231
31 Sovereign PB Derivatives Fund HU0000707732
32 Takarek Total Return Investment Fund HU0000707997
Note: On 11 September 2017 Concorde Asset Management was renamed to HOLD Asset Management.
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4.1. Treatment of the risk-free rate
The risk-free rate used was the 12-month benchmark rate of the Government 
Debt Management Agency, because the return on these short-term government 
securities is risk-free and it also accurately reflects the major changes of the 
risk-free rate in the period under review. The MPPM was calculated taking into 
account the monthly changes in the 12-month benchmark rate. To calculate the 
daily continuously compounded risk-free rate for the given period, one has to take 
the value of the relevant monthly risk-free rate and transform with the logarithmic 
function the nominal annual return shown in the Government Debt Management 
Agency’s database with effective return calculation, then prorate it from the 
annualised return to daily return, for 250 trading days, using the following formula:
 




4.2. Treatment of the fund returns
The daily log returns can be determined by downloading the daily unit price data 










4.3. Determining MPPM values with the Ingersoll formula
The Ingersoll MPPM values need to be determined for ρ = 2, ρ = 3 and ρ = 4. In all 
three cases, first the return premium from the given period over the risk-free rate 
should be raised to the power of 1 – ρ to adjust the return ratio by the risk:
 








then the log of the average risk-adjusted return premium calculated for the whole 
period is divided by 1 – ρ:
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Finally, the value of Θ̂ calculated for the daily returns is annualised by multiplying 
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 Θ̂ estimates the risk-adjusted return premium of the investment fund. In other 
words, a given Θ̂ is the portfolio’s score that equals the continuously compounded 
and annualised return of a risk-free asset, exceeding the risk-free rate by Θ̂.
4.4. Determining MPPM values with the Brown formula
In the Brown approach, the MPPM can be stated as the difference between the 
average excess return and the variance of the excess return calculated from the 
sample, where the coefficient of the variance is (1 – ρ)/2.
Thus, to calculate the Brown MPPM, one first needs to calculate the average excess 
return by taking the log of the ratio of the daily return of the investment fund and 
the risk-free rate for each day:
 















In the Brown approach, the other building block is the calculation of the variance 
of the excess return calculated from the sample.
Finally, the difference between the two values is calculated for the three ρ’s (2, 3 
and 4), where the coefficient of variation is (1 – ρ)/2. The daily Θ̂ value derived in 






4.5. Comparison of the Ingersoll and Brown MPPM values and rankings
This is one of the first studies to compare the MPPM values calculated with the 
Ingersoll and the Brown formula. Very similar results were derived for the MPPM 
with respect to both the value of the measure and the ranking (Table 3, where, for 
example, “MPPM(3)” in the Ingersoll section means the MPPM value calculated 
with the Ingersoll formula and a risk aversion factor of 3, while “MPPM(3) rank” 
means the ranking of the fund calculated with the same formula). In quantifiable 
terms, this means that correlation is 1 for the MPPM values with a risk aversion 
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factor of 2, and around 0.9999 even with a parameter of 3 or 4. And the rank 
correlation takes a value of 1 even with a risk aversion factor of 2 or 4, exhibiting full 
consistency, while it is 0.9996 with a factor of 3, exhibiting almost full consistency, 
which means that out of the 32 funds under review, 30 received the same ranking 
calculated with the two approaches, and only two funds switch ranks. Out of the 96 
cases of the MPPM ranking of the 32 funds calculated with 3 different risk aversion 
factors, there were only 2 differences: therefore, consistency is 97.92 per cent for 
the two methods.
The percentage differences of the MPPM values derived from the two calculation 
methods are usually below 1 per cent (See Table 3 under “Ingersoll-Brown Δ%”). 
In the case of the OTP EMDA fund, there is a difference of 79.9 per cent with a risk 
aversion of 4, which is the greatest percentage difference, but this does not alter 
the ranking. This is partly because the MPPM values are very close to 0 (Ingersoll 
MPPM –0.0003, Brown MPPM –0.0005), thus the relatively small change in absolute 
value (the value of +0.0002 seen in the “Ingersoll-Brown Δ” section of Table 3 under 
MPPM(4)) means a large percentage change between the two calculation methods. 
On the other hand, compared to the relatively small change in absolute value, the 
MPPM value of the next-ranked investment fund is sufficiently far away.
When changing from the Ingersoll to the Brown formula and using a risk aversion 
factor of 3, the OTP Supra fund sticks out and switches places with the Concorde 
Columbus fund. While the Concorde Columbus values calculated with the two 
methods are identical to six decimal places for all risk aversion factors, in the 
case of the OTP Supra, the MPPM value increases by 2.66 per cent with a risk 
aversion factor of 3 when the Brown approach is used, which is the second greatest 
difference in absolute terms (0.0013). The change in the OTP Supra fund’s MPPM 
that also influences ranking is attributable to the fact that while this fund generates 
the second largest returns, and the standard deviation of its returns is the fourth 
greatest, based on the results, the Brown linear approximation of the MPPM 
penalises risk less than the Ingersoll approach. The switched ranking of the two 
funds is also due to the fact that with a risk aversion factor of 3 there is a relatively 
large difference between the two approaches in absolute terms, and compared to 
that the difference between the MPPM values of the two funds is relatively small.
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Table 3











MPPM(2) 0.0500 –0.0523 0.0435 0.0612
MPPM(3) 0.0486 –0.0544 0.0216 0.0475
MPPM(4) 0.0472 –0.0566 –0.0003 0.0330
MPPM(2) rank 6 32 8 2
MPPM(3) rank 5 31 10 6
MPPM(4) rank 5 31 16 7
Brown
MPPM(2) 0.0500 –0.0523 0.0435 0.0615
MPPM(3) 0.0486 –0.0542 0.0215 0.0488
MPPM(4) 0.0472 –0.0561 –0.0005 0.0361
MPPM(2) rank 6 32 8 2
MPPM(3) rank 6 31 10 5
MPPM(4) rank 5 31 16 7
Ingersoll-Brown Δ
MPPM(2) 8.10673E–07 –5.02266E–05 3.8088E–05 –0.000291847
MPPM(3) 1.65408E–06 –0.0002099 0.000122 –0.001266
MPPM(4) 2.51586E–06 –0.0004900 0.000243 –0.003065
MPPM(2) rank 0 0 0 0
MPPM(3) rank –1 0 0 1
MPPM(4) rank 0 0 0 0
Ingersoll-Brown Δ%
MPPM(2) 0.0016 0.0960 0.0875 –0.4768
MPPM(3) 0.0034 0.3860 0.5642 –2.6627
MPPM(4) 0.0053 0.8663 –79.92 –9.2836
Note: In the table, yellow denotes the cases where the rankings were switched when calculated with the 
Ingersoll and the Brown approach, while orange denotes the cases where the MPPM values differed 
substantially between the two methods (either in absolute value or relatively).
4.6. Comparison of the doubt ratio values calculated from the Ingersoll and the 
Brown MPPM and the Brown approximation
Until now, the doubt ratio has never been calculated in practice with the Ingersoll 
and the Brown formula to compare the results. The doubt ratio can be determined 
based on Brown et al. (2010) (3) by comparing the MPPM values calculated with 
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different risk aversion ratios and estimating the value of the implied risk aversion 




Θ̂Ingersoll 2( )−Θ̂Ingersoll 3( )
+2  (12)




Θ̂Brown 2( )−Θ̂Brown 3( )
+2  (13)
According to the Brown approximation, the doubt ratio can also be calculated as the 






The doubt ratio value is practically almost identical when calculated using the 
formula based on the Brown MPPM or the Brown approximation (to 13 decimal 
places); thus, the calculated ranking is also identical, and rank correlation and 
correlation take a value of 1, exhibiting full consistency. When calculating from the 
Ingersoll or the Brown MPPM (or using the Brown approximation), very similar 
results are obtained: the correlation and the rank correlation are 0.999. The doubt 
ratio ranking is identical with all three calculation methods in 29 cases out of the 
32 investment funds under review, representing 90.6 per cent of the funds.
Only two funds exhibited major differences in the doubt ratio values calculated 
with the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM (and the Brown approximation) (Table 4 
“DR(Ingersoll)-DR(Brown) Δ” and “DR(Ingersoll)-DR(Brown approximation) Δ”): 
OTP Supra and Sovereign PB Derivatives. The different values cause a change in 
ranking in only the latter case (Table 4 „DR(Ingersoll)-DR(Brown) rankingΔ”). The 
5.65 per cent change in the case of the OTP Supra fund is relatively small in absolute 
terms, and the subsequent doubt ratio value is sufficiently far away. However, the 
Sovereign PB Derivatives Fund is ranked two places lower in the Brown ranking 
than in the Ingersoll ranking, whereas the Raiffeisen Hozamprémium és Raiffeisen 
Indexprémium values that precede it are hardly modified, and there was no 
change in their relative ranking either. The change in ranking is ultimately caused 
by the major drop in value (–8.97 per cent) in the Sovereign PB Derivatives Fund, 
and the fact that the subsequent funds’ doubt ratio values are close enough to 
4  See formula (1).
5  See formula (2).
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enable a change in rankings. This fund exhibited the third largest MPPM change in 
absolute value and the fourth largest percentage change with a risk aversion factor 
of 3 when calculated with the Brown approach compared to the Ingersoll version 
(0.386 per cent), and the results show that the MPPM difference was magnified 
when transferred to the doubt ratio values (8.97 per cent).
4.7. Comparison of the Ingersoll and the Brown method based on practical 
applicability and the complexity of their implementation, proposal for the 
preferred method
The calculations showed the applicability and the difficulty of implementation as 
well as practical aspects of the differences between the methods in the case of 32 
Hungarian absolute return investment funds.
With respect to MPPM calculation, there is no major difference between the two 
approaches as regards difficulty or the necessary calculation steps. While the 
Ingersoll formula takes the average of the risk-adjusted return premia in the period, 
and then adjusts it with a logarithm and the risk aversion factor, the Brown approach 
calculates using the simple difference of the average excess returns in the period 
and the variance, where the risk aversion factor is included as the coefficient of 
variation. So the Brown approach uses an additional step when calculating the 
variance of excess returns, and this facilitates the better understanding of the 
logic behind the MPPM structure by quantifying risk. Since the Brown MPPM is 
a linear approximation of the more accurate Ingersoll MPPM, and according to the 
calculations there are differences between the two methods that influence ranking, 
the Ingersoll approach should be used to calculate MPPM. The calculation of the 
Brown MPPM or the steps necessary for that are recommended if the analysis also 
seeks to find out the average and standard deviation of excess return to ensure the 
better understanding of the correlations.
The calculation of the doubt ratio includes the same steps using both the Ingersoll 
and the Brown MPPM values (or the Brown approach to the doubt ratio); therefore, 
they require exactly the same effort. Taking into account the observed inaccuracy 
of the Brown MPPM formula arising from the linear approach, the doubt ratio can 
be more accurately calculated from the Ingersoll MPPM, and therefore the use of 
the latter is recommended.
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5. Summary, conclusions
The development of performance measures has managed to remedy the problems 
of earlier solutions, but in the case of the measures popular in the literature and 
used most widely today, the issue of performance manipulation still needs to 
be tackled. This article outlined the Ingersoll manipulation-proof performance 
measure, which solves this general problem when assessing investment funds and 
hedge funds. The Brown MPPM version was also described, which is the linear 
approximation of the Ingersoll measure. Furthermore, the doubt ratio developed by 
Brown et al. (2010) was presented, which can be used as a manipulation-detecting 
measure because it measures implied risk aversion. By using data from Hungarian 
absolute return funds for our own calculations, it was shown how the change in 
MPPM and implied risk aversion can be calculated in practice using the measures 
of the two groups of authors.
This was among the first comparisons of the MPPMs calculated with the two 
different methods, and the first in the case of the doubt ratio. It was shown that 
the results of the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM and doubt ratio almost completely 
overlap, and the reasons behind the small number of differences observed were 
examined.
In the case of the MPPM, the ranking is the same with both methods for all 
32 funds, using a risk aversion factor of 2 or 4. Only the risk aversion factor of 3 
produced differences, and even then 30 out of the 32 funds under review received 
the same ranking, with only two switching places when calculated with the different 
approaches. This is partly because with a risk aversion factor of 3, the difference 
between the MPPM values of the two funds is relatively small, whichever method 
is used. On the other hand, one of the two funds concerned has the second largest 
returns and the fourth largest standard deviation of returns, while the other has 
average values in terms of both, and the results attest that the Brown linear 
approximation of the MPPM penalises risk less than the Ingersoll approach.
When calculating the doubt ratio from the Ingersoll and the Brown MPPM (and 
using the Brown approximation), very similar results are derived, the correlation 
and the rank correlation are 0.999. The ranking is identical with all three calculation 
methods in 29 cases out of the 32 investment funds under review, representing 
90.6 per cent of the funds. The difference is attributable to the fact that a huge 
drop in value is observed in the case of one fund between the Ingersoll and the 
Brown approach, and the subsequent funds’ doubt ratio values are also relatively 
close, while their values are not significantly modified, and they retain their relative 
ranking. This fund exhibited the third largest MPPM change in absolute value and 
the fourth largest percentage change with a risk aversion factor of 3 when calculated 
with the Brown approach compared to the Ingersoll version (–0.386 per cent), and 
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the results show that the MPPM difference was magnified when transferred to the 
doubt ratio values (8.97 per cent).
The results of the calculation led to the following conclusions:
1.  The Brown linear approximation of the MPPM penalises risk less than the Ingersoll 
approach.
2.  The larger changes in the MPPM values observed between the Ingersoll and 
the Brown approach are usually magnified when transferred to the doubt ratio 
calculated from them.
3.  A change in ranking between the two methods is seen for both the MPPM and 
the doubt ratio if the observed change is large enough and the values of the 
funds ranked near the fund concerned are close enough to its values, so that this 
change in value affects ranking.
4.  Since there is no significant difference between the Ingersoll and the Brown 
MPPM calculation as regards difficulty or the number of steps required, and 
since the Brown approach, the inaccuracy of which sometimes alters the ranking, 
is merely a linear approximation of the Ingersoll MPPM, the MPPM calculation 
is recommended to be performed using the more accurate Ingersoll approach. 
However, the Brown method may be useful for analysis purposes when calculating 
the average and standard deviation of excess return.
5.  This first comparison showed that the doubt ratio can be more accurately 
calculated from the Ingersoll MPPM, therefore the use of this approach is 
recommended.
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Performance Measurement of Active 
Investment Strategies Using Pure Factor 
Portfolios*
Máté Fain – Helena Naffa 
The article uses pure factor portfolios formed by multivariate cross-sectional 
regressions to examine whether these active investment strategies could achieve 
excess return relative to passive strategies. The hypothesis can also be construed as 
a test of market efficiency. The study includes ten style factors. Our empirical study 
shows that a consensus buy strategy of the pure value factor yielded significant 
positive excess returns in the past almost 20 years. Size and momentum factors 
characterised in the literature by positive excess return are not significant in our 
study. Excess return of the factors capturing riskiness (earnings variability, volatility, 
leverage) is significant and negative, which corroborates with our expectations, 
rendering a consensus sell investment strategy successful, based on these factors. 
The profitability, growth and trading activity factors produced results contrary to 
our expectations; therefore, excess return could have been achieved via a contrarian 
selling strategy. Our research results are consistent with the weak form of market 
efficiency analyses.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G11, G12, G14, G15.
Keywords: equity markets, asset pricing, return, pure factor portfolio, multivariate 
regression, performance measurement, market efficiency
1. Introduction
The active professionals engaged with financial investments and scientific 
researchers have always been intrigued by the question how to forecast and 
interpret the fair expected return of securities reflecting risk1 and ultimately equity 
prices.2 The various capital market theories and applications devised in past decades 
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
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1  There is a major difference between expected return and the required rate of return, which should be borne 
in mind. See, for example, Fernandez (2015) and Fernandez – Acín (2015).
2  More precisely, investors are interested in total return, comprising the sum of dividend yield and price 
changes. In this study, return always means total return.
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focused on identifying the various factors influencing returns and on establishing 
a significant link between expected return and risk.
How has financial and investment thinking changed over the last roughly 50 years? 
The analytical framework of stocks’ intrinsic value emerged in the 1930s. The major 
methodological tomes are attributable to Williams3 and Graham – Dodd4 (Malkiel 
2001). Modern finance was born and consolidated in the 1950s and 1960s. This 
period was characterised by economists and their theories such as the modern 
portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952) or the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). Contemporary thinking featured 
rational investors, efficient markets from an information perspective (see Fama 
1970) and approaches that interpreted the development of returns as random walk.
Around the 1970s, the belief that markets are probably not “that” efficient as 
previously supposed, and that investors do not always behave rationally slowly 
became accepted in financial thinking.5 The assumptions and conclusions of the 
CAPM were increasingly questioned; in response, multifactor models started to 
dominate (see the Arbitrage Pricing Theory by Ross 1976). The literature usually 
attributes the spread and popularisation of the multifactor models to Fama – 
French. By now, researchers in the field have identified roughly one hundred factors 
that could explain returns. In any case, it is not easy to decide which of these 
can be deemed significant in this universe of factors, both statistically and from 
the perspective of practical interpretability. Cochrane (2011) aptly referred to this 
multitude as a factor zoo.
Our study uses pure factor portfolios formed by multivariate cross-sectional 
regressions to examine whether these active investment strategies could achieve 
excess return relative to passive strategies. The hypothesis of the paper can also be 
regarded as a test of market efficiency. The universe of the analysis comprises the 
equity market of the United States between 2000 and 2018, while the benchmark 
is the Russell 3000 Index. The indicators used for assessing the performance of the 
factors are Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio.
The sections below first describe the major studies criticising the capital asset 
pricing model and the efficient market theory and also present the market pricing 
anomalies (Section 2). After the anomalies, the focus shifts to various multifactor 
models explaining returns, mainly the works of Fama and French (Section 3). After 
reviewing the literature, studies are presented that used pure factor portfolios to 
3  The Theory of Investment Value
4  Security Analysis
5  This is the period of the emergence of behavioural finance, the foundations of which were laid down by 
Kahneman and Tversky with their seminal work published in 1979 (Prospect Theory).
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analyse various returns (Sections 4 and 5). Before turning towards the empirical 
part of the paper (Section 7) the database used is described in detail (Section 6). 
Section 8 summarises the main messages of the paper.
2. Market anomalies
Before starting with the detailed discussion of market anomalies, it must be 
underlined that testing market efficiency and quantifying the risk-adjusted abnormal 
rate of return of equity investments is basically identical to testing the widely-used 
pricing models (mostly the CAPM). According to Chien-Ting (1999), the anomalies 
related to CAPM as a benchmark may have three main reasons: 1) measurement 
errors, 2) unrealistic assumptions of the model, and 3) model specification errors.
The methodological and measurement errors include inaccurate measurement 
of the model variables, such as risk-free return, the beta and the market risk 
premium, since the theoretical CAPM does not provide practical guidance for 
their calculation.6 The most often cited flawed assumptions include the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). Model specification errors are grounded in statistics. 
They include, for example, the omitted variables bias. The presence of these errors 
does not (necessarily) mean that markets are not efficient, “merely” that not all 
the explanatory factors have been taken into account.
According to the classification by Chien-Ting, the use of pure factor portfolios is 
intended to address model specification errors in the first place and measurement 
errors in the second place. Nonetheless, the modelling takes into account the claim 
by Damodaran (2012) that if the outcome of an analysis explaining returns is not 
sensitive to various model specifications, it is much more likely that it is due to the 
lack of market efficiency rather than a model specification error.
It follows from the above that one of the key conditions of the CAPM is the existence 
of perfect (competitive) markets (see Lintner 1965:22). However, perfect markets 
assume market efficiency. At the same time, efficient markets do not necessarily 
have to be perfect (Kasper 1997). In practical terms, this means that if the conditions 
of efficient market theory are violated, the presumptions of the CAPM regarding 
perfect markets do not hold. In recent decades, several studies have been conducted 
on market anomalies that seem at first glance to violate the assumptions on 
market efficiency. Some of these market anomalies are highlighted below (without 
attempting to be exhaustive). The next subsection presents multifactor models 
that use some of these factors to explain returns. Everyday trading and portfolio 
optimisation (searching for alpha) based on the anomalies described here can be 
regarded as different styles of investment.
6  The assumption that the beta and the market risk premium are constant over time is also untenable.
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The momentum effect can be briefly summarised as follows: the current good 
performance will be followed by good performance, while the current poor 
performance will be followed by poor performance. Statistically speaking, a positive 
autocorrelation can be observed between subsequent returns. The real question in 
connection with the anomaly is time: how long does the momentum last? Fama and 
Blume (1966) examined the presence of positive autocorrelation on daily returns, 
integrating the filter technique from Alexander’s 1964 work. Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) and Conrad and Kaul (1988) analysed weekly returns. The essence of their 
conclusion is that although there is some positive autocorrelation, it is not sufficient 
to generate significant profit. The paper by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) used 
a longer period. The authors found the momentum factor to be significant over 
a time horizon of 3–12 months. The 2001 article by the same authors confirms their 
observations from 1993.
One phenomenon closely linked to momentum is the reversal (adjustment) effect. 
This assumes negative autocorrelation, meaning that markets tend to penalise 
former “winner” stocks and reward “loser” stocks after some time: in other 
words, markets have a tendency to overreact. Among others, De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985 and 1987), Howe (1986) and Brown and Harlow (1988) examined market 
overreaction and concluded that reversal can be seen in the long run, over years. 
According to the findings of De Bondt and Thaler, the originally “loser” portfolio 
outperformed the earlier “winner” 36 months later, by approximately 25 per cent. 
Howe found that stocks that achieved large gains performed below the market by 
30 per cent one year after the good news. Overall, the momentum factor seems to 
be relevant in the short run, and the reversal effect seems to exist in the long run.7
The size effect, which is also referred to as small-firm effect, was originally described 
by Banz (1981). The essence of this anomaly is that the return that can be achieved 
by small firms is significantly higher than the risk-adjusted fair return. Banz 
performed the analysis on a large sample: the database contained the companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange for at least five years between 1926 and 
1975. His research shows that the largest difference was seen in the case of the 
smallest firms (hence the name “small-firm effect”). Several papers have attempted 
to explain the reasons for excess returns. Some of these treat small enterprises as 
firms neglected by large portfolio managers (“neglected firm effect”), which allows 
them to achieve higher risk-adjusted returns (Carvell – Strebel 1987; Arbel et al. 
1983). Yet a study from 1990 (Beard – Sias 1997) concluded that the neglected 
firm effect did not exist anymore. Other studies (see Reinganum 1983, Ritter 1988) 
emphasized tax considerations at the beginning and the end of the year, which led 
to the finding that the size effect exists “only” in January (January effect).
7  “Mean reversion” is a concept closely linked to momentum and the reversal effect. See De Bondt– Thaler 
(1989).
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The value factor helps to identify corporate fundamentals that can significantly 
determine value, thus making it possible to recognise undervalued and overvalued 
stocks. Widely-used value factors include the price/earnings ratio (P/E), its inverse, 
the earnings yield ratio (E/P), the price to book value ratio (P/BV) and dividend yield 
(DIV/P). The empirical findings of Basu (1977, 1983) confirmed the belief widely held 
among investors that securities with a low P/E ratio (or high E/P ratio) are undervalued 
and may generate excess returns. Fama and French (1992) showed that the firms 
listed on the NYSE, the AMEX and the NASDAQ with a high BV/P ratio between 1963 
and 1990 generated substantial excess returns compared to the companies with a low 
BV/P ratio. Rosenberg et al. (1985), Chan et al. (1991) and Capaul et al. (1993) have 
basically the same conclusions for different periods and markets.
Regarding value factors, the paper of Robert Novy-Marx (2013) should also be 
mentioned, who argues for the explanatory power of a somewhat different 
profitability factor. According to the author, the gross margin8 is an appropriate 
alternative to BV/P, as the criticism against the explanatory power of the book 
value-to-price ratio are not relevant here (see, for example, the critiques against 
Fama and French 1992). He justifies this by stating that profitable firms have lower 
operating leverage, and therefore positive corporate cash flows are more stable 
and sustainable on the long run.
Another interesting and relatively new topic is the low volatility or low beta 
anomaly. The essence of this anomaly is that companies with high volatility (beta) 
significantly underperform low-risk (beta) investments. Baker et al. (2011) underline 
that the results are not entirely new, but earlier authors have not emphasised the 
importance of this phenomenon enough. Others reach a similar conclusion, see, 
for example, Frazzini – Pedersen (2014), Ang et al. (2006, 2009), Blitz and van Vliet 
(2007), Bali et al. (2011).
3. Multifactor models
The multifactor models most often cited in the literature are associated with the 
works of Fama and French (FF).9 Of course, there are other important studies in 
the literature not just those of FF. One should mention Barr Rosenberg, who was 
one of the first to focus on factor models, both on a theoretical and a practical 
implementation level. Rosenberg (1974) laid down the statistical foundations of 
8  The difference between net sales and the cost of goods sold.
9  The methodological background to the early works by Fama and French is provided by Fama – MacBeth 
(1973). The most important methodological messages of the paper should be briefly summarised, 
particularly because several subsequent analyses used this technique, including the study by Chen et al. 
(1986:394) presented below. First, the returns of the selected stocks have to be explained by the selected 
risk factors, which yields the beta parameter associated with the risk factors. Second, the returns have to 
be regressed again, but this time with the betas derived in the first step. The result of the second regression 
is the risk premium of the factors.
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multifactor models. Later, together with his colleagues, he also performed empirical 
analyses, in which he dedicated great attention to industries and to the financial 
statements’ data (see, for example, Rosenberg – McKibben 1973; Rosenberg – Guy 
1976). Another often quoted work is Carhart (1997), which expands the three-factor 
model by Fama – French (1996) with the momentum factor. From the Central and 
Eastern European region, one could mention Zaremba – Konieczka (2017), Berlinger 
– Walter (1999) or Naffa (2009).
Chen et al. (1986) identified several macroeconomic factors, such as industrial 
production, expected and unexpected inflation changes, unexpected changes in 
bond risk premia and term premia, which may influence expected return. Using 
the two-stage Fama – MacBeth regression technique presented above, they found 
that industrial production, unexpected inflation and the excess return on bonds 
have significant explanatory power.
Fama and French (1992) explained returns by making two statements, which caused 
huge turmoil among academics and practitioners. First, the authors found that the 
returns between 1963 and 1990 were considerably influenced by two variables: size 
and the BV/P ratio. According to the relationship between returns and explanatory 
variables, the investments with a high BV/P ratio and relatively small size performed 
better, yielding higher returns. The authors’ second conclusion, which sparked 
greater turmoil, was that there was no relationship between systematic risk, or 
the beta, and returns (the beta was statistically insignificant). This was worrying 
news with respect to the applicability of the CAPM.
In an article published a few years later (1996), Fama and French introduced an 
asset pricing technique to the academic community that later became known as the 
three-factor model. The title of the paper (Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing 
Anomalies) is “talkative” in the sense that the authors were looking for explanations 
on the risk-adjusted excess returns that cannot be explained by the CAPM. They 
argued that besides the market portfolio, two further explanatory variables should 
be used to capture the observed anomalies: the difference between the return on 
a portfolio of small and large stocks (size factor, SMB) and the difference between the 
return on a portfolio with a high BV/P value and a low BV/P value (value factor, HML).
The authors have recently (Fama – French 2015) added two further factors to their 
earlier model, namely the profitability (citing Novy-Marx 2013) and the investment 
variables. The variables were defined in line with the approach used in the three-
factor model. The profitability variable was represented by the difference between 
the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks with robust and weak profitability 
(RMW). The investment variable (CMA) expressed the difference between 
the returns on portfolios of the stocks of the companies with conservative and 
aggressive investment strategies.
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4. Pure factor portfolios in the literature
Several recent studies (Menchero 2010; Menchero – Lee 2015; Clarke et al. 2017; 
Menchero – Ji 2017) have pointed out the statistical shortcomings of earlier models 
explaining returns. The articles cited draw attention to the significance of pure factor 
portfolios. Pure factors have the advantage that the effects of other factors do not 
influence them, so pure factors correlate best with the given factor but not with the 
others (thus multicollinearity is eliminated). From a mathematical perspective, pure 
factor portfolios are based on multivariate cross-sectional regression. According to 
Clarke et al. (2017:27): “… pure factor portfolios are rebalanced [at regular intervals] 
to have exposures of exactly zero to all but the primary factor of interest. […] The 
security weights of the pure portfolios are based on multivariate Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) regressions.”
The definition of pure factors is consistent with multifactor APT models and with the 
expectations of modelling. On the basis of the definition by Bodie et al. (2011:331), 
a factor portfolio is:10 “… a well-diversified portfolio constructed to have a beta of 1 
on one of the factors and a beta of 0 on any other factor. We can think of a factor 
portfolio as a tracking portfolio.”
Menchero – Lee (2015:71-72) classify factor portfolios into three main groups: 
(1) simple factor portfolios that can be captured methodologically through 
simple regression; (2) pure factor portfolios where the best approach is to use 
multivariate regressions; (3) minimum-volatility factor portfolios that are based 
on the optimisation of expected return and variance. In the following, the focus is 
on pure factor portfolios (2), but before that a brief summary is provided on the 
shortcomings of simple factor portfolios to demonstrate how pure factors achieve 
great enhancement.
The main drawback of simple factor portfolios is that they may accidentally reflect 
the effects of other factors, thus taking unnecessary risk into the portfolio, without 
improving expected performance. Menchero – Lee (2015:73) illustrate the distortion 
by the following examples: if stocks with a positive momentum also have a higher 
beta, the momentum factor has a positive exposure to the beta factor. In a similar 
fashion, if energy stocks have been performing well recently, the simple momentum 
factor assigns too much weight to the energy sector (relative to the benchmark). 
To put it simply, it does not show the real risk–return ratio.
The use of pure factors makes multicollinearity manageable, due to multivariate 
regression models. Menchero – Ji (2017) refer to the Bloomberg Global Equity 
10  For more details on factor portfolios and their role in determining returns, see, for example, Lovas (2017).
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Model, where the pure factor returns are calculated from the regression of the 
return of a given equity on four core factors. These are as follows: market - (M), 
country - (c), industry (i) and investment style (s). The formula is the following:
 rn = rM +ΣcXncrc +Σ i Xniri +Σ sXnsrs +un . (1)
In the above equation, “rn” is the expected return of the given stock n, “rM” is the 
expected return of the market factor, “Xnc” is the exposure of the given n stock 
to the country factor c and “rc” denotes the expected return of the given country 
factor c.11 The other factors can be interpreted in a similar fashion: “Xni” and “ri” are 
the exposure to the industry i and the expected return, respectively, while “Xns” 
and “rs” is the exposure to the given style s and the expected return. “un” is the 
idiosyncratic return of the given stock n. The individual stock-specific returns are 
assumed not to correlate with each other or the individual factors.
Equation (1) shows that stocks have a unit exposure to the market factor. Exposure 
to the country and industry factors is measured with dummy variables, so the 
particular stock has a unit exposure to its own country and industry, but zero 
to any other country and industry. Exposure to style factors can be measured 
by the standardised values of the given factor (for example P/E). As a result of 
standardisation, if the stock’s exposure to the appropriate style factor is positive, 
the given stock has above-average value for the corresponding style.
Menchero and Ji (2017) present an example of the logic behind pure factors, using 
Bloomberg Global Equity Model data from 31 January 2016. Table 1 contains the 
weighting scheme of various factor portfolios, with respect to different segments 
of the global equity markets.12 In the second column, the table is supplemented 
with the weights of the (global) market portfolio.
11  In factor modelling, the reference to “factors” can often be ambiguous. The difference between factor 
exposure and factor return should be emphasised. Factor exposure often covers obvious characteristics of 
individual stocks, such as a specific industry or country. By contrast, the factor return is the return that can 
be derived from the analysed factor exposure (using the appropriate mathematical apparatus).
12  The table is just an extract, therefore it does not contain all the country, industry and investment style 
factors.
60 Studies
Máté Fain – Helena Naffa 
Table 1
Bloomberg Global Equity Model, 31 Jan 2016











World (net) 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Long 100.00% 105.19% 61.25% 93.46% 108.69% 40.18%
Short 0.00% –5.19% –61.25% –93.46% –108.69% –40.18%
US (net) 39.55% 39.55% 60.45% –39.55% 0.00% 0.00%
Long 39.55% 39.65% 60.45% 0.07% 15.75% 9.52%
Short 0.00% –0.09% 0.00% –39.62% –15.75% –9.52%
Japan (net) 8.36% 8.36% –8.36% 91.64% 0.00% 0.00%
Long 8.36% 9.32% 0.02% 91.64% 26.25% 4.42%
Short 0.00% –0.97% –8.38% 0.00% –26.25% –4.42%
Auto (net) 2.93% 2.93% 0.00% 0.00% 97.07% 0.00%
Long 2.93% 3.11% 0.98% 4.94% 97.07% 1.24%
Short 0.00% –0.18% –0.98% –4.94% 0.00% –1.24%
US Auto (net) 0.38% 0.43% 0.87% –0.97% 11.98% 0.10%
Long 0.38% 0.43% 0.87% 0.00% 11.98% 0.18%
Short 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –0.97% 0.00% –0.08%
Japan Auto (net) 0.99% 0.89% –0.19% 4.94% 26.25% 0.09%
Long 0.99% 0.94% 0.01% 4.94% 26.25% 0.33%
Short 0.00% –0.04% –0.20% 0.00% 0.00% –0.23%
Source: Menchero – Ji (2017:6)
The third column of the table shows that the market factor portfolio contains 
100 per cent net long positions. The other factor portfolios are strictly dollar-neutral. 
The Japanese factor portfolio is 100 per cent long for the Japanese market, and 
100 per cent short for the market portfolio. Nevertheless, in the market portfolio, 
the Japanese market has a net share of 8.36 per cent, therefore combining the 
values of the two positions, a net long weight of 91.46 per cent is derived for the 
Japanese market (and by analogy, all other markets have a net short weight of 
91.46 per cent). The Japanese factor portfolio is industry-neutral, so a net weight of 
zero is shown for all industries (this table only presents the auto industry). Similarly, 
the Japanese factor is style-neutral (but the table does not contain this).
The industry pure factor portfolios can be interpreted in a similar fashion: they take 
a 100 per cent long position in the given industry (auto industry), and a 100 per 
cent short position in the market portfolio. Since in this case the auto industry has 
a share of 2.93 per cent in the market portfolio, the auto industry’s overall net long 
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weight is 97.07 per cent (and similarly, all other industries have a net short weight 
of 97.07 per cent). The industry factor is country- and investment style-neutral.
As a practical example, let us assume a global portfolio investor (Menchero – Ji 
2017:7) who would also like to invest in the Japanese market, generally expecting 
a bull market, but does not wish to commit to any investment style, industry or 
any other variable; the only thing that matters is the country factor. If the investor 
purchased the Japanese market portfolio, the share of the car industry within 
the portfolio would be 11.84 per cent,13 in contrast to 2.93 per cent in the global 
portfolio, so the auto industry would be overweighted. However, pure factor 
portfolios eliminate this shortcoming by appropriately separating the true sources 
of returns. In other words, by purchasing the global market portfolio and the pure 
Japanese country factor portfolio, the portfolio takes a 100 per cent long position 
in Japanese investments, zero net weight in other countries, and it is industry- and 
investment style-neutral.
In their paper, Clarke et al. (2017) analysed the monthly returns of 1,000 US stocks 
between 1967 and 2016 for six different factors: 1) value (E/P); 2) momentum; 
3) size; 4) low volatility (low beta); 5) profitability; 6) bond beta. The latter is to take 
into account the effects of market interest rates on equity markets and the factors. 
The key message of the study is methodological in the sense that the authors 
point out the necessity of using pure factors. They argue that the Fama–MacBeth 
regression framework can function truly well if the explanatory factors are regularly 
adjusted to filter out secondary effects. They do not wish to identify new factors, 
but 50 years’ worth of data offer some interesting results. For example, the excess 
return of the pure value factor over the market return has been diminishing in 
the past 15 years. Similar developments could be observed in the case of the 
momentum factor, after it became increasingly popular in the 1990s.
5. Methodological framework of factor portfolios14
Factor returns are usually quantified by cross-sectional regressions. The given factor 
is represented using a portfolio replicating it. Factor-replicating portfolios can be 
formed in two ways: 1) using simple factor portfolios through simple regressions, 
2) using pure factor portfolios through multivariate regressions. The shortcomings 
of simple factor portfolios have already been mentioned, but they are an important 
starting point from a methodological perspective. First, the simple regression 
calculation methodology of factor returns associated with investment styles, and 
13  Within the global portfolio, the Japanese car industry’s market share is 0.99 per cent, whereas the entire 
Japanese market’s share is 8.36 per cent. The ratio of the two is 11.84 per cent.
14  This methodological description is based on Menchero (2010), Mechero – Ji (2017) and Clarke et al. (2017).
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country and industry factors15 is presented. After the univariate case, multivariate 
regressions are briefly described.
A simple regression is written for the return of the simple factors of investment 
styles:
 rn = rW + Xnsrs +un , (2)
where “rn” is the expected return of the given stock n, “rW” is the intercept, “Xns” is 
the exposure of the given stock n to the style s, “rs” is the return of the given style 
factor s and “un” is the company-specific return. All stocks have a unit exposure to 
the intercept, which may be called the global factor.16 Factor returns (rs) should be 
estimated on a sample of sufficient size.
In order to reduce the estimation errors of factor returns, the appropriate weighting 
should be used. One possible (but not the only) calculation method uses the square 
root of the capitalisation of stocks:
 Σnvn =1 , (3)
where “vn” is the square root of the capitalisation of the given stock n, in proportion 
to the root of the total capitalisation of the investment universe under review. The 
total of the ratios gives 1.
Since the exposures to the given investment style s are standardised, the expected 
value calculated with the regression weights is zero:
 ΣnvnXns = 0 .   (4)
Due to standardisation, the given factor has a unit standard deviation calculated 
with regression weights:
 ΣnvnXns2 =1 .  (5)
Using the equations seen above, the following equation can be written for the 
return of the style factor:
 rs = Σn vnXns( )rn , (6)
where “rs” is the return of the factor portfolio with a weight of “vnXns”. From 
a practical perspective, the simple style factor portfolio takes a long position 
for the stocks with a positive exposure, and a short position for the stocks with 
a negative exposure, taking a proportionately greater position in the stocks with 
15  From a methodological perspective, factors measured on a continuous scale (that are typically standardised) 
are differentiated from those represented by dummy variables.
16  Assuming a global investor.
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a larger regression weight. The portfolio is dollar-neutral, since the weights add up 
to 0. The style factor portfolio has a unit exposure to the given style (the sum of 
the products of the weights vnXns and the exposure Xns is 1).
The regression equation of the grouping factors measured with dummy variables 
is as follows:
 rn = rW +ΣgXngrg +un , (7)
where “Xng” measures the exposure of the given stock n to the grouping factor g 
(0,1) and “rg” is the factor return for the given grouping factor g. The interpretation 
of the other variables is similar to formula (2).
Equation (7) contains clear multicollinearity (the sum of the industries equals the 
global portfolio), therefore the following constraint is introduced to ensure the 
applicability of the regression:
 ΣgWgrg = 0 .   (8)
As the formula shows, the sum of the market value-weighted factor returns is 0 
(“Wg” means the market weight of the given group). Using equation (8), the simple 









where “Vg” is the regression weight of the given group g.
In the case of the factors measured with dummy variables, the global factor 
contains only long positions. All groups are weighted by market value, but within 
the particular groups, the individual stocks are weighted by the regression weights. 





Σn∈g vnrn( )− rW , (10)
where “rW” can be interpreted based on formula (9). Let us see an example for 
the content of formula (10): simple country factor portfolios take a long position 
in the country portfolio using regression weights and a short position in the global 
portfolio.
Pure factor portfolios require multivariate regression calculations. Here formula 
(1) can be repeated:
 rn = rw +ΣcXncrc +Σ i Xniri +Σ sXnsrs +un .  (11)
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The model uses regression weights in proportion to the square root of the given 
stocks’ market capitalisation. All stocks have unit exposure to the global portfolio 
as well as the corresponding country, industry and investment style portfolio (the 
exposure is zero in all other cases). The idiosyncratic returns are uncorrelated with 
each other and the factors. The model handles the problem of multicollinearity 
as described above. Menchero (2010), citing Ruud (2000), determines the factor 
returns using the weighted least squares (WLS) method as follows:
 rk = ΣcΩnkrn , (12)
where “Ωnk” denotes the weight of the given stock n within the given pure factor 
portfolio k.
6. Methodology of the empirical analysis and the database used
The empirical section of the study compares the performance of the factors and the 
market portfolio, raising several important methodological questions: Which are 
the most widespread performance measures in the literature and in the investment 
industry? What statistical and mathematical tools and assumptions are required to 
appropriately calculate the performance measures? We attempt to answer these 
questions in the following.
There are many performance measures for assessing investments: Eling and 
Schuhmacher (2007), and Farinelli et al. (2008) give an excellent summary of 
the topic. The present article does not intend to explore the whole universe of 
performance measures; nevertheless, two widely used indicators were selected, 
namely Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio. The alpha is to find out whether 
the given factor outperformed the market portfolio or not. The Sharpe ratio also 
measures excess returns, but it takes into account total risk.
The alpha by Michael C. Jensen (1968) shows the excess return over the CAPM. The 
calculations are performed as follows:
 Alfait = rit − rft +βi ⋅ rMt − rft( )( ) , (13)
where “rit” is the return of the given factor i, “rft” is the risk-free return, “βi” is the 
market risk and “rMt – rft” is the market risk premium for given time t. The beta is 








where “CoviM” is the covariance between the returns of the given factor i and the 
market portfolio (M) and “VarM” is the variance of the return of the market portfolio.
rk = ΣcΩnkrn
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The Sharpe ratio was described by William F. Sharpe in his 1966 article.17 When 
calculated, it shows how the excess return of the given portfolio over the risk-free 






where “rit – rft” is the excess return of the given factor portfolio i over the risk-free 
investment at a given time t, and “σit” is the standard deviation of the risk premium 
of the given factor portfolio i at time t.
The excess return is tested using regression models. The idea is to first explain 
the performance of the pure factors (dependent variables) one by one by the 
performance of the market portfolio (explanatory variable). From the perspective 
of the analysis, the key is the constant parameter of the regression equations (β0): 
if it significantly differs from zero, the given factor delivers excess returns. The 
regression equations logic is as follows: the explanatory variables are the log return 
and the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, while the dependent variables are the 
log return and Sharpe ratio of the given factor.
Before beginning the test of the performance metrics, the type of regressions has 
to be specified. This issue is fundamentally influenced by the behaviour of returns 
and the error terms characterising the Sharpe ratio time series: if the error terms are 
homoscedastic and are not autocorrelated, a simple OLS regression can be used.18 
If these requirements are not met, the ARCH-GARCH regression models created 
for financial time series analysis are used. Autocorrelation is assessed using Engle’s 
so-called “ARCH effects” test, while the disturbing heteroscedasticity is checked 
using the Breusch–Pagan test.
It is important to note that the GARCH models are used even if the particular 
regression will be OLS-based in the end, since the volatility in the denominator of 
the Sharpe ratio or the beta parameter necessary for the calculation of Jensen’s 
alpha are not constant over time, and thus conditional variances and covariances 
are required. The usefulness of GARCH models is that they make volatility and 
covariance dynamic, which thus allow performance measures to be dynamic and 
our hypotheses to be adequately tested. The analysis uses simple GARCH and DCC 
GARCH models, the methodological background for which can be found in Bollerslev 
(1986) and Engle (1982; 2002).
17  Sharpe originally called it the “reward-to-variability” ratio; it started to be referred to as the Sharpe ratio 
only later, in his honour.
18  There are further requirements of the OLS regression models, without which the least squares method 
cannot be BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator). For more details, see, for example, Wooldridge (2013).
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Testing the performance of factor returns requires reliable data. The factor portfolios 
and the returns of the market index are taken from the Bloomberg database. The 
downloaded time series cover roughly the past two decades, so they include the 
weekly log returns between 4 January 2000 and 10 December 2018 for the US 
equity markets. The weekly log returns include the market portfolio and ten pure 
factor portfolios. Using the Pure Factor Returns function of the Bloomberg Factors 
to Watch (FTW), the pure factor portfolios are rebalanced on a weekly basis. The 
ten pure factor portfolios are listed in Table 2.
Table 2
Pure factor portfolios used in the empirical analysis
Name Acronym Name Acronym
Value V Volatility Vol
Size S Dividend D
Profitability P Growth G
Trading activity TA Leverage L
Earnings variability EV Momentum Mom
The size factor in the table focuses on large enterprises. If the direction is reversed, 
the size factor represents the performance of small firms, so the signs regarding 
performance are also reversed. The empirical analysis takes into account this feature 
of the model. The factors were chosen because the relevant studies mostly focus 
on these investment styles, as already shown in the literature review.19
The market portfolio regarded as the benchmark during the analysis is the market 
value-weighted Russell 3000 Index, which covers the 3,000 US listed companies 
with the largest capitalisation. The enterprises in the Index cover roughly 98 per 
cent of the entire American equity market. Figure 1 shows the Russell 3000 Index 
between 2000 and 2018.
19  The definitions of the pure factor portfolios used by Bloomberg and the corresponding calculation methods 
are described in the Annex.
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The figure distinguishes two periods. The first lasts from early 2000 until 2009 Q1, 
and it is referred to as the “crisis period”. The dot-com bubble burst at the beginning 
of the millennium, and then 2007 saw the subprime mortgage crisis in the United 
States, which quickly became a global economic crisis. By March 2009, the market 
hit rock bottom, which was followed by an approximately 10-year recovery, albeit 
with “minor” economic downturns. Therefore, the period after March 2009 is 
referred to as the years of “recovery”.
Of course, the time series could be broken down into shorter phases. In the period 
referred to here as the crisis, an adjustment was observed between 2002 and 2007. 
And the recovery between 2009 and 2018 was interrupted by the occurrence of 
the Greek debt crisis around 2010 and by the tumbling oil prices between 2014 
and 2016, which precipitated the Russian financial crisis. However, in line with 
the analysis purposes of this paper and for reasons of brevity, it is sufficient to 
distinguish the aforementioned two larger periods, so that the performance of 
the factors can be analysed in the entire period and examined with various “price 
regimes”, to test whether there is a difference in factor performance in a “crisis” 
(between 2000 and early 2009) and the years of the “recovery”.
Before turning to the empirical findings, it is assessed whether the conditions of 
the applicability of the GARCH and DCC GARCH regression models are met. First, 
the log returns of pure factor portfolios and the market index are analysed, as these 
are the input for calculating Jensen’s alpha, and the GARCH model is also sought 
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to be used for calculating the volatility in the denominator of the Sharpe ratio.20 
After the log returns, the behaviour of the GARCH regressions is evaluated on the 
Sharpe ratios’ time series.
20  It has already been noted that when using the GARCH models, the aim is often not to draw traditional 
regression conclusions but to model conditional variance (volatility).
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  Note: See Table 2.
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Figure 2 shows the weekly log returns of the Russell 3000 Index and the ten 
pure factor portfolios between 2000 and 2018. The log returns allow an intuitive 
examination of the clustering of volatility. Most factors clearly exhibit volatility 
clustering (the two major crises were indicated with darker shading). At the 
beginning of the period under review, between 2000 and 2002, returns typically 
fluctuated widely (dot-com bubble), which was followed by a lull, then 2008 and 
2009 once again saw extraordinary volatility (global economic meltdown). The past 
roughly ten years were again calmer.
If the applicability of the GARCH models is sought to be examined in a more 
formalised framework, Engle’s Lagrange multiplier (LM) test should be performed 
(“ARCH effects” test). Table 3 summarises the test results.
Table 3
Engle’s ARCH effect test for market portfolio’s and pure factor portfolios’ returns
with 3 weeks lag
LM RX V S P TA EV Vol D G L Mom
























p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sharpe ratios
χ2 1.767 3.161 1.285 1.127 3.416 0.828 0.075 0.635 2.226 2.447 0.884
p-value 0.622 0.367 0.733 0.771 0.332 0.843 0.995 0.888 0.527 0.485 0.829
Notes: See Table 2. *** Significant at 1 per cent, ** Significant at 5 per cent, * Significant at 10 per cent
When examining the log returns, the H0 hypothesis can be rejected in the case of 
the Russell 3000 Index and most of the factors at rational significance levels, so 
the ARCH effect can be observed. The dividend factor is not significant at 1 per 
cent, but it is only just so at 5 per cent. The analysis of the Sharpe ratios shows 
that no ARCH effect can be observed for any factor, so the H0 hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. If the Sharpe ratios were shown as in Figure 2, it would be clear that 
there is no substantial volatility clustering. Based on the results, the performance 
of the Sharpe ratios is tested with a simple OLS regression. Since no autocorrelation 
can be observed, the next task is to determine the heteroscedasticity of the error 
terms. The relevant Breusch–Pagan (BP) test can be found in Table 4.
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Table 4
Heteroscedasticity test of the factor portfolios’ Sharpe ratios

















p-value 0.002 0.512 0.766 0.000 0.076 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.125
Notes: See Table 2. *** Significant at 1 per cent, ** Significant at 5 per cent, * Significant at 10 per cent
At the usual significance level of 5 per cent, the H0 hypothesis cannot be rejected 
in the case of the size, profitability, earnings variability and momentum factors, so 
the error terms of these factors are assumed to be homoscedastic. Based on the BP 
test, the residual variables of the other factors are heteroscedastic, and therefore 
the robust version of the OLS regression is used in their case.
7. Empirical findings
This section of the paper presents the empirical findings of the analysis. The 
hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The given pure factor portfolio produced excess returns over the 
passive strategy.
In formal terms:
H0: RP (factor) = MRP, or β0 = 021
HA: RP (factor) ≠ MRP, or β0 ≠ 0
Hypothesis 2: The given pure factor portfolio produced risk-adjusted excess return 
over the passive strategy.
In formal terms:
H0: Sharpe (factor) = Sharpe (passive strategy)
HA: Sharpe (factor) ≠ Sharpe (passive strategy)
21  RP and MRP are short for the risk premium and market risk premium over the risk-free rate, respectively. 
The risk-free rate is the return on the 1-month US T-bill for the given period.
In the regression methodology, Jensen’s alpha equals the intercept, which is usually denoted as β0. In the 
literature on investments, alpha is actually a “special” β0.
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The above hypotheses are actually the tests of the market anomalies presented 
in the section on literature review, but they can also be interpreted as the tests 
of efficient markets. The hypotheses are examined for the entire period under 
review (2000–2018), the crisis years (2000–2009) and the recovery period after the 
crisis (2009–2018). The division of the entire period into phases practically adds 
a subhypothesis to the main ones: Is it possible to achieve risk-adjusted excess 
return over the market with the factors in the crisis (recovery) years?
The first hypothesis assesses Jensen’s alpha; it is tested using the DCC GARCH 
model, the regression model based on conditional variances and covariances. The 
second hypothesis tests the Sharpe ratio. To verify the Sharpe ratio hypotheses, the 
OLS regression model handling heteroscedasticity is used in the case of the factors 
where this is necessary (otherwise the calculations are based on the traditional 
OLS).
Before the detailed analysis of the results of the regression calculations, the 
performance of the factors and the market portfolio in the past 19 years should be 
evaluated. Figure 3 shows the cumulative log returns of the Russell 3000 Index and 
the ten factor portfolios based on weekly data. The crisis and the recovery years 
are distinguished, and the total 19-year cumulative return series is also shown.
The examination of the entire period attests that the performance of the market 
index (RX) (black solid line) basically caught up with the value factor by the end 
of 2018 (V line). During the crisis, the value factor performed better than all the 
other strategies and the market as a whole. In this period, the cumulative return 
of the pure factors exceeded the return of the market portfolio several times. The 
last ten years heralded a change, and the market return was much higher than the 
factor returns.
Figure 3 may suggest that the factor portfolios are less volatile than the market 
portfolio. This is precisely because of the structure of pure factor portfolios: 
they control for the effects of other factors, making the actual return–standard 
deviation relationship easier to capture, and thus also reducing standard deviation 
(see Menchero – Lee 2015:83 and Clarke et al. 2017:27). In connection with the 
relationship between total market risk and the volatility of the various factors, the 
paper by Csóka et al. (2009) should be mentioned. The authors acknowledge in 
their article that risk can always be allocated in a stable manner, so that no subset 
(coalition) of the subelements (factors) resists the given allocation.
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Table 5 contains the average return and standard deviation of the factors and 
the market in recent years as well as the performance measures. The average 
return and standard deviation figures are annual values calculated from weekly 
log returns.22
22  The calculation methodology is as follows (for the more detailed relationships between the formulas, see 
Medvegyev – Száz 2010:15–17): the arithmetic average of the weekly log returns – ln(St/St-1) – gives the 
average weekly log return (rh), and the standard deviation of the weekly log returns (σh) is also obtained. 
The annual average log return is calculated from the formula “r = rh * 52”, while the annual average standard 
deviation is derived from “σ = σh * √52”. The average annual Sharpe ratio is derived by substituting the 
annualised returns and the annualised standard deviation into formula (15). The average annual Jensen’s 
alpha is the output of the GARCH regression (the regression calculates the average weekly alpha, which 
has to be multiplied by 52 to give the average annual alpha).
Figure 3





























Note: See Table 2.
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The examination of the entire period (2000–2018) shows that the value factor had 
the highest returns (4.42 per cent). Positive returns could also be achieved with 
the passive strategy (3.91 per cent), the small firm factor (1.73 per cent), the profit 
factor (0.67 per cent) as well as the volatility (0.36 per cent) and the momentum 
factor (0.24 per cent). When adjusting for risk (Sharpe ratio), the best performance 
is still linked to the value factor (0.78 per cent, compared to 0.12 per cent by 
the market), while the performance of the profitability, small firm, volatility and 
momentum factors is negative. The average annual return of the other factors was 
slightly negative.
In the “crisis” period (between 2000 and 2009), positive returns could be achieved 
with the value (7.31 per cent), the size (2.65 per cent), the profit (2.21 per cent) 
and the momentum factor (1.20 per cent). The passive strategy fared fairly poorly 
(–6.64 per cent). It can be seen that although the returns of the other factors were 
negative, the losses were always lower than in the case of the market factor. All in 
all, the crisis years saw higher volatility than the entire period under review, and 
therefore the Sharpe ratios are negative everywhere, except for the value factor.
In the “growth” years (between 2009 and 2018), returns were positive with 
decreasing volatility, except for the profit, momentum and earnings variability 
factor. Nonetheless, the positive returns were mostly close to zero. At this time, 
the market portfolio outperformed the factor portfolios by far, generating a return 
of 13.81 per cent, compared to the average annual performance of 0.35 per cent 
in the case of the factors.
Table 6 contains the outcome of hypothesis testing of excess return. We can say 
that the two types of performance measures basically lead to the same conclusions; 
therefore, only Jensen’s alpha is analysed below.
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Máté Fain – Helena Naffa 
Interestingly, neither the size nor the momentum factors achieved significant excess 
returns, regardless of the period under review,23 and thus the zero hypothesis on 
zero excess return cannot be rejected at the rational significance levels. This partly 
tallies with the conclusions of Clarke et al. (2017) and Beard – Sias (1997), and it is 
probably attributable to the fact that in the 1990s, investors increasingly adopted 
these strategies.
When examining the crisis years and the recovery period separately, there is a major 
difference between the significance of the factors. In the crisis years, all of the 
factors, except for the size factor, generated significant excess returns (the p-values 
were practically zero). By contrast, in the recovery period most factors were unable 
to achieve significant excess returns, so the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. No 
excess return could be achieved with the value, size, profitability, dividend, growth 
and momentum factors, but the factors measuring riskiness (earnings variability, 
volatility, leverage) and the trading activity factor capturing the liquidity of assets 
were exceptions to this rule.
In the following, the direction of the excess return of the factors deemed significant 
is examined, to find out which investment strategy was beneficial in the past almost 
20 years. The assessment is presented along two dimensions simultaneously: based 
on the buy or sell recommendation arising from the literature or the investment 
practice on the one hand, and the ex-post buy or sell strategies derived from 
the empirical findings on the other hand. The two dimensions can produce four 
outcomes: 
1)  Consensus buy: the long position produced excess return according to both the 
assumption and the empirical findings.
2)  Contrarian buy: the assumption forecasts selling, however, according to the 
empirical findings, the long position produced the excess return.
3)  Consensus sell: the short position produced excess return according to both the 
assumption and the empirical findings.
4)  Contrarian sell: the assumption forecasts buying, however, according to the 
empirical findings, the short position produced the excess return.
“Consensus” means that the recommendations in the literature and the empirical 
findings coincide, while “contrarian” denotes the empirical findings that run counter 
to the expectations in the literature. In the former case, the advisable trading 
23  The momentum factor is significant at 5 per cent in the crisis years (and not at 1 per cent) and has negative 
returns. Since the factor-extracting variable is the cumulative return of the previous year, this result conflicts 
with the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman from 1993 and 2001, and it was useful to pursue a contrarian 
strategy (see Figure 4).
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strategy was to follow the recommendations in the literature, while in the latter 
case it seemed to be expedient to reject the strategies formulated based on earlier 
experiences (and use a so-called contrarian strategy).
The first quadrant of Figure 4 only contains the value factor in the consensus buy 
category, so according to the literature positive excess return was expected for this 
factor, which was ultimately confirmed by the findings. The alpha was 1.82 and 
2.90 per cent for the entire period and the crisis years, respectively. In the recovery 
period, neither factor outperformed the passive strategy to a significant extent.
Figure 4
Significant excess returns of factor portfolios




































Note: The size of the circles in the figure captures the extent of the excess return. The colour coding 
facilitates the consistent representation of the active strategies across the periods. See Table 2.
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There was no significant recommendation for contrarian buy: in other words, no 
factor produced a positive alpha in the past 20 years, while the literature expected 
negative excess returns. This holds true for the crisis and the recovery years as well.
In the case of the factors measuring riskiness (earnings variability, volatility, 
leverage), the empirical analysis confirms the negative excess return expected based 
on the literature on market anomalies. The consensus short strategy dominated for 
all three factors for the entire period and also for the two subperiods. The excess 
return was –2.14, –2.28 and –2.15 per cent for the entire period.
Surprising results were obtained for the trading activity, dividend, growth and 
profitability factors. The hypothesis foresaw positive excess returns, but significantly 
negative returns were observed. It was advisable to use a contrarian sell (short) 
strategy. Nevertheless, only the trading activity was significant in the recovery years. 
The excess return was –2.59, –1.76, –1.81 and –1.45 per cent for the entire period.
8. Conclusion
The article used pure factor portfolios formed by multivariate cross-sectional 
regressions to test the hypothesis that active investment strategies achieve excess 
return relative to passive strategies. The hypothesis can also be construed as a test 
of market efficiency. Factor performance was measured by Jensen’s alpha and the 
Sharpe ratio.
The universe of the analysis comprised the equity market of the United States 
between 2000 and 2018, while the benchmark portfolio was the Russell 3000 Index. 
This period saw two major crises, so the time series was examined in two parts: the 
period between 2000 and 2009 was referred to as the “crisis” years, and the period 
after 2009 was called the “recovery” years. The factors under review were the 
following: value, size, profit, trading activity, earnings variability, volatility, dividend, 
growth, leverage and momentum.
The main findings of the empirical study are as follows. The excess return of the 
size and momentum factor often cited in the literature was not significant for the 
entire period or the recovery years. During the crisis years, the momentum factor 
was significant, but the size factor was not. Moreover, in the recovery period, 
most factors did not generate significant excess returns (except for the factors 
capturing riskiness and trading activity). The hypotheses on excess return could 
not be confirmed for these factors and periods.
Finally, the investment strategies of the factors generating significant excess returns 
during the period under review were presented. The investment strategy was 
framed by contrasting buy or sell recommendations suggested by the literature 
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or the professional investment convention with the ex-post findings. As expected, 
over the past roughly 20 years, significant excess returns (alpha of 1.82 per 
cent) could only be achieved with the pure value factor, hence the consensus 
buy strategy was profitable. This partial result of the study is in accord with the 
works of Fama and French. Excess returns of the riskiness proxy factors (earnings 
variability, volatility, and leverage) were significant and negative (–2.14, –2.28 
and –2.15 per cent), which also coincide with the expectations formulated by the 
literature, therefore the consensus sell investment strategy was the successful once. 
Contrary to expectations, however, empirical results yielded negative returns for the 
profitability, growth, dividend and trading activity factors, and therefore investors 
could have realised excess returns via a contrarian sell strategy. Overall, the findings 
reinforce the weak form of market efficiency cited in the literature.
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Issues and Types of Adverse Selection and 
Negative Selection*
László Csorba 
In a relatively high number of cases, there are selection criteria in everyday life, 
the implementation of which clearly does not support the development of the 
economy, even in the short term. At the same time, the phenomenon of adverse 
selection raises its head relatively rarely in reality, since it is equally dependent on 
the preconditions of a high degree of hidden information and the complete good 
faith of the stakeholders. In comparison, negative selection is – by necessity – a more 
frequent case. In such cases, the relevant information is available to the parties. 
At the same time, the individual or group possessing the information consciously 
abuses their dominant position. Moreover, this specifically disadvantages those 
who currently best comply with the existing selection requirements, but in spite 
of this are vulnerable due to the lack of a proper negotiating position or interest-
asserting capability. However, the dominant position or power possessed by the 
relevant party can also be used “according to its intended purpose”, which enables 
the implementation of positive selection that is very likely to promote development.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: D81, D82, D92, E32, L15
Keywords: economic evolution, economic selection, adverse selection, negative 
selection, market structure, stakeholder theories
1. Introduction
In folktales, it is a common ending that good deeds are amply rewarded. The fact 
that this is not always so in everyday life seems natural, since even in a modern 
market economy not every effort is destined to succeed. It is more remarkable that 
in Eastern and Central Europe we usually do not feel that the message of the adage 
“It is the horse that pulls its weight that gets beaten” is no exaggeration. Mihály 
Vörösmarty wrote in his poem titled Appeal: “And here in age-long struggles fell 
our best and noblest, dead.” In fact, the way a particular community, organisation, 
group or company treats its best members tells a lot about it. A military leader 
or even a football coach worth his salt knows that the best persons should be 
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protected, treated gently and supported, to enable them to serve the interests of 
their communities, and ultimately those of the leaders for as long and as best as 
possible. They know that if the existence of the best ones are put on the line or even 
lost, the survival of the community may become questionable. On the other hand, in 
everyday life it is common that the best employees, managers, the best customers, 
even high-performing companies or entire industries suffer disadvantages. Typically, 
economic operators suffer the disadvantages not directly in their person, legally or 
physically, but rather because the goods, services produced by them or the activity 
performed by them, generally, their implemented activities are underrated. This 
underrating may occur both inside and outside the organisation, and it is reflected 
back (Schumpeter /1934/ 1980) to every operator participating in creating the given 
value. Here is what István Széchenyi wrote about it: “The Hungarian farmer cannot 
bring his fields to the highest level of flourishing. (...) It is because of limitations, 
especially the limitation of meat, that one of the cornerstones of our agriculture 
is paralysed, and therefore stands with one leg raised. The administered price of 
meat makes all proper fattening useless, and wherever fattening is useless, there 
one of the cornerstones of the economy is missing. Good meat is not more expensive 
than bad meat, so why would a farmer strive to produce better meat?” (Széchenyi 
/1830/ 1903: 58–59). The majority of domestic economic operators do not seem to 
understand – and this is almost like a tradition – the seriousness of the requirement 
that the high quality they need – whatever the area where they want to utilise 
it – should be properly appreciated and rewarded, to enable the relevant efforts 
of the stakeholders to benefit in the longer term as well. This study is intended to 
provide assistance for the awareness necessary for this.
2. The foundational logic of economic evolution
Darwin’s theory of biological evolution had a strong impact on several disciplines, 
including economics. The idea that, by way of the filtering effect of evolution, 
a population capable of achieving a high level of harmony could be created from 
the constantly emerging variations, has stirred the fantasy of several economists. 
According to Thorstein Veblen (1899: 125), who is considered one of the founders of 
evolutionary economics, “The life of man in society, just like the life of other species, 
is a struggle for existence, and therefore it is a process of selective adaptation. The 
progress which has been and is being made in human institutions and in human 
character may be set down, broadly, to a natural selection of the fittest habits of 
thought and to a process of enforced adaptation of individuals to an environment 
which has progressively changed with the growth of the community and with the 
changing institutions under which men have lived.1
1  Veblen (1972: 180)
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For a long time, the analogy between biological specimens and economic operators, 
the population and the national economy, industry and market seemed quite 
unambiguous. Especially in the special case when a high level of adaptability of 
economic operators and that of the population was identified with economic 
development. Kotosz (2002) also pointed out that in fact, there is no accurate, 
generally accepted definition for evolutionary economics, similarly to several 
branches of economics, especially to those that do not belong to the mainstream. 
In the opinion of Beinhocker (2006), applying the terminology of game theory, 
economic evolution itself, its basic logic is a “child’s play”, in that there is and there 
can be no difference between the researchers and analysts exploring various fields 
of this subject. In fact, we have a given set, a population which – still or already 
– must have at least two members. Let us assume that there are minor or major 
differences among members of the population in terms of their capabilities or 
the activities they perform. Hence, let us assume that there are variants. Through 
selection, certain consequences are attached to the individual variants, depending 
on the extent of their adequacy in respect of the current selection requirements. It is 
possible that differences compared to one another –who is which variant – happen 
to be insignificant, but typically the variants may face different consequences. 
Consequences that are more favourable improve the chances of the given variant 
for survival or its survivor conditions, and consequences that are generally adverse 
do the opposite. According to Beinhocker (2006), economic evolution is different 
from biological evolution in that the role of awareness is extremely high in both 
the creation of variants and in the field of selection requirements, and thus the 
biological characteristics of humans could be much less important. In fact, Harford 
(2011) highlights that in biological evolution there is and there can be no foresight 
or planning, only different levels of compliance with the trials. Only the current 
variants and the current selection requirements exist. At the same time, in economic 
evolution humans try – with varying degrees of success – to look forward, to plan 
and to gain advantages in selection, even at the expense of longer-term investments 
or sacrifices. The reason why evolutionary economics itself is still so diverse in 
the opinion of Beinhocker (2006) is that various concepts exist to explain the 
emergence of variants, selection requirements, the process of selection or the 
existence, expression and transfer of genes, as well as the spread of successful 
patterns and concerning the relationship between economic development and 
economic evolution.
Schumpeter, one of the major economists of the 20th century, also believed that the 
foundational evolutionary logics can be transferred into economics. As is pointed 
out by Shionoya (2008), Schumpeter initially interpreted development and evolution 
as basically identical. Hagemann (2008) points out that the early, famous work of 
Schumpeter – The Theory of Economic Development – systematically used the term 
evolution instead of development in its earliest version. Even in its title. However, 
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according to Shionoya (2008), Schumpeter later realised that although the role of 
knowledge and awareness in the process of economic evolution is very high, it is 
not at all obvious that those innovations – i.e. variants – that are successful in the 
short term will result in favourable quality transformations, i.e. the development 
of the economy in the longer term as well. In the opinion of Nazaretyan (2003), 
it could also happen in the economy that short-term efficient adaptation to the 
current conditions destroys the foundations of longer-term survival. In other 
cases, drastic changes in the circumstances subsequently make the former highest 
level of compliance and adaptability a complete dead-end. This is what we call 
an evolutionary dead-end. An evolutionary dead-end is not very common even 
in biology, and in economic evolution it is even less frequent. According to Deng 
(2003), there are several development alternatives even at this point, and the 
decision time horizon of the decision-makers is still very far from the beginning of 
the supposed endgame. Therefore, in these cases we can talk about developmental 
dead-ends at best. In their theory of the so-called learning society, Stiglitz and 
Greenwald (2016) keep away from the specific sub-areas of economic evolution, the 
debates going on about these, and only focus on the basic rationale of economic 
evolution, as outlined above. According to Stiglitz and Greenwald (2016: 188–190), 
countries that are capable of alleviating the major problems of economic evolution 
by establishing and maintaining the creative and learning capabilities of society 
can be successful or relatively more successful in the future. In their opinion, the 
following factors counter the efficiency of economic evolution:
•  when profit is applied as an exclusive criterion of selection, as the sole benchmark 
of adequacy;
•  when the time horizon of the operators is short;
•  when economic competition may be decided even in the short term;
•  when those that issue negative externalities, i.e. the beneficiaries of irrational 
abundance, are able to secure a lasting evolutionary advantage.
3. The requirements of selection
In the opinion of Nelson and Winter (1982), the selection criteria are the 
requirements that define the likelihood of survival by the measure of compliance 
with them, as well as the characteristics of the survival state, i.e. the conditions 
for survival. In respect of economic evolution, Nelson (1995) drew a distinction 
between biological selection criteria consisting of conditions created by the natural 
environment and “cultural” selection criteria created by humans. In economic 
selection, “fit” operators which maintain a higher level of harmony with the current 
selection criteria have better chances of becoming survivors in the given period 
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and in a favourable state, which will provide more significant and positive chances 
for them later on. Therefore, operators who enjoy an advantage in selection can 
“afford” more than those who are less in harmony with the selection criteria. The 
source of that could be knowledge, power, health, time, money or other resources. 
Friedman (2007) concludes that if a more successful survivor starts the next period 
with such additional reserves, this will provide to them relatively higher freedom 
of action, less vulnerability and more opportunities for influencing and making 
an impact. Nelson and Winter (1982: 262–263) defined four elements of the 
environment of selection:
•  what are the expenditures required by the individual activities and what returns 
can be accomplished by them;
•  the method by which the preferences and rules of the consumer or the regulatory 
agency affect efficiency;
•  what relationship applies between efficiency on the one hand, the size of the 
operator and the level of market concentration on the other hand;
•  in what way and to what extent one can learn from successful innovators, to what 
extent copying is facilitated or prevented.
Within the cultural, artificial selection environment, a market and a non-market 
selection environment has been distinguished. According to Dosi and Nelson (1994), 
some actors – for example, legislators – specifically show a certain purposefulness 
and complexity, in order to shape the partial results of the selection, typically 
through the selection environment. At the same time, the economic thought of 
the early (1934) school also associated with the name of Schumpeter (1980), namely 
that ultimately it is the consumers who determine the value of everything, became 
popular and remains so to this day. It is their decision that is reflected back all the 
way to the prices of raw materials or is expressed at the given point in the value 
chain in the amount of wages as well. Agreeing with that, Sandlin and Mclaren 
(2010) emphasise that ultimately it is the consumer who helps reproduce capitalism 
on an ongoing basis. Naturally, it makes a difference how successful reproduction 
is, especially in the long term.
An actor that has a so-called dominant (market) position is capable of influencing 
the definition of the selection criteria of the actors affected by its activity, including 
customers, competitors or suppliers, in a direct and meaningful way, even in the 
short term, as well as the compliance of the stakeholders with these selection 
criteria (Utton 2003). Meanwhile, the relevant stakeholders are capable of exerting 
similar impacts on the party in a dominant position only in an indirect manner and 
in the longer term, by the so-called co-evolution. Power is not a market category. 
Power means formal or informal prerogatives in a hierarchical relationship, for the 
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person having the power to direct or substantially influence the activities of the 
obligor, in order to accomplish aims that are theoretically the aims of the group, 
also defined by the hierarchical relationship (Kornai 1993).
4. Group selection
By group we mean an interest community of individuals not isolated from one 
another, where cooperative interactions assuming reciprocity occur relatively 
regularly among the members and where the activities of the members have 
a meaningful impact on each other’s goal attainment activity (Bergh – Gowdy 
2009). Therefore, group members depend on one another and thus they are forced 
to display a certain degree of cooperation, adaptation and mutuality, especially 
because this dependence is not an occasional arrangement, but rather a permanent 
one, owing to the series of interactions. Following this logic, all organisations, 
including companies, can be considered a group. But the community of residents 
in a street, family or circle of friends can also be a group. There may be overlaps 
between groups, i.e. one person may be a member of multiple groups at the 
same time. Membership is not necessarily established by joining a group formally. 
Similarly to contracting, implied conduct may be very significant in this case as 
well. In other words, in the event of the realisation of a series of interactions 
with other members and compliance with the rest of the conditions for group 
membership, we can already talk about belonging to a group, without formal joining 
or admission having taken place. In the study, within groups we focus on companies. 
In accordance with the concept of the group as outlined above, according to Van den 
Bergh and Stagl (2003), during group selection a member of a particular community 
participates in selection primarily and crucially not separated from others, not on 
their own, but rather as part of a large or small community as a unit of selection. 
In this way, it is not the particular individual characteristics, but rather the relevant 
group characteristics that need to apply with the selection requirements. A group 
may exist because the individual obtains or may obtain some kind of selection 
advantage from activities more or less coordinated with its peers and its “proximity” 
to them: its chances for survival increase and its survival conditions may improve. 
At the same time, the entirety of the group may also obtain a selection advantage 
through the relatively larger and more diverse population and through synergies. 
The decision situation often mentioned as an example “a smaller slice of a larger 
cake or a larger slice of a smaller cake” applies to the situation as well. The operation 
and survival of the group in the longer term is also manifested by the fact that 
series of interactions regularly occur among group members and with other groups 
over and over again, i.e. using the terminology of game theory, infinitely repeated 
games are realised.
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During these repeated interactions or “games”, group members have a chance of 
getting to know one another better and they implement combinations of various 
alternative actions and “test” the strategies of themselves and those of others. 
Eventually, a higher level of trust and a sense of responsibility may develop among 
“veteran” members of groups that experience and survive longer periods, and 
furthermore, a shared value system and routines may be established, which can 
significantly facilitate the successful achievement of their aims. Not every group is 
destined to succeed. Establishment of groups and participation in them provides an 
opportunity for acquiring selective advantages. However, as with every opportunity, 
this also needs to be managed properly for the individual to retroactively consider 
its group membership for a particular period as a success. In economic group 
selection, it is also not ruled out that every group may strengthen its survival 
characteristics absolutely (Polignac 1995), even though substantial differences may 
persist, originate or increase compared to one another.
Nevertheless, the development of the size of the group or population is also 
a substantial criterion of acquiring an advantage in group selection (Bergh – Gowdy 
2009). The size of the group is so much a benchmark of success that according 
to Avilés (2002), it is a general feature among individuals that in the case of two 
alternative groups to choose from, they want to join the larger group. Barry (1961) 
pointed out that when the population of a particular city decreases below a certain 
level, it starts showing signs of collapse, since outward migration could become 
a self-propelling process. On the other hand, the attainment of a certain city size 
will generate a self-propelling process in the opposite direction. Diamond (2009) 
illustrated by several historical examples that a human community becomes 
vulnerable and its direct physical survival is endangered if – while meeting other 
conditions – the size of the group drops below the critical level and there is no way 
to substitute the lost members. Today, in a modern market economy, the physical 
existence of members of a particular group cannot be endangered, but at the 
same time, the decline and termination of the groups themselves – companies, 
organisations, populations, markets, industries, customer communities and 
others – is a very real danger. We know full well that this is an inevitable feature 
of the operation of the market economy. Still, when it is a group to which we are 
committed, we would like to act against the decline or termination. On the other 
hand, as we will see in the following part, it does make a difference whether a group 
is defeated in selection because considering the important, substantial aspects, it 
does not perform well enough compared to the rest of the groups, or because sand 
got into the cogwheels of the operating mechanism of selection.
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5. Stakeholder base and free riders
The so-called stakeholder theory is primarily associated with the name of Edward 
Freeman (1984), a representative of the theory of strategic management. It intends 
to demonstrate that a company is structured not only according to the shared will of 
the owners and the employees, but it is subject to the essential influence of other 
stakeholders as well. Masahiko Aoki (1984) uses the methodological toolset of game 
theory to present the basic relations determining corporate existence by presenting 
the company as a system distinct from its environment, through the emergence 
and changes of its internal institutions. Clarkson (1995) identifies primary and 
secondary stakeholders within the stakeholder group. Primary stakeholders include 
those without the support and cooperation of which, i.e. the realisation of interests 
necessary for that in the making of company decisions, it is not possible to ensure 
the existence or survival of the company at all. This category generally includes 
employees, management and owners, but apart from these, even an authority 
that issues an operating license may be a primary stakeholder, for the necessary 
time. Members of the secondary group are also important, but their support “only” 
increases the efficiency of the company, it has a favourable impact on the likely 
survival state conditions of the company. Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that three 
conditions must be met simultaneously for one to be a stakeholder. It should be 
affected by the operation of the company, this concern should be important for it 
from some aspect, and it should have some kind of power to affect the operation 
of the company. Freeman and Liedtka (1997) go as far as talking about stakeholder 
capitalism. In other words, the engine of existence and development as a capitalist 
company is a stakeholder base that is more extensive and stronger compared to 
other systems. Since each of the stakeholders is subject to some kind of impact 
by the given company, organisation or activity, therefore directly or indirectly, as 
initiators, suffering or receiving parties, each of us is a participant of the relevant 
interactions. That way – regardless of what other groups the members are also 
interested in – each of us paddles in the same boat in terms of selection and 
moreover as a group. Naturally, this is an advantage for those who are affected 
positively and a disadvantage for the negatively affected.
One of the most well-known analyses of the so-called free rider problem that loads 
the operation of communities can be associated with Hardin (1968) and deals with 
the tragedy of commons. Before that, Olson (1965) provided the general theoretical 
framework. It posits that an actual or potential group member may expropriate 
some of the common goods produced by a group, in such a manner that while 
doing so, it does not take its share or its fair share of the burdens of the common 
good that has become a private good in the meantime. The result of the free 
rider behaviour will be a decrease in group performance or group efficiency, or it 
relatively underperforms the level that would have become attainable but for the 
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free riders. The term “free rider” does not sound as bad as the level of the negative 
impact it could have on the given group in group selection. Recently, free riding has 
also been identified as a negative externality burdening the group, regardless of 
whether it is committed by an actual group member or only by a potential group 
member (Milgrom 1987; Laffont – Tirole 1988; Rey – Salanié 1996). Free rider group 
members are not real, only pseudo-members in the conceptual framework of group 
selection. While earlier free riding was almost considered as a natural feature of 
large groups, i.e. something that they have to tolerate, later approaches consider 
it much more as a negative externality that can and should be reduced.
6. Adverse selection and negative selection
It is important to clarify at the beginning of this chapter that this study is intended 
to provide a normative approach to selection requirements. It is not our aim to 
assess the “adequacy” of selection requirements, such as their compliance with the 
needs of sustainability. In the process of economic evolution, adverse selection and 
negative selection are phenomena that can occur regardless of the actual selection 
requirements that apply in terms of economic development. Subsequently many 
selection requirements are proven to have had an expressly adverse effect. At the 
same time, this failure arising from the trial and error method is an apparent feature 
of both biological and economic evolution.
The mere name of adverse selection means that here we are talking about such 
an unusual thing, a “selection anomaly” in which selection occurs specifically 
despite the selection requirements. Not because of human misconduct or ill-will, 
but because in respect of certain goods, situations and activities the knowledge 
of the involved actors is not sufficient to set up selection requirements that they 
are also capable of enforcing. As a result, economic operators which otherwise 
fulfil the relevant selection requirements relatively the best by the goods produced 
by them, by their services, activities or performance have to leave the group, for 
example, the industry, market, company or organisation. The reason of departure 
forced by economic necessity is that owing to the high level of compliance with the 
selection requirements, the goods, services, activities or performance considered 
of the highest quality and the economic operator which provides these do not 
receive the highest consideration in relative terms to which they are proportionately 
“entitled”. They will not and cannot receive it, because the other economic operator 
which determines and provides the consideration is not in a position where it could 
determine the level of compliance with the selection requirements with at least 
rough accuracy, owing to the information asymmetry it suffers. Therefore, the 
consideration is only defined as an estimate and apparently its basis can only be 
an expected quality value. In this manner, by necessity, the consideration available 
for the actors capable of providing the relatively highest level of quality substantially 
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underrates their efforts. This leads to them leaving the group to find another 
group where relevant efforts are rewarded in the appropriate manner and on the 
appropriate level. It is important to note that money or value expressed in monetary 
terms are not the only forms of consideration, it can also be, for example, moral 
appreciation. Since after some time it is noticed that providers of higher quality have 
left, more and more estimated considerations are defined for the remaining group 
members, each time on a lower level than before. Unless some kind of solution is 
provided for the problem of the evaluation of quality, according to Akerlof (1970), 
the group will eventually fall apart.
In everyday life, processes are also labelled as adverse selection that are in reality 
forms of manifestation of negative selection, which is discussed later. In fact, in 
adverse selection the actor affected by the selection fulfils all the current selection 
requirements at relatively the highest level by the good, service or activity provided 
by it or by its performance, but it still cannot obtain the relatively proportionate 
consideration. The system is prevented from doing so by hidden information. On 
the contrary, in the case of negative selection discussed below, the undervalued 
actor cannot fulfil an important selection requirement properly, while it can fulfil 
all the others. This leads to a phenomenon with similar manifestations as the one 
we saw with adverse selection. Here, the problem of the undervalued actors is 
that they are not in an appropriately strong negotiating position. Not only are they 
not in a dominant position or in a position of authority in respect of the party that 
defines the consideration, their interest-enforcing ability is also expressly weak. 
Although this selection requirement is not one directly associated with the goods, 
services or activity provided by the actor, or with the performance provided by it, 
it still is a selection requirement.
Tirole (2016) concludes that all in all, selection can be negative or positive. If 
appropriate objectivity is ensured, it is actually possible to make a distinction 
between the two. The relevant community may develop through positive selection. 
For example, according to Tirole a case in point is when the market is expanding, 
something that is also manifest in such features as the improvement of the 
determining factors, which could make the relevant activities more efficient. In the 
case of a market, this means a lower price level projected on unchanged products, 
while the producer side is also capable of retaining its profitability in the long 
term. However, negative selection undermines and disrupts efficiency in some way, 
which will result in adverse consequences for the community sooner or later. I have 
summarised the comparison of adverse selection and negative selection in Table 1.
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Table 1
Comparison of adverse selection and negative selection
Aspect Adverse selection Negative selection
Who will be in a selective 
disadvantage 
Those who comply with all the 
selection criteria the best, by the 
goods produced by them, or by 
their activities or performance.
Those who comply with all the 
selection criteria – except one – 
the best, by the goods produced 
by them, or by their activities or 
performance.
What circles are adversely 
affected by selection directly
External and internal 
stakeholders
External and internal 
stakeholders
Deficiencies of disadvantaged 
parties
Cannot express their high quality 
outwards
Have no negotiating power, are 
in a subordinated position
Good faith of those who cause 
a disadvantage
They are in good faith They abuse their rights, 
dominant position or power
The purpose of originators of 
disadvantage by causing 
a selective disadvantage
Causing a disadvantage is not 
intentional
A private interest against the 
internal stakeholders, a short-
term group interest against the 
external stakeholders
Impact on the size of the group Constant loss of members At the beginning there is no loss 
of membership, but later on it 
becomes continuous
Final outcome of the process Termination of the group Termination of the group
Opportunities of removing, 
suppressing
Reducing the information 
asymmetry below the proper 
level
Imposing sanctions for abuse by 
the relevant selection criteria 
and/or by creating commitment 
of the abusers
Forms of manifestation of this 
phenomenon
Equal treatment regardless of 
quality, with hidden information
1)  Equal treatment regardless of 
quality, without hidden 
information;
2)  Ad hoc and collective soft 
budget constraint;
3)  Abuse with the dominant 
position of monopoly;
4)  Corruption hidden activity;
5)  Maintenance or change of 
status quo while suppressing 
higher quality
7. Fundamental types of adverse selection and negative selection in 
everyday life
As seen previously, in reality negative selection underlies most of the processes 
of apparent adverse selection and not actual adverse selection. As we will see in 
the summary chapter, in themselves dominant position or power are not adverse 
for the purposes of selection either, since they can be used in many ways. The 
problem of negative selection basically occurs when the abuse of dominant position 
or power is intentionally targeted against those who otherwise fulfil every selection 
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requirement at the highest level, with the exception of interest assertion. In the 
following part, we present a brief description of real adverse selection and those 
types of negative selection that are significant in respect of economic selection.
7.1. Equal treatment regardless of quality, with hidden information
In his famous study, George Akerlof (1970) presents how informational asymmetry 
in a market between the demand and the supply side can result in adverse selection, 
which may ultimately lead to the collapse of the market. This process can intensify 
owing to the high and increasing uncertainty, since there are no institutions 
operating in the market – as clear selection criteria – that could minimise this 
uncertainty. In Akerlof’s model, buyers cannot assess the actual quality of the 
product, and therefore they have to underprice it systematically and increasingly. 
These activities also increasingly keep sellers which come up with better quality 
products that are of higher quality from this aspect away from the market. For lack 
of a better alternative, an average good considered to be of average quality could 
not be priced higher than the average price, which creates an adverse situation for 
sellers delivering higher quality and a favourable situation for those delivering lower 
quality.2 Therefore, in this case the buyers are not in a position to assess quality of 
the goods because of the hidden information, and for lack of the institutionalisation 
of some kind of solution, this will result in a deterioration of the market. In this 
case, it is a consequence of the lack of knowledge of the actors on the buyer’s side, 
and moreover in an unintended way. Buyers expressly want to recognise higher 
quality and are also willing to pay higher prices for it proportionately to that, but 
they are unable to do so.3
Arrow (1979) considered the uncertainty of the quality of goods to be purchased 
more significant than even the uncertainty of the prices. Price and non-price 
indications – such as those on quality – are equally significant in the decisions 
made by economic operators. If an insurance company is not capable of screening 
out the low-quality portion of possible customers, the phenomenon of adverse 
selection may become extensive, and increasingly those customers will take out 
insurance who will raise the highest compensation claims, at a high price, owing 
to the poor portfolio. As the customer portfolio is deteriorating and insurance 
premiums keep rising, more and more high quality customers will stay away from 
the insurance market. Therefore, the company needs to make efforts to be able 
to offer a proportionate insurance premium for everyone, distinguishing the high 
quality customers from the low-quality ones: screening theory (Spence 1973; 
Stiglitz 1975). By this, the expenditures on obtaining and enforcing non-price type 
indications and information may be recouped. However, as has been pointed out 
2  The research of Major (2014) on the system of relations of economic operators and their bilateral asymmetric 
informational positions has led to similar conclusions.
3  Vincze (1991a, 1991b) analysed this model of the emergence of adverse selection in great detail.
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by Bester (1985), it is important to fine-tune the severity of screening. Excessive 
severity could plunge the market into a decline – through the loss of some of 
the high quality customers – in the same way as the penetration of processes 
of adverse selection can. Unreasonably loose control could expose the operation 
of the company to excessive risks. Even high quality customers are interested in 
conveying genuine signals – signalling theory (Spence 1973) – to the effect that they 
can be considered high quality customers. In their compelling model simulating 
the behaviour of the insurance market, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) present, on 
the one hand, that higher quality customers express their lower risk characteristics 
by a higher level of risk sharing with the insurance company, i.e. the deductible. 
Naturally, the repeated application of screening on one side of the market could 
encourage the actors on the other side or in certain markets even force them to 
release signals about themselves that comply with the system of conditions of 
screening (Riley 1989).
7.2. Equal treatment regardless of quality, without hidden information
Of the types of negative selection, let us first review the case in which the actor 
makes no distinction on the input side between different qualities, in respect 
of either the supplier or the employees. In this case the actor has appropriate 
information concerning the inputs, and in respect of the inputs it is also important 
for it to obtain the highest possible quality. However, by abusing its dominant 
position it attempts to obtain higher quality at a price that is usually attached to 
lower quality. In other words, the pricing of the inputs is not quality-dependent. 
It is obvious that according to the basic logic of the market, in this case the actor 
could only obtain higher-quality inputs if the production of these involves lower 
expenditures by the actors affected there. But in a high number of cases this is not 
so. What else could still ensure that the actor can obtain higher-quality inputs, 
more beneficial for it, persistently at such lower prices that could only yield an 
adequate income for the input-side stakeholders at a lower level of quality? 
According to Kegan and Lahey (2017), a large number of economic operators 
display substantial resistance to any kind of change. In our case, a change for 
the input-side stakeholders producing high quality would mean that they would 
have to accommodate to the production of lower quality inputs requiring lower 
expenditures. This is only possible for suppliers in the first place, since an employee 
is not able to invalidate their qualification, experiences or other required skills and 
competences. If an employee is not able to take a proper bargaining position, they 
have no other choice than accept the abuse of power to their disadvantage or join 
another group with better outlooks. This lock-in situation is extensively analysed 
by Hirschman (1995) in his work titled Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.
However, in the case of suppliers, “quality deteriorating” production methods must 
also be elaborated and learned and this too requires efforts. Helplessness could 
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stabilise production at an earlier level of quality, at a higher one in our example, 
(Schumpeter 1980). The measure of the producer’s helplessness occurring as 
a result of technological change and manifest in the duration of staying away from 
change, is significantly shaped by the size, knowledge and income of the operator 
(Dong – Saha 1998), on the other hand, the cultural embeddedness of the owners 
formulating the production strategy, managers or employees, their system of norms 
do not enable the intentional reduction of quality even if it would increase the 
profitability and survival chances of the operator (Solow 1979). If the production of 
the high quality “best possible” good is based on deeply embedded norms, customs 
or possibly religion, then these could be maintained for as long as several decades or 
generations (Williamson 2000) even when consideration is not proportionate with 
quality. It happens often even without the institution of embeddedness of efforts 
at higher quality, that commitment is on a personal or group level. The operators 
perceive the disappearance of relatively higher quality as a crisis and they would 
like to terminate this crisis by the institutionalisation of higher quality on the one 
hand, on the other hand, by accepting and obtaining acceptance for a proportionate 
market price, if they had an appropriate bargaining position or interest asserting 
capability for that (Sylvander et al. 2006:63).
The second sub-type is the case of collective reward and penalty. Both of these 
concepts consist of two components. As was pointed out by Avnar Greif (2006), 
in the case of collective punishment, each member of a particular community 
participates in punishing those who operated in violation of the rules, regardless 
of which member of the community was injured directly. Any member of the 
community who fails to participate personally in punishing the perpetrator will be 
punished themselves. At the same time, even if the perpetrator acted alone, not 
only one person will be punished, but the group that includes them as well. In the 
case of the medieval “merchants of the Maghreb” this meant that any member of 
the merchant community who acted in grave violation of the rules was no longer 
allowed to trade with anyone, he was placed under a certain kind of boycott. This 
could be easily extended to include several members of his narrower group or 
even to the entire group, regardless of the fact that the rest of the affected group 
members apparently did not commit any crime. Therefore, collective punishment 
was intended to take advantage of a stronger commitment to the narrower 
group, for the benefit of the larger group. This kind of punishment is a strong 
deterrent. The method of decimation, as applied in ancient Rome, is based on 
a similar fundamental rationale. The fundamental rationale of collective reward 
is similar. In other words, it is not that – theoretically – it would be impossible to 
clearly identify those members of the community who deserve a reward or that 
no differentiation would be possible among them, but rather that rewarding the 
entire group provides a better drive for increasing the cooperation of the members. 
According to Narloch et al. (2012), the system of collective rewarding is workable if 
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the members of the group are appropriately homogeneous, in terms of both their 
individual characteristics and their interests. This system presumes appropriate 
group cohesion as well as cooperation within the group. However, where these 
attributes are missing, those members of the group which contribute to group 
efforts to a relatively higher extent, by higher expenditures or more significant 
sacrifices could more easily deplete their reserves, while their proportionate 
entitlement of the collective reward does not compensate them for all of this 
(Willer 2009). In a community that is not closely-knit or not homogeneous enough, 
collective punishment means a similarly substantial disadvantage for those who 
otherwise fulfilled the selection requirements relatively at the highest level, but 
there is no way to have their extra efforts returned and they have to suffer the 
same disadvantage as the others. It is these operators who are the first to see their 
operations and activities fail (Heckathorn 1993). It needs to be highlighted that it 
should also be interpreted as collective punishment if in reality there is no formal 
collective punishment, but there is no reward either. Therefore, where a community 
is not appropriately homogeneous, tightly-knit and cooperative to start with, and 
although there are no collective punishments, but there is no differentiated reward 
system either, there we will certainly face the consequences of negative selection.
7.3. Ad hoc and collective, soft budget constraint
When analysing the soft budget constraint, János Kornai (1997) points out that 
in the case of a hard budget constraint it is essential for the operators to attain 
an appropriate level of efficiency from their income, to be able to cover their 
expenditures. However, with a soft budget constraint the budget is no longer able 
to constitute a bottleneck for the operator. Those who should become victims of 
this selection requirement are also able to continue operating, since their actual 
or relative losses – relative to the more efficient ones that is – will be covered 
eventually. If they are saved by the state, then it will marshal the resources for 
this coverage of loss and income support by directly or indirectly taking away 
the profits of the successful operators. If the profitability of the company does 
not significantly affect the remuneration of the management, then there is no 
appropriate motivating force for the management to make substantial efforts in 
order to reduce costs and increase profitability (Kornai et al. 2004). The same 
applies to subordinates: successful innovation draws no or insignificant rewards 
from the centre, even at management level, which hardly affects those who actually 
did the job (Kornai 2010). The presence of soft budget constraint in a group does not 
necessarily mean that negative selection is also present. Kornai (2008) describes that 
the regular annual debt consolidation by the state in the case of domestic hospitals 
and “bailouts” results in a situation where the hospitals have clearly adapted to 
this feature of their financial environment. Those that attained a relatively greater 
harmony with the rest of the selection requirements – i.e. are among the best 
in terms of healing and prevention and generally in financial management – as 
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well as those that did not. In this way, hospitals that represent higher quality are 
not necessarily disadvantaged only because they show greater harmony with the 
selection requirements, i.e. there is no negative selection at present among hospitals 
in Hungary. Apparently, they operate and manage their finances with wide efficiency 
gaps according to several aspects, but those hospitals that represent higher quality 
do not have to suffer selective disadvantages. Having said that, it is true that the 
reason why hospitals need a bailout by the state at the end of each year, is that they 
are underfinanced by the state during the year, as a way of motivating them for cost 
efficiency. The debt consolidation of local governments implemented between 2011 
and 2014 is a different situation. Similarly to hospitals, Lentner (2014) did not find 
negative selection for these either, but only because he did not meaningfully include 
in his analysis those local governments that had not accumulated debts earlier, 
and despite that, were capable of significant development. A budget constraint 
that is occasional and ad hoc in nature and is also soft occurs too infrequently 
to make the rescued parties view it as a selection requirement and adapt to its 
existence. Despite that, this phenomenon also clearly affects selection among local 
governments (Vigneault 2005) and this applies to countries other than Hungary as 
well. Local governments with balanced finances are put at a disadvantage by the 
occasional, but general debt consolidation plans that apply to everyone – a soft 
budget constraint – compared to those that became indebted generally through 
their own faults. By their balanced financial management they caused just as much 
“damage” to their own local government as the amount of the debt that they 
could have borrowed and then have consolidated by the state. Although in Hungary 
the central government took notice of this controversial situation and intended to 
provide compensation for local governments with balanced finances, only a token 
amount was provided as compensation. In the case of Hajdúszoboszló, it remained 
below 10 per cent, and the local governments had to submit grant applications 
even for that amount. At the same time, the awarded support was allowed to be 
spent only on projects that were substantially completed earlier in the areas of well-
managed local governments.4 With this, the small town was put at a disadvantage 
of about HUF 3 billion compared to those cities that financed their similar tourism 
developments from loans.
7.4.  Hidden corruption
According to the principle-agent theory, agents will basically follow their own 
interests that may conflict with the interests of the principal. Concerning the 
decision characteristics of agents, there is an informational asymmetry to the benefit 
of agents, and the higher risk appetite of agents compared to their principles partly 
derives from this (Eisenhardt 1989). To talk about corruption, Graaf and Huberts 
4  Support for developments of municipalities pursuant to Article 10 of Annex 3 of Act C of 2014 on the central 
budget for Hungary for the year 2015.
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(2008) add another condition to this, namely the condition that the agent needs 
to assert its own private interests, through the violation of the rules applying to its 
activity, at the expense of the interests of that group where it has obligations and 
responsibility as a member. The power that was abused by certain group members 
in this case is enabled by the informational asymmetry from which they benefit, 
and is created by their decision and action autonomy of a specific measure. In the 
United States of America mainly the abusive practices of the management of private 
companies are considered corruption (Heidenheimer – Johnston 2011:28–29), after 
all, it is not necessary to have state property or a public office for the interests of 
a community to be sacrificed illegally in the assertion of private interests. In the 
framework of the principal-agent theory, corruption related to the public sector can 
be interpreted similarly, with the difference that the politicians who oversee the 
offices are themselves the agents of the voters. Therefore, in this case we talk about 
agents of agents. As is presented by Guriev (2004), because corruptible officials or 
managers demand a share of the implementation costs or revenues of projects, 
corruption systematically and continuously eradicates the highest quality. This is 
because typically not the best ones will become the winners, since the best bidders 
would not have to apply corruption in order to win. Lower “quasi-quality” provides 
more available resources to be skimmed for those involved in corruption. But even 
if occasionally the highest quality was selected, economic motivation for further 
quality development would still be weakened. Thus, high quality goods are gradually 
disappearing from the market in any case, and the increasingly poor quality can 
cause increasingly worse damages to the community. Competition is distorted, 
and indirectly the entire society suffers welfare losses (Hámori 2002). According to 
certain experts – Huntington (1968) and Leff (1964) among others – corruption is 
not generally and clearly harmful concerning the development of the economy. In 
their opinion, several kinds of corruption increase efficiency, improve operability 
and provide lubricant for the machinery of the economy as an early stage of the 
institutionalisation of the new rules. Others – including (Méon – Sekkat 2005) – do 
not share this view. In their opinion, the assertion of private interests at the expense 
of group interests means a disadvantage relative to the affected groups in selection, 
even if otherwise those rules that are violated do not support the development of 
the group adequately. Only such illegal activities can actually be a “lubricant” for the 
machinery – while committing not corruption, but other acts of crime – that directly 
prioritise the perceived interests of the group. It is true that all this is done probably 
at the expense of other economic operators, while personal private interests may be 
satisfied indirectly. Bardhan (1997) pointed out that the fact that Eastern European 
countries were capable of accomplishing economic growth parallel with increasing 
corruption after the political changes, but this does not mean that corruption did 
not set back the development and growth of these countries. We will never know 
what would have been the growth rates of these countries with substantially less 
corruption. However, it is certain that economic operators who were unable to 
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fulfil only one single selection requirement at a high level were pushed back and 
put at a disadvantage by necessity, i.e. they did not have the proper bargaining 
position and they lacked adequate interest-asserting capability. Therefore, negative 
selection created and could create chances for those operators by corruption who 
had an excellent bargaining position and interest-asserting capability, even though 
they were less capable of meeting other selection requirements. In accordance 
with that, the calculated estimates of Mo (2001) show that 1-per cent increase in 
the level of corruption reduces economic growth by 0.72 per cent, in other words, 
one unit of increase of the corruption index reduces economic growth by 0.545 
percentage points.
7.5. Discriminatory action of a monopoly at the expense of the best customers
According to Lambsdorff (2002), in the vast majority of cases, monopolies are 
fundamentally created by the intervention of the state into the economy. Either 
the state wants to realise rent through them or it wants to provide these to another 
economic operator. According to Lambsdorff, there is an obvious connection 
between rent-seeking and corruption. But rent can be obtained not only illegally, 
not only by corruption. A monopoly is capable of providing rent to its owners in 
a legal way as well (Hillman – Katz 1984). Typically, monopolies undoubtedly have 
a dominant position, but this derives not only from their market share, but also 
from demand features, for example, from its different elasticity, (Pindyck 1985). 
Economics has been interested in monopolies for a long time. The social deadweight 
loss caused by monopolies is an essential parts of textbooks on microeconomics, 
as is the discussion of applied price discrimination. According to these, it seemed 
necessary that monopolies should be considered one of the basic types of market 
failures (Stiglitz 1986). At the same time, Vickers (2005) notes that the abuse of 
dominant position by a monopoly may not be manifest in relatively higher prices, 
but in the tools by which it attempts to maintain its monopolistic power. Such 
areas of maintaining the dominant position as a restriction of competition or unfair 
competition may lead to inequitable, unfair competition, or perhaps to the total lack 
thereof, and indirectly may not serve development either. However, the way actual 
and possible competitors are treated cannot result in negative selection. As pointed 
out by Baumol (1982), even a monopoly with the most powerful dominant position, 
i.e. the one that abuses it the most, only becomes unchallengeable if currently and 
in the predictable future it can present the best possible proposal to its customers, 
in terms of both price and quality. If this is not so, then potential entrants pose a real 
threat to it even if very serious barriers to entry exist. Therefore, the only way for 
a monopoly to maintain its monopolistic power is to ensure that it is the one that 
meets the existing selection requirements the most, however inequitable these 
might be. As long as only such challengers, such actual or potential competitors 
are defeated by it who comply with the selection requirements to a lesser extent, 
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selection remains positive (Schumpeter 1942). Therefore a monopoly cannot cause 
negative selection in respect of its competitors. However, the situation is different 
concerning its suppliers, employees or customers.
In the earlier sections, the negative selection of the input side – regardless of 
the existence of a monopoly – has been discussed. Let us now continue with the 
buyer side. Mussa and Rosen (1978) demonstrated that the price discrimination 
and quality policy applied by the monopoly in respect of the individual buyer 
segments result in peculiar cases by creating several kinds of combinations. Indeed, 
when price discrimination is coupled with quality provided on a standard level, 
an excessively large difference may emerge in the price-to-value ratios of a good 
sold to the individual segments. Buyers who receive access at the lowest price 
receive relatively high quality in exchange for their money, while those who pay 
the highest price receive relatively low quality as consideration. Therefore, what 
is too high for the latter is not the price, but rather the consideration manifested 
in quality by the monopoly. If the buyer’s segment that pays the highest price is 
composed of those buyers who comply the best with the selection requirements 
imposed by the monopoly, then in this case the monopoly may be losing its best 
customers. When a monopoly abuses its dominant position in respect of its best 
paying customer community, then there is a high probability of the emergence 
of negative selection. The only way to stop negative selection is price capping 
by statute or an increase in quality standards (Besanko et al. 1987). According 
to Forgács (2013), the contribution revenues for domestic health insurance stem 
from one third of the population, while essentially the entire population is entitled 
to healthcare services. As he pointed out “for those who pay the contribution, 
sometimes a very high amount, it is difficult to tolerate that they receive the same 
treatment as their fellow countrymen who never pay any contribution. This anomaly 
is compensated by the German social security system in such a manner that persons 
belonging to the upper income decile are not even allowed to use the services 
of solidarity-based insurance” (Forgács 2013:8). In addition, those who pay the 
highest contribution are in the best health on average, and therefore they should 
use services rarely, but then in high quality. However, the domestic healthcare 
system does not intend to forego the resources provided by these persons, since in 
that case even the general quality minimums could not be maintained any longer. 
In turn, this results in constant negative selection, even formally the best customers 
continue paying social security contribution. The healthcare sector is constantly 
losing these persons as customers: they use private healthcare services, and now 
it is not uncommon that they buy these services in a foreign country. Therefore, 
hardly any supplementary income flows any longer to healthcare practitioners in 
the form of gratitude payments made by them.
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7.6. Suppression of higher quality for the maintenance or change of the status 
quo
The status quo between the affected persons – whether they are entities or 
individuals – is of determining importance for every stakeholder, since this is what 
designates the boundaries of autonomy in activities, responsibilities, powers and 
decision-making. Changing the status quo, even though it can be more favourable 
for the given person or entity for the attainment of their aims, is always loaded with 
uncertainty. In respect of the existing status quo, the person or entity has certain, 
minor or major knowledge owing to past experiences and learning; by comparison, 
in respect of the assessment of future status quo they may have substantially less 
knowledge available. Until the new status quo is reached, several transaction and 
other costs are also incurred, the amount of which is not easy to forecast, nor is it 
easy to forecast the amount of supplementary yields. In addition to cost-benefit 
analysis, we should also anticipate the increase in risks, since the existing routines 
and skills are incomplete from the aspect of the different future, or at least they 
have not gone through the baptism of fire yet. In the model of planned behaviour, 
Ajzen (1991) presents the behaviour of the persons or entities as the combined 
effect of three factors: the norms applying to the planned behaviour or activity of 
the person or entity, their own relevant attitudes, and their perceptions concerning 
maintaining control over the future activity. It is these three factors from which such 
a critical level of motivating could develop that is already sufficient for the planned 
activity to start. At the same time, the persons or entities continue to afford special 
attention to the measure of keeping under control by the start of the activity, since 
the biggest danger for them could be the loss of control. The more relevant past 
experiences and similarities the person or entity has, the likelier that they will be 
able to keep the planned activity under control. In their theory applicable in every 
market, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) point out that if in a decision situation 
choosing – i.e. maintaining – the existing status quo as an alternative is allowed by 
the community, organisational norms and the rules of the regulatory body, then it is 
the most likely choice to be made. And when it is not allowed, then the alternative 
that will be chosen is the one that will result in conditions that are the closest to the 
conditions provided by the existing status quo. Naturally, the extent may change, on 
the one hand because of taking into account uncertainty and risks as a rational actor, 
on the other hand, because of wrong perceptions of cognitive origin – decoding 
of information – and thirdly, owing to differences in psychological commitment. 
According to Mokyr (2004), persons and groups interested in maintaining the 
current status quo traditionally attempt to block technological progress and other 
forms of development. They do so even though they could be clearly aware that 
those goods, services, processes and techniques and through these, indirectly those 
who produce them, comply better with the existing selection requirements than 
themselves. This is exactly why it is necessary to counter them, to put them at 
a disadvantage and to squeeze them out, because by their appearance, actions and 
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activities they made it clear that – using the terminology of Baumol (1982) – there 
is a good chance to challenge or change the current status quo. In the opinion of 
Geletkanycz (1997), commitment to the current status quo has its roots in social 
norms and values, in a form that is almost genetically coded. However, it is not self-
evident at all that the newly created higher quality or the operators that represent 
them should be put at such a disadvantage, by abusing a dominant position, that 
already corresponds to negative selection. The selection requirements should be 
especially stringent in respect of new things, but it is not desirable to create an 
insurmountable disadvantage for the possible tools and agents of development 
(Geletkanycz 1997).
According to Olson (2008), compelling institutional changes must be applied to 
prepare the field for radical economic development or transformation. However, 
for this the community of operators interested in the maintenance of the status 
quo, possessing strong bargaining power and interest-asserting capability, should 
be significantly weakened. For this to happen, they should be put at a significant 
disadvantage in selection, in the short term already. As a result of the institutional 
and political changes, those operators who otherwise comply with the existing 
selection requirements to the highest degree may lose their strong bargaining 
positions and interest-asserting capabilities in respect of the governing power. If 
the selection requirements in the economy have not changed, then the market 
mechanisms – including the use and abuse of dominant position – are not really 
suitable for weakening those operators who comply best with the requirements 
through negative selection. However, the government is capable of launching the 
process of negative selection more efficiently, by abusing its power. The reason why 
governments abuse their power is that although formally the relevant actions may 
seem legitimate, they are obviously in conflict with the economic and other interests 
of the governed group. This is what happened in Hungary as well after the Second 
World War, where the prosperous peasants (kulaks) were interned to promote 
the political changes of the time, and extensive nationalisation took place (Glatz 
1997). In the beginning the most successful, biggest rural farmers and companies 
were targeted, and later on, of those who remained, the relatively most successful, 
largest ones. This resulted in a permanent disadvantage in the development of 
Hungary’s domestic economy.
8. Conclusions
In a relatively large number of cases, there are selection criteria in everyday life, 
the implementation of which clearly does not support the development of the 
economy, even in the short term. At the same time, the phenomenon of adverse 
selection raises its head relatively rarely in reality, since it is equally dependent 
on the preconditions of a high volume of hidden information and the complete 
108 Studies
László Csorba 
good faith of the stakeholders. In comparison, negative selection is – by necessity 
– a more frequent case. In this case, the relevant information is available to the 
parties. At the same time, the individual or group possessing the information 
consciously abuses their dominant position. Moreover, this puts at a disadvantage 
exactly those who currently best comply with the existing selection requirements, 
but despite that, they are vulnerable because of the lack of a proper negotiating 
position or asserting capability. However, the dominant position or power in 
the possession of the relevant party can also be used “according to its intended 
purpose”, which enables the implementation of positive selection, very likely to 
promote development (see Table 2 for a summary of that).
Table 2
Taking advantage of dominant position or power – as opposed to abuse
Description Abuse with dominant position Example for abuse of dominant 
power
Equal treatment regardless of 
quality
Bleeding out the best operators 
on the input side, collective 
punishment, collective reward
Definition of consideration 
differentiated according to 
quality, forcing or motivating 
operators representing lower 
quality for development
Ad hoc and collective, soft 
budget constraint
Putting the best performers at 
a disadvantage, retroactively 
raising their alternative costs 
drastically
While bailing out weaker 
performers, provision of 
a proportionate premium that 
significantly exceeds even the full 
compensation of those that do 
not require assistance
Hidden corruption Squeezing out the best 
stakeholders that do not perform 
hidden activities
Establishment of an organisation 
that ensures the coordination of 
individual and group interests 
and a high level of individual 
interests
Discriminatory action of 
a monopoly
Discrimination at the expense of 
the best customers
Innovations for goods that the 
buyers find more attractive or for 
cost reduction; Increasing the 
knowledge of the customers
Suppression of higher quality for 
the maintenance or change of 
the status quo
Pushing the best quality 
stakeholders to the background
Constant planning, 
encouragement of constant 
learning and adaptation, 
enforcement
According to Akerlof and Klenow (2009:323), the perception of corruption is – 
similarly to other negative selection – an indication that from the aspect of the 
development of the group, “bad guys” managed to infiltrate the system. In fact, 
these “bad guys” are considered a body alien to the interests: they are pseudo-
members of the group who serve interests not compatible with the interests of the 
group. Although they seem to be group members, in reality it is just the other way 
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around, and therefore their presence, their free riding cause negative externalities 
to certain stakeholder groups, and thereby manifests every reason that results 
in a selection problem designated by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2016:188–190) and 
already referred to in Chapter 2:
•  For these individuals which abuse their dominant position, power or profit is the 
only success criterion;
•  As free riders, they have a short-term planning horizon;
•  As a result of their activity, those which best comply with the selection 
requirements are pushed to the background and expelled from the system within 
the shortest time;
•  Their irrational abundance acquired through their operation regularly resulting 
in negative externalities provides a selection advantage for them, even in the 
long term.
Considering developed market economies, the leaders are not distinguished from 
the rest of the countries by the lack of a wild presence of dominant positions in 
the markets, or a lower level of concentration of power. The substantial difference 
lies in the fact that in the leading countries in most cases dominant position and 
power are used, but not abused.
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Is Learning a Wonder Weapon of Endogenous 
Economic Growth?*
Péter Mihályi  
This essay attempts to refute the practicality of the main policy propositions of the 
book by Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald (S&G) entitled Creating a Learning 
Society. More specifically, it looks at the 700-page scholarly work from the 
perspective of countries struggling to catch up with the advanced Western countries. 
In the opinion of the author, S&G use the term “learning” in such a broad sense 
that it becomes almost meaningless as an explanatory factor and/or an objectively 
verifiable indicator. Equally important, by using such a value-loaded, entirely positive 
term like “learning”, S&G create a misleading feeling in the readers: catching-up 
is easy (win-win). As history has shown, it is not easy. In the paper, the model of 
a lesser known Hungarian economist, Ferenc Jánossy (1914–1997), is presented as 
a more convincing explanation of endogenous economic growth. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E61, E71, F12, I26, I28 
Keywords: Infant industry, learning-by-doing, labour productivity, endogenous 
growth, Washington consensus
1. Introduction
Personally, it makes me contented to see that thick theoretical books are now 
coming into fashion in economics once again. In the recent past, the first in the 
sequence was Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s (2012) monograph – Why 
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty – with 529 pages. Two 
years later came the 703-page blockbuster work of Piketty (2014) and the joint work 
of Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruce C. Greenwald (henceforth: S&G) at 660 pages. One 
can, of course, make cynical estimates about the percentage of buyers of these 
books who really read them from cover-to-cover, but the sheer size of these works 
opens the possibility of a broad, deep discussion among those specialists who have 
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 18 Issue 2, June 2019, pp. 117–139.
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Péter Mihályi is a Professor at the Department of Macroeconomics at Corvinus University of Budapest and 
Visiting Professor of the Department of Economics and Business at the Central European University (Budapest), 
both in Hungary. E-mail: peter@mihalyi.com
The English manuscript was received on 25 April 2018.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.33893/FER.18.2.117139
118 Essay
Péter Mihályi  
read the aforementioned books thoroughly. Social and economic issues are always 
multi-faceted. There is no such thing as a single-factor explanation. When complex 
and controversial issues, such as inequality in the case of Piketty or learning as 
the main driver of development in the case of S&G are analysed at this length, it 
opens up the possibility for specialists to verify or refute the authors’ assertions 
from many angles (e.g. methodology, geographical validity, data reliability). Such 
a broad evaluation of new propositions is simply not feasible in the case of a journal 
article or conference paper, where only one assertion or hypothesis is made (“One 
idea, one paper”) and there is simply no place to discuss the earlier, rival theories 
except of those published in the same or similar journals in the previous 3–4 years.
S&G certainly meet the requirements of a prudently written monograph. Nearly 
all the 17 substantive chapters are enriched with appendices, in which they spell 
out the simply formulated, take-home message of the given chapter using a formal 
model. What is even more valuable (and rare), in the last part of the book (Chapters 
18–22 and the Afterword) the giants of the economics profession, such as Philipe 
Aghion, Robert Solow and Kenneth J. Arrow express their opinion on the main 
tenets of the book itself, as they were formulated in the first, 2008 draft of the 
manuscript.
There is no doubt that S&G set an extraordinarily ambitious task for themselves. 
In our reading, their aim was to come out with a landmark book and a persuading, 
unique policy doctrine on a par with the Communist Manifesto (1848) of the young 
Marx and Engels and The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto 
of W.W. Rostow (1960), an economic history account of the modern world economy. 
As the full title of S&G’s book indicates, the authors try to build a new conceptual 
model of growth, development and social progress.
Authoring a thick book like this comes with a trade-off. It takes a lot of time to read 
it. As S&G explain, the book’s main idea was born at a 2008 conference celebrating 
the work of K. J. Arrow in general and his “learning-by-doing” growth theory in 
particular. Those were very different times from the present ones, when trade wars 
are already being fought between the world’s super powers. If the S&G book had 
been drafted today, it would have been a very different book in many ways.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the main take-
home policy recommendations of the S&G book, and then Section 3 attempts 
to show the flaws in these ideas. Section 4 introduces an alternative model of 
knowledge dissemination based on the book of an internationally lesser known 
Hungarian economist, Ferenc Jánossy (1914–1997). The advantage of his model is 
that he interpreted learning as a qualitative change, as opposed to the “knowledge 
gap” approach used by S&G which underscores the quantitative nature of the 
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changes. Section 5 presents short summary and a prompt reaction to the 2018 
Nobel prize awarded to Paul Romer for his endogenous growth model.
2. Starting point of the S&G hypothesis and its construction
The concept of a “learning society” has been used in the scholarly literature for 
almost 50 years.1 Among international organisations, it was first embraced by 
the OECD (2000) as a key to a nation’s economic development. The idea was 
subsequently taken further by the UNESCO, stating that education should extend 
beyond formal learning (in schools, universities, etc.) and continue until the end 
of life (“lifelong learning”).
But this is not the point where S&G start the presentation of their hypothesis. They 
start with the rejection of the mainstream, neoclassical growth model, the Cobb-
Douglas production function, the famous Y=A(Kα L1–α) equation, the Solow model 
and the Golden Rule of Edmund Phelps, because this family of models assumes 
that technological change is an exogenous factor in the model. This criticism, as 
S&G readily acknowledge many times in the book, is not original. It is derived from 
Arrow (1962), where the concept of learning by doing, as the endogenous driver 
of labour productivity growth was first introduced.2 Let us recall that the idea of 
endogenous growth itself can be traced back to the so-called Verdoorn law (after 
the Dutch economist P. J. Verdoorn) and through him back to Adam Smith. As is well 
known, it was the great Scottish philosopher who first realised that the unstoppable 
rise of labour productivity is primarily the consequence of the division of labour 
which in turn leads to “the increase of dexterity in every particular workman” as 
a by-product of the rising volume of production. When a cobbler makes a boot or 
the hairdresser cuts a client’s hair in practicing his profession, he himself becomes 
better and more productive all the time. This is all true, even if the cobbler or the 
hairdresser does not invent anything new, but simply applies and practices the 
know-how invented and introduced by others. Thus, rising productivity is achieved 
through practice, self-perfection and minor innovations, without adding workers or 
investing significant amounts of capital. This line of thinking was taken further by 
Verdoorn (1949), who found statistical evidence that in the long run macroeconomic 
productivity grows proportionally to the square root of output.
According to S&G, the secret of technical progress is not innovation, but the 
dissemination of innovation embodied in the learning-by-doing process (p. 490). 
1  See e.g. Hutchins (1970), Schön (1973), Husén (1986) and Hughes – Tight (1995) among the English language 
works published before the millennium.
2  Arrow’s specific microeconomic example to justify the concept of learning-by-doing was borrowed from 
a 1936 paper published in an aeronautical journal, according to which the labour hours required to build 
airplane frames declined in reverse proportion to the third root of the number of frames built. As the cited 
author – Wright (1936) – explained in the paper, his cost estimates were based on his own personal work 
experience in the 1920s.
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And indeed, if we take a look at the countries in the world, it is not difficult to 
observe that productivity differences within one country and/or within a single 
industry of the same country are quite considerable. Lewis’s (2004) empirical study, 
based on the collective effort of the research staff of McKinsey Global Institute, is 
full of such examples. At the end of the 1990s, labour productivity in the Japanese 
retail trade sector was not higher than one half of the comparable US figure, while 
the successful Japanese car manufacturing firms – such as Toyota – surpassed 
in labour productivity their US competitors by a margin of 30 per cent. Labour 
productivity in housing construction varied even more.3
As a generalisation of the learning-by-doing theory, the S&G hypothesis is built on 
four new propositions:
(i)  Growth is based on innovation, which in turn is based on learning. Both concepts 
are more important than allocative efficiency.
(ii)  The presumption that all firms are efficient is false; the majority of firms 
always operate below the efficiency frontiers, whether in the United States or 
elsewhere.
(iii)  Knowledge is quantifiable. The “knowledge gap” between the potential 
maximum and the actual average within a country or within a given industry is 
in itself a source of rent.
(iv)  If the knowledge gap is persistent, countries can be trapped in a low-level 
equilibrium (low rate of productivity growth) even over the medium or long 
term.4
From here, the thinking of S&G makes a turn that takes them beyond Myrdal 
(1957) and Kaldor (1966), who in the 1960s were already inclined to support state 
intervention as a part of macroeconomic demand management in the allocation of 
resources.5 But why should the state control the knowledge dissemination process 
from the supply side (as opposed to the Keynesian demand-side explanation)? 
According to S&G, globalisation and within this the growing gap between social 
and individual returns is the most important impediment to worldwide, lasting and 
equitable growth. Knowledge is a public good and in the absence of government 
3  The book drew on extensive microeconomic studies of 13 countries over 12 years conducted by the Institute 
staff and invited world-class university professors, such as Robert Solow himself. See also fn. 9.
4  For the first authentic formulation of these hypotheses, see Greenwald – Stiglitz (2006).
5  On Kaldor’s views in this regard, see Mihályi (2017) and Thirlwall (2017).
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intervention it is undersupplied by utility maximising firms and/or individuals.6 
Unlimited free trade, the cross-border flow of capital and labour, the mechanism 
of freely floating exchange rates, the liberalisation of financial markets7 and the 
harsh protection of intellectual property rights (essentially the entire list of the 
Washington consensus, Williamson, 1990, 2008) are all problematic, because in 
the less developed economies – i.e. practically in all countries, except the US – 
the overwhelming American productivity superiority prevents the local engineers, 
workers and business managers from learning and innovating. Under such a regime, 
conducting research is bound to fail businesswise. But without continuous learning 
and innovation, there is no opportunity to grow and develop. From the point of 
view of the developing countries – or using S&G’s terms: infant industries and 
infant economies – it is more promising to restrict competition and protect the 
entire home economy rather than entering into open competition with the more 
advanced economies.
According to Stiglitz and Greenwald, infant economies have two good reasons to 
protect their internal markets and support the national companies’ learning and 
research possibilities: (i) the countries and the domestic firms learn directly from 
the production process as the learning-by-doing theory suggests; and (ii) the newly 
acquired knowledge always has significant, dynamic spill-over effects (or positive 
externalities). S&G mention several examples, such as technological innovations 
in the manufacturing sector where a good idea of one firm can be applied later by 
other firms of another industry, or organisational innovations, such as the “just-in-
time” inventory management technique which can be applied across industries, 
once the necessary organisational skills and disciplines are learned by a relatively 
large pool of managers (p. 65).
If we return to the previously mentioned example of the cobbler, the problem is 
that once it was found out how to produce good quality, inexpensive boots in the 
US, firms in other countries will never be able to compete with the industry-leader 
US cobbler. According to the S&G hypothesis, this is a major problem not because 
all other countries will find it more economical to import boots from the US, but 
because the infant economies will never learn how to make boots. Furthermore, 
once a boot factory in a developing country starts its operation despite the poor 
chances of success, there is a high likelihood that it will lose out in free competition 
and go bankrupt. Then the already acquired “new knowledge” will be wasted (p. 
6  Although S&G fail to mention, there is nothing new in this proposition either. Enhancing the Marshallian 
concept of externalities, Marshall’s favourite disciple, Arthur Pigou (1920) stated exactly the same: “self-
interest will not (…) tend to make the national dividend a maximum” (Part II, Chapter IX). In the original 
Arrow paper, the same proposition is made as well. The competitive solution is different from the societal 
optimum solution, because “learning means that an act of investment benefits future investors, but this 
benefit is not paid for by the market” (op. cit. p. 168).
7  Exposing their criticism over this issue, S&G go quite far in the direction of populism, when they refer to 
“speculative businesses” and conclude that “in certain cases it is more efficient, if the state implements the 
allocation of capital investment itself” (op. cit. pp. 410–411).
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491) and the spill-over effects will cease driving the other segments of the economy 
forward. According to S&G, their theory is valid historically as well. “[T]he fact 
that some countries and firms have “learned how to learn” helps explain why the 
last two centuries have seen such remarkable increases in standards of living, in 
comparison to the millennia that preceded them, which were marked by stagnation” 
(p. 373). In short: the secret of development is learning and learning to learn.8
3. Challenging the S&G theory
The S&G hypothesis is not convincing at all and the solicited commentators on 
the original 2008 draft (Aghion, Solow and Arrow himself) did not hide very much 
their own reservations either. In our opinion, Stiglitz and Greenwald pretended as 
if they did not know…
1.  … that the essence of the capitalist system is the rivalry. There are always 
winners and losers in a competitive environment (Lavoie 1985). Only in the 
world of Utopia can one think of countries enjoying the same level of economic 
development and the closure of the knowledge gap.
2.  … that market competition is the strongest driver of innovation, even if there are 
well-known situations when limited competition actually hampers innovation 
(e.g. the rise of monopolies).
3.  … the variation of productivity among firms operating on the same market is not 
caused by a failure in learning. It is the result of better management,9 the power 
of increasing return to scale and the natural monopoly situations arising from it. 
In other cases, better performance and higher productivity are simply a matter of 
luck. It doesn’t make much sense to say that Facebook is successful because its 
managers “learned how to learn”, while Compaq, the once renowned computer 
manufacturer disappeared from the world markets because its business leaders 
were bad “pupils”.10
4.  … that if a Chinese product outcompetes an American or a European producer, 
the reason is not that the Chinese workers are cleverer or have learned more. It 
is usually because Chinese wages are still so much lower.11
8  The expression of “learning to learn” was originally developed in Stiglitz (1987).
9  This point was actually raised in the contribution of Robert Solow in Chapter 21. He directly referred to 
the empirical findings of Lewis (2004), in which he was one of the main research contributors. The key 
finding of the research was that the lower quality of management did not have much to do with learning, 
knowledge or competence. The cross-country comparisons showed that it was caused “by the weakness 
of competitive pressure, and the most important obstacle to competitive pressure was formal or informal 
protection. Firms and industries exposed to competition from best practice were driven toward best 
practice” (op. cit. pp 501–502).
10  In fact, the company disappeared after it signed a merger agreement with Hewlett-Packard in 2002.
11  I am grateful to Michael Joffe for this crucially important completion of my argumentation.
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5.  … the 75,000 employees who lose their jobs on every working day in the American 
economy are not bad “learners” either. They get fired because the structure of 
the economy is constantly changing. Certain industries created new jobs for 
decades (e.g. retail trade, publishing, etc.), but after some fundamental shifts in 
technology, the very same industries started to shed labour.12
6.  … that rent-seeking and corruption are more important snags in the developing 
countries than in the advanced ones. Therefore, centrally determined industrial 
policies carry with them an intrinsic risk. If governments assume the power to 
select the winners, the industries and firms that “merit” protection, the risk of 
state capturing might arise, and in this way industrial policies become the hotbed 
of corruption.13
Several contradictions arise from the fact that the two authors of the Learning 
Society are Americans and that therefore the book was chiefly addressed to the 
American readership. They tried to phrase their ideas in a way that is understandable 
and attractive for Americans. For example, it is a widely held opinion that the 
American educational system is disgracefully feeble and, therefore, emphasising 
the importance of learning is a popular proposition for every segment of American 
society. The upper middle class and the middle class are happy to read about this 
because these elites are convinced that they merited their relatively high social 
positions through successful education (Reeves 2017). The lower level classes 
also like to be open to the importance of education, because they expect the 
government to spend more on the education of their children.
Who is losing in free trade? At this point, some readers of the present paper might 
start to protest and raise two objections. First, it has been argued for more than 200 
years by scholars of the economics profession that free trade is not desirable for 
developing countries and new (“infant”) industries. The most important example 
was the case of the United States of America. Alexander Hamilton, one of the 
founding fathers, who served his newly born country as Secretary of the Treasury 
between 1789 and 1795, became renowned as an opponent of free trade and as 
a supporter of protectionism. It is also common knowledge that Hamilton’s views 
influenced the German Friedrich List (1841), who became the main proponent 
of economic protectionism on the European continent two generations later. 
Second, speaking for protectionism and against free trade means something very 
different today, when the United States – as the most developed Western country 
– complains about the consequences of free trade on its labour markets, than it 
did before the trade war started between China and the United States.
12  Krugman (2016)
13  This argument, which is probably trivial for readers in the post-communist countries, was mentioned in the 
contribution of Philippe Aghion (p. 496). Together with Iván Szelényi, the present author came to similar 
conclusions in Mihályi – Szelényi (2017).
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Piketty’s voluminous book, already mentioned above, was a totally unexpected 
and unparalleled commercial success. In two years more than 2.1 million copies 
were sold in French, English, German, Chinese and Spanish. For many reasons, 
S&G is unlikely to come close to this achievement. Among the reasons, I presume, 
the protectionist trade rhetoric of the current US administration is by far the 
most important. Any idea that so closely resembles the official US government 
position is bound to be rejected by the academic circles in the United States and the 
prestigious European university departments as well. It is widely known that there 
was a historical precedent, when protectionist legislation was enacted by the US 
Congress and signed into law by a president, but the consensus view today is that 
the so-called Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was – also according to Arrow – “a 
very destructive policy” (p. 508).14
Against the backdrop of such history and the noisy trade protectionism of many 
Republican-leaning congressmen and congresswomen, everything that was 
proposed by Stiglitz and Greenwald in 2014 sounds totally different today. While 
the book’s main idea, that learning can be a wonder weapon in the hands of 
enlightened, good-willing policy-makers, will continue to attract many supporters, 
the present academic environment will remain unsupportive of the policy proposals 
emanating from S&G’s interpretation of the “learning by doing” metaphor. As long 
as the ongoing trade negotiations are not completed, S&G’s suggestions pointing 
in the same direction will be hardly heard.
It is inconceivable that the two authors did not take into consideration that the 
asymmetric limitation of free trade and/or administrative manipulation of exchange 
rates are not real options for infant economies. They don’t have enough power. It 
is very difficult to speak openly like this: “We would like to export freely, but we 
restrict imports. We will keep the value of our currency low, but our trade partners 
should allow their currency to fluctuate freely.” Using double standards can be one 
element in the toolbox of a powerful country. As recent examples show, the US was 
able to put pressure on other countries to open their market to US goods, while the 
14  The full, official title of the Act was already expressive: “An Act to provide revenue, to regulate commerce 
with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States, to protect American labor, and for 
other purposes.” When it was still under debate in Congress, a petition was signed by 1,028 economists 
in the US asking President Hoover to veto the legislation. The legendary automobile executive Henry Ford 
spent an evening at the White House trying to convince Hoover to veto the bill, calling it “an economic 
stupidity.” J. P. Morgan’s chief executive Thomas W. Lamont said he “almost went down on [his] knees to 
beg Herbert Hoover to veto the asinine Hawley-Smoot tariff.” Initially, Hoover himself opposed the bill and 
called it “vicious, extortionate, and obnoxious”, but eventually he yielded to influence from his own party 
and signed the bill. The new tariff imposed an effective tax rate of 60 per cent on more than 3,200 products 
and materials imported into the United States, quadrupling previous tariff rates on individual items, and 
thus raised the average tariff rate to 19.2 per cent. As was feared, Canada and other countries raised their 
own tariffs in retaliation after the bill had become law. Unemployment was at 8 per cent in 1930 when 
the Smoot–Hawley tariff was passed, but the new law failed to lower it. The rate jumped to 16 per cent in 
1931, and 25 per cent in 1932–33.
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US markets remained closed for the partner country. But this is not a viable strategy 
for converging countries, except for the very large ones such as China or India.15
To whom is the book’s message addressed? To whom do the authors direct their 
policy recommendations? To the poorest countries of Africa, the 10 new Member 
States of the European Union, to Russia or China, or to Greece or Italy, as the laggard 
countries in the EU? In the book, there is no answer to this critically important 
question. What is even more troublesome, the authors close their book by saying 
that industrial policies and government interventions in trade are desirable and 
may even be a permanent part of economic policy in the most advanced countries 
and not just in the early part of the convergence period of an ambitious infant 
economy (p. 474).
Learning has several meanings in the book. As we noted already, much of what S&G 
call learning is partly or entirely something else. There are at least five different 
meanings of “learning” in the book.
1.  Often the term’s true meaning in the given context is adjustment (p. 375). Firms 
always try to adjust to the changing market conditions, sometimes successfully, 
other times unsuccessfully. Behind the failures the retrospective analysis usually 
identifies managerial mistakes, bad judgment or slow reaction.
2.  Industrialisation in lagging, catching-up countries is always based on emulation. 
In these economies, improved competitiveness at the level of firms means the 
adoption of existing technologies, and usually not the latest ones. If this is followed 
by innovation, this innovation is incremental and of small significance. This was the 
“secret” of the successful industrialisation of Japan, the Soviet Union, and South 
Korea. Other authors rightly use the term catching-up growth to characterise the 
nature of this type of development. By contrast, cutting-edge growth is observable 
only in the most advanced countries.16 Confounding the two types of progression 
and the two types of learning processes behind them is utterly misleading.
3.  Few growth specialists or economic historians would question the importance 
of acquiring basic cognitive skills, like reading, writing, arithmetic, etc. There is 
a huge literature asserting that economic development is correlated with formal 
education (schooling), especially with the advancement of primary education.
15  Robert Solow pointed out this contradiction, and – in an extremely polite way – made a devastating counter-
argument. It is true that for an infant economy it is of vital importance to direct its products toward export 
markets in order to exploit the advantages arising from scale economies. Exporting is also very important to 
maintain and improve the quality of its products and services under the pressure of the high requirements 
of the foreign buyers. At the same time, however, it follows from the S&G hypothesis that the infant country 
should protect its own domestic markets from foreign competitors. One can imagine tolerance for the 
protection of an infant industry here and another there, but an overarching protection for an entire infant 
economy would be a harder sell (op. cit. p.501).
16  See Joffe (2017). With the same meaning as cutting-edge growth, Jones (2015) introduced the term frontier-
growth.
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4.  Since Max Weber’s hypothesis on the contribution of the Protestant values to 
growth, there has been a broad agreement that non-cognitive (cultural or soft) 
skills are also indispensable for growth. Sometimes these skills are part and parcel 
of the local, traditional culture (e.g. Protestant ethic, Confucianism); in other 
cases, these skills need to be “imported” and disseminated by the educational 
system, religious organisations, the media, etc. The dissemination of English as 
a foreign language and Anglo-Saxon cultural values is a good recent example in 
Eastern Europe. The modernisation of Russia under Peter the Great (1696–1725) 
and Japan during the Meiji period (1868–1912) worked with similar policy tools. 
Such implantations are almost impossible to carry out effectively without some 
kind of government commitment, although today much of it happens through 
the unstoppable use of the internet and mobile phone applications, even if the 
incumbent governments don’t like it or try to stop it. A recent bad example in 
this regard is the decision of the Iranian leadership to ban the teaching of English 
in all primary schools.17
5.  Admittedly, the US has been the most advanced and most productive economy 
for about a century, and its advantage has only increased vis-à-vis Western Europe 
since the onset of the international financial crisis of 2008. But how can the US 
economy be so effective in spite of the allegedly poor quality of its educational 
system? In our opinion, the answer is simple. The tens of millions working in 
the trade and service sector don’t need to learn how to do business in school. 
They bring this knowledge from home. Americans have been good entrepreneurs 
since the foundation of the Republic, and there is a constant supply of potential 
entrepreneurs through immigration.
The importance of resistance to learning. The authors correctly point out more 
than one time in the book that certain conservative societies are purposely built 
on the strategy of no-change (p. 96). But they fail to draw the conclusion from this, 
namely that in such cases what is missing is not “learning” or “the capacity to learn”, 
but those specific values that are required to catch up with the more advanced 
countries. In more difficult cases, the majority of people in such conservative 
countries are honestly and deeply convinced that it is in their country’s interest to 
defend the “old” values.
Finally, an author from a post-socialist economy can only regret that S&G do 
not even mention the bitter experiences of the large and small former socialist 
countries, such as the Soviet Union or Hungary, and the military dictatorships in 
Latin America that in many ways were similar to the planned economies. Dozens 
of such countries pursued protectionist policies for decades in the 20th century. But 
17  The Guardian, 7 January, 2018.
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their overall growth performance was dismal. These countries failed to catch up 
with their international competitors as long as they pursued such policies.
In a certain sense, this is understandable. Professor Stiglitz and Greenwald do 
not have personal experience with such regimes and, therefore, do not have 
a gut feel for how centralised, autocratic regimes function. But they should know 
from the literature that there are few good examples proving that state-initiated 
trade restrictions, investment policies, and industrial research – which are all 
important parts of the “learning society” model – lead to the hoped-for results, to 
a sustainable increase in competitiveness and catching-up in productivity levels. 
Only the case of Japan (between 1945 and 1990), South Korea (1978–2010) and 
Taiwan (1960–1990) can be cited as convincing examples. If in the case of China, 
state-supported industrial research brings significant and sustainable returns to the 
country in the future (which is far from certain), this is probably due to the gigantic 
size of its economy.18
4. A better theory of “learning by doing”
Learning is a qualitative change. Even among Hungarian economists of the young 
generation, only a few read and remember the works of Ferenc Jánossy (1914–
1997), a Hungarian economist of great originality.19 This is a pity because much of 
S&G sounds very similar to Jánossy’s thoughts developed during the 1960s. In our 
opinion, Jánossy put forward a more convincing endogenous growth theory than 
the S&G concept.
The central assumption of this theory is that over the long run the productive 
potential of an economy is determined by the size and qualification structure of 
the labour force only. Technically speaking, the slope of the long-run potential 
growth path is determined by the rate of accumulation in labour qualifications and 
is thus unaffected by the investment rate. In the short run, however, actual output 
is limited by the workplace structure of the economy, i.e. the capital stock and its 
technological composition. In crisis-free economic development, the complementary 
factors of production tend to accumulate in harmony, so that the employment 
structure of the economy reflects the qualification structure of the labour force. 
However, in the immediate aftermath of a war or a major depression, a large gap 
between actual and potential output can open up due to a severe distortion in 
factor proportions. This phenomenon is termed “structural incongruence” and is 
18  According to the latest available data, China’s total R&D in 2013 was equal to the money the United States 
spent in 2005 (Veuglers 2017).
19  Ferenc Jánossy grew up in Germany and worked and studied engineering in the Soviet Union between 
1933–1946 before returning to his native Hungary. German was his first language; therefore everything 
he wrote in German was subsequently translated into Hungarian. His most important book, The End of 
the Economic Miracle. Appearance and Reality in Economic Development was simultaneously published 
in German and Hungarian in 1966. The English translation, used in the present paper, appeared in 1971.
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assumed to result from the depletion of physical capital, especially machinery, as 
a consequence of wartime destruction and/or depressed investment activity. This 
structural incongruence constitutes an extraordinary growth potential. Initially, due 
to the low capital-labour ratio, returns on capital are very high, inducing exceptional 
rates of investment and, consequently, accelerated capital accumulation. In other 
words, during the reconstruction period, there are no labour-supply constraints on 
capital formation. Once the economy returns to its long-run potential growth path, 
the miracle ends. Further expansion must rely exclusively on improvement of the 
qualification structure of labour, since the complementary workplace structure of 
the economy can no longer develop faster.20
In this complex model, Jánossy interpreted learning – i.e. the improvement of 
the qualification structure of the labour force – as a qualitative change rather 
than a quantitative process: “man’s individual knowledge today is not necessarily 
greater than yesterday’s, but mainly of a different kind” (Jánossy 1971: p. 205). 
This is very much different from Arrow’s starting point (“knowledge is growing in 
time”21) which has been taken over uncritically by S&G. If, however, learning means 
a qualitative change, there is no such thing as a “knowledge gap” that separates 
infant economies from the more developed countries (as S&G claim on p. 481). 
Every child who grew up on the enchanting Indian stories of James F. Cooper or Karl 
May knows that the life of Native Americans required all sorts of knowledge (horse-
riding, hunting, making fire, shooting arrows, etc.) which were necessary to survive 
in that environment. Their knowledge, of course, was immeasurably different from 
the knowledge of modern American farmers growing wheat in the state of Iowa, 
or a banker working on Wall Street today. But horse-riding is not a must anymore.
The concept of “learning by doing” was identified by Jánossy independently from 
Arrow, and his metaphor (learning from the machine) was more illuminating than 
that of Arrow. As Jánossy wrote “cutting can only be learned at a lathe, crushing at 
a milling machine, and driving at the wheel of the car. (…) This transfer of knowledge 
through the means of production is of particular interest (…) because this is 
precisely what causes the misleading impression that perfection of machinery is 
the primary factor of economic development” (op. cit. p. 209). Due to this important 
link, there is no real substitution between capital (C) and labour (L). Both of them 
are needed – simultaneously at a given point of historical time and in more or less 
fixed proportions.22
20  For a detailed, English language summary of Jánossy’s model and fresh research in the spirit of Jánossy, 
see Tarján (2002) and Vonyó (2008).
21  See Arrow’s clear statement in the first paragraph of his 1962 paper (op. cit. p. 155). Author’s emphasis 
(P.M.).
22  This is very different from Arrow’s original approach, where the cumulative production of capital goods is 
used as a proxy for workers’ experience – i.e. for learning.
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Forced industrialisation is risky. In several of his writings, Jánossy discussed the 
ways and means how these fixed proportions were often purposely distorted by 
government policies. One important example is when state-controlled, forced 
industrialisation leads to loss-making investments and then the government has no 
choice other than to impose limits on other market participants to protect the newly 
created factories. This may make sense, concludes Jánossy similarly to S&G, if and 
when the loss-making investment significantly helps the formation of the working 
force in the enterprise concerned. The example of the Soviet industrialisation drive 
in the 1930s proves that such policies are sustainable for quite some time. But 
there are two uncomfortable by-products of policies based on the presumption 
that allocative efficiency doesn’t count. Firstly, to maintain such a system, the state 
needs a large and brutal state apparatus, because these loss-making investments 
are financed to the detriment of consumers. With the benefit of hindsight, it is 
very likely that the development of Russia would have been faster and much less 
murderous than it was, if the market system had been maintained all along the 
70 years of socialist planning. Second, the forced investment drive – at least in 
the Soviet or the Chinese cases – led to slow growth in consumption, which in 
turn slowed the “learning” of the labour force. Widespread knowledge of driving 
supposes private ownership of passenger cars, clean working hands require the 
availability of bathrooms at home, the knowledge of foreign languages requires 
mass tourism, etc.
Jánossy, who spent many years in the Hungarian Planning Office, warned his 
contemporary socialist planners not to try to accelerate economic growth through 
radically increased research and development expenditures (R&D) either. Although 
it is not easy to comprehend on first hearing, innovation, as the output of research, 
does not generate welfare directly. Innovation is merely a “recipe” that shows 
how the structure of production needs to be modified in order to increase the 
productivity of labour (op. cit. p. 117). Whether the conditions of implementing 
the necessary restructuring of production are present or not in a given country and 
a given industry, depends on the quality of the labour force at large, and not on the 
quality of the researchers. It doesn’t help if the R&D activity runs much ahead of the 
quality of the labour force. If this happens, it leads only to massive societal waste.
As shown above, the broader meaning of learning in the S&G concept included 
emulation, the copying of technologies of the more advanced countries. There 
is nothing wrong with this. Although in theory, the possibility of a revolutionary 
innovation being born in an infant economy cannot be excluded, the experience of 
the past two centuries has showed that all pioneering innovations came from the 
most advanced countries such as Britain, Germany, and the US. János Kornai (2014) 
compiled a list of 111 innovations of great significance and proved that indeed only 
the most advanced countries were capable of converting inventions to innovation 
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and organising the large-scale manufacturing of the new product in a commercially 
viable way (op. cit. pp. 5–18). There are few exceptions to this rule. The inventor of 
the ballpoint pen lived in Argentina, Nescafe is a Swiss product, and the software 
behind Skype was developed in Estonia, but none of these innovations had a major 
macroeconomic impact on the countries where these exceptional technological 
attainments were achieved.
Before anybody falls in love with the “Learning Society” hypothesis, it is worth 
recalling the warning of Jánossy (1969) who introduced the concept of “quasi-
development”. This is directly linked to emulation or copying. As he argued 50 
years ago, when a country tries to accelerate economic growth in general and 
the development of manufacturing industry with protectionist trade policies 
and artificial manipulation of the exchange rate, etc., there is a danger that the 
emulation will be successful only in a statistical sense. The volume of production 
will increase, but the quality of goods coming off the conveyor belts of the newly 
created factories will be hopelessly inferior to the products of the advanced market 
economies. Many socialist countries went through this bitter experience. Perhaps 
the most telling illustration is the fate of the Soviet Lada passenger cars produced 
during the 1970s and 1980s, originally copied from a 1966 model of the Italian 
car manufacturer Fiat. Millions of such cars were manufactured, but they were 
outmoded from Day One onwards, and the factory made financial losses on the 
Western exports of these cars.
Aggressive spending on schooling does not guarantee success either. It follows from 
Jánossy’s endogenous growth concept that growth also cannot be accelerated by 
the forced expansion of schooling.
•  Let us illustrate this point first with present-day pair-wise comparisons. Take 
Poland and Germany. According to standardised OECD data, the share of persons 
in the labour force with a tertiary education degree is the same in both countries 
(28 per cent), while productivity23 is more than 2.1 times as high in Germany. 
We can take another, even more shocking, example. In the 25–64 age group, 
54 per cent of the Russian workers had some tertiary education, which is much 
higher than the corresponding American, Japanese or Israeli figures (all between 
45–50 per cent), let alone the comparable Danish figure (37 per cent). Regarding 
productivity, however, the American level is 2.5 times as high as in Russia.
•  Similar differences can be identified when the least educated population is 
compared (primary education). The share of Hungarians in the labour force with 
no more than 8 years spent in school is just 1 per cent, while in Portugal this 
23  Measured as output per hour worked in international US dollars (converted to 2016 price level with 
updated 2011 PPPs).
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indicator stands at 32 per cent. From this strikingly large difference, one would 
assume that the Hungarian economy must display higher productivity levels. 
However, the contrary is the case: output per hour worked is 10 per cent higher in 
Portugal than in Hungary.24 It is worthwhile to cite old cross-country comparisons 
as well. In 1910, the percentage of illiterates in Hungary amounted to 15 per 
cent and the country’s GDP was estimated by Maddison at 2,000 $/head.25 By 
contrast, in Italy and Belgium, where the illiteracy rates were 38 and 25 per cent, 
respectively, the GDP/head figures were 2,332 and 4,064 dollars – i.e. significantly 
higher than in Hungary.
•  Cross-country studies equipped with rigorous econometric tools also lead to 
similar conclusions. In Pritchett (2006), the lack of econometric evidence for the 
quantitative “knowledge gap” is explained by the fact that over the last 50 years 
schooling at all levels (from primary to tertiary) has expanded massively on all 
continents, while there has been a historical and continued divergence in output 
per capita. Hence, the cross-national dispersion of schooling per worker and the 
dispersion of output per head have moved sharply in opposite directions.
Thus, the implication that the level and growth of aggregate schooling per worker 
will do, at best, a modest amount to explain the growth of output per worker only 
confirms Jánossy’s assertion born in the 1960s.
As another Hungarian economist – Polónyi (2010) – already noted, this “over-
education” is not a unique Hungarian phenomenon. It holds for all the post-socialist 
countries that the population’s formal educational level is higher than in market 
economy countries with similar levels of economic development. Quite clearly, 
this over-education drive was – to a very great extent – driven by the absence of 
tuition fees during the decades of socialism. As Jánossy (1969) and Holló (1974) 
who worked together showed, the extensive growth strategy in general and in the 
educational sector, in particular, led to quasi-development and over-education, or 
waste – if we allow ourselves to use such a harsh term. Later research upheld this 
speculative finding. Covering more than 60 countries with comparable PISA-test 
results, a study by the consulting company, McKinsey (2010:14–15) found that in 
low- and middle-income countries “systems with similar education spending have 
widely varying levels of performance – until the USD 6,000 spend per student (PPP) 
mark is reached – system performance spans the full spectrum of poor, fair, good, 
and great”. Better schools do not necessarily lead to more growth (Hanushek – 
Woessmann 2012).
24  The source of education and productivity data are https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EAG_
NEAC (downloaded on 30 August 2017) and The Conference Board (2017), respectively. All data refer to 
2015.
25  GDP/head data in constant 1990 USD.
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Resistance to change/learning. At this point, it is worthwhile to return to one of 
the shortcomings of the S&G hypothesis which was mentioned above: namely, 
that it does not pay sufficient attention to the natural inertia of societies and the 
conscious resistance to change. By using such a value-loaded, entirely positive term 
like “learning”, Stiglitz and Greenwald create a misleading feeling in their readers: 
catching up is easy. In reality, the transition has always been difficult from low to 
middle or from middle to upper-income and very few countries have succeeded in 
it.26 In the last 20 years, South Korea was the only large country in the world that 
managed to pass the second hurdle.
Jánossy showed with a simple argument that rapid economic progress is not easy 
at all, because people, for good reasons from their perspective, resist. “For if no 
great resistance would stand in the way of diffusion of new achievements and of 
greater labour productivity, there would be no people left who carry drinking water 
home in earthen vessels on their heads from the well, no nomad tents, and even no 
steam locomotives, the last specimens of which would already stand in museums 
next to waterwheels and handlooms” (op. cit. p.135). Often religious norms are 
the main obstacle, such as the strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law in some 
countries according to which girls should not be allowed to go to school.27 The 
traditional forms of Hinduism have a similar negative impact on women’s education 
and employment. In other cases, as the authors of the third thick book, Acemoglu 
and Robinson, convincingly demonstrated, the resistance comes from a small group 
of people or a minority group within the country controlling all political institutions 
and excluding others from decision-making, ownership rights, fair competition, 
etc. This, in turn, may lead to counter-resistance, strikes, uprisings and civil wars, 
which then throw countries back in development by decades. A few hundred years 
ago, the resistance to change and to new narratives was difficult in Europe too. 
Scholars at the turn of the 15th and 16th century often risked their own lives when 
they criticised the canonised truths of Greek and Latin authors, dead already for 
many hundreds of years.
Convergence is difficult, because the pioneers learn too. With the introduction 
of the “knowledge gap” concept, the S&G hypothesis creates a deceitful image 
about the future chances of infant economies to catch up with the most advanced 
26  Using the World Bank’s categorisation – low-, middle and upper-income countries – and more recent data 
for a large number of countries Cox (2017) paper is a convincing illustration of this statement.
27  A 2017 Pew Research Center survey in 39 countries asked Muslims whether they want sharia law, a legal 
code based on the Quran and other Islamic scripture, to be the official law of the land in their country. 
Responses to this question varied widely. Nearly all Muslims in Afghanistan (99 per cent) and most in 
Iraq (91 per cent) and Pakistan (84 per cent) support sharia law as official law. But in other countries, 
especially in Eastern Europe and Central Asia – including Turkey (12 per cent), Kazakhstan (10 per cent) 
and Azerbaijan (8 per cent) – relatively few favour the implementation of sharia law. The variation in Africa 
is also considerable: 86 per cent in Niger, but only 37 per cent in Tanzania. http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/, downloaded 
on 1 September 2017.
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countries. It is enough that well-meaning policy-makers support learning and the 
spread of innovation in all possible ways. By contrast, Jánossy presented a very 
simple illustration that shows that – beyond the problem of resistance, analysed 
already above – the horrendous difficulty in catching up with the most advanced 
countries lies in the fact that the most productive economies are usually capable 
of improving their performance all the time, and there is no intrinsic impediment 
blocking them from innovating further.
In the Anglo-Saxon world, this phenomenon is known as the Red Queen Hypothesis, 
which is an often used metaphor in everyday life, in economics, in the theory of 
arms race, in evolutionary biology, etc. The Red Queen is a fictional character in 
Lewis Carroll’s (1865) fantasy novella, Through the Looking-Glass. Talking to the real-
world hero of the book, Alice, the Red Queen described her empire as a system, in 
which “It takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.” In narrow, 
economic terms, this is the description of competition: if your competitors are 
moving ahead, you have to move as fast, not to lose ground. In broader evolutionary 
terms (Valen 1973), the message is: “For an evolutionary system, continuing 
development is needed just in order to maintain its fitness relative to the systems 
it is co-evolving with.”
The following model directly taken over from Jánossy’s book (op. cit. pp. 128–131) 
illustrates the connection between the diffusion of innovations and the rise of 
productivity in time and space. Let us assume that six shipwrecked sailors – A, B, 
C, D, E and F – go ashore on a Monday and start to catch turtles as the only source 
of food on an uninhabited island. After one day of hard work, each of them returns 
with 10 turtles. Then sailor A racks his brain overnight and comes up with a trick, 
a kind of a turtle trap, with which he succeeds in doubling his catch on Tuesday. He 
catches 20 turtles instead of 10, while the other five sailors achieve only the yield 
of the previous day. After that, the innovation begins to spread. On Wednesday 
the trap is already used by sailor B, and on Thursday by sailors A, B and C as well. 
On Friday, A succeeds in perfecting his method further, and thus catches 30 turtles, 
while B, C and D – still using Tuesday’s innovation – continue to get 20 each, while 
E and F, still using their hands only – catch 10 each. The improved method finds 
acceptance too and is adopted by B on Saturday, while all the others remain content 
with Tuesday’s innovation, except for the most backward among them, F, who still 
hunts turtles without any tool. Table 1 below shows the “catch” for each sailor and 
each day.
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Table 1
The spread of innovation in catching turtle in the Jánossy model
Sailor Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
A 10 20 20 20 30 30
B 10 10 20 20 20 30
C 10 10 10 20 20 20
D 10 10 10 10 20 20
E 10 10 10 10 10 20
F 10 10 10 10 10 10
Source: Jánossy (1971) p. 129.
In order to show the course of the first and the second innovation – increasing 
the daily catch from 10 to 20 and then from 20 to 30 – the data in the table are 
presented in graphic form (Figure 1) too. The figure is a representation, in a general 
sense, of productivity as a function of time and place.
The three-dimensional figure has the advantage of showing both the increase of 
productivity in the course of time and the growing variation of productivity for each 
day of the week (non-existent on Monday, quite significant on Saturday). These 
two cross sections of time and sailors are shown as projected silhouettes. The third 
projection, an aerial view shows the diffusion process itself – i.e. how fast the steps 
of productivity created by the inventions of sailor A were diffused. The measure 
of diffusion at a given time is the number of sailors who have already adopted the 
Figure 1
























Source: Jánossy (1971) p. 129.
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innovation. In this example, the speed of diffusion is one worker per day. Let us 
now leap from the six sailors to the entire population of the globe, and from the 
“developments” of one week to developments of several centuries, while we stay 
in the one-product (turtles-only) world.
Let each sailor correspond to a country, his labour productivity to the average 
productivity in that country, and the week on the uninhabited island to world 
economic history over the past 200 years. The increase in productivity of one 
country forms a cross-section through time – this is the per capita growth of 
national income (or GDP). On the left-hand side of Figure 2, the projected silhouette 
corresponds to the GDP growth of country A, while on the right-hand side we see 
(without projection) that in country F there was no GDP growth at all over the past 
200 years. The other projected silhouette shows the productivity of the six sailors 
on Saturday, or (in the generalised model) all countries of the world in order of 
their stage of development after the transmission of the innovations. Country A is 
the most developed and country F is the least advanced one. If we extend our time 
horizon, we can easily get the same result: only country A innovates – the one which 
was the most advanced already at the beginning – and the rest grow as fast as they 
can emulate the leading edge technology.
While we stay within Jánossy’s endogenous model, we are moving closer to 
reality if we say that – beyond the qualification of the labour force – economic 
development in peace times is strongly influenced by three static endowment 
factors and three countervailing dynamic forces. The static (hardly changeable or 
improvable) factors are geography, ecology, and geopolitics. The physical distance 
from the centres of economic growth, access to the high seas, weather conditions, 
the availability of exploitable natural resources (e.g. hydrocarbons), and navigable 
rivers all matter (Diamond 1997; Sachs 2003; Sachs 2012). Seashores and mountains 
and archaeological treasures inherited from the past are all valuable for the 
development of tourism – a high value-added industry in general. The dynamic 
factors are
•  the inertia that slows down the market-driven changes in the quality of the labour 
force,
•  the ambition to emulate the more advanced countries which works in the opposite 
direction, and
•  immigration, if it helps to increase healthy rivalry in the recipient country.
I do not want to pretend that the identification of these six factors is a particularly 
original idea. S&G are undoubtedly fully aware of them. However, they are all 
intrinsically more controversial than learning, and thus challenging to publicise in 
broader social circles.
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5. Conclusion and the further direction of research
This essay on Creating a Learning Society by Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald 
shows that the term “learning” is used in the book in such a broad sense that it 
becomes almost meaningless as the alleged main driver of economic convergence. 
Another major shortcoming of S&G is that they leave obscure to whom their policy 
advice is addressed: to the very poor, infant economies, the unsuccessful countries, 
or to every country that aspires to catch up with the world’s leading economy, 
the United States. By using such a value-loaded, entirely positive term such as 
“learning”, Stiglitz and Greenwald create a misleading feeling in their readers: 
catching up is easy. The present paper, relying on the endogenous growth theory 
of a lesser known late Hungarian economist, Ferenc Jánossy showed that it is 
not because people, for good reasons from their own perspective, resist change. 
Furthermore, catching up is difficult, because if your competitors are moving ahead, 
you have to move just as fast, just not to lose ground.
This essay was already accepted for publication when the news came that Paul 
Romer was awarded the 2018 Nobel Memorial Prize for laying down the foundation 
of the endogenous growth theory in 1990. A comparison of Romer’s model with 
that of Jánossy should be the subject of a next study.
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The Dawn of Eurasia – On the Trail of the New World Order
Hungarian translation: Eurázsia hajnala – Az új világrend nyomában
Pallas Athéné Publishing House, Budapest, 2018, p. 252
ISBN: 978-615-5884-09-2 
In his book, Portuguese politician and political scientist Bruno Maçães expresses 
his view that the coming decade will not be ruled by a specific continent, but will 
instead see the advent of Eurasia. He draws attention to the fact that Eurasia is in 
itself a complex world where very different political regimes coexist. He argues 
that this super-continent may play the role of a balancing power in the near future. 
After the Second World War, European countries had to face the fact that they 
had lost their leading role in the world and the United States rose to become the 
major power. In his view, a similar transfer of power is in progress today, resulting 
in the rise of China. A possible consequence of this shift is that Eurasia’s role will 
increase since China sees the envisaged global order in the Eurasian concept. An 
important evidence of this idea is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This emerging 
“Chinese” worldview proves that China (and according to the author, also Russia) 
already live in the Eurasian era. And so the book points out that it would make sense 
to consider Europe and Asia as one continent and think from now on in terms of 
a uniform Eurasia. 
In the first part of his book, Maçães examines the roots of separation between 
Europe and Asia. He also explores the possibilities that could end this fragmentation 
and expresses his view about the possible role of the new super-continent which 
is being built on the ruins of the past world order. The border between Europe 
and Asia was always uncertain and illusory. The author makes use of Voltaire’s 
ideas to point out that it is difficult to tell where Europe ends and Asia begins 
when arriving at the Sea of Azov. Continuing this line of thought, the author argues 
that the separation between the two regions is not so much spatial but rather 
temporal owing to the fact that Europe had quite a head start during the era of 
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the Industrial Revolution in terms of modernisation and development. But today 
it seems that it is not impossible to make up for this disadvantage. What is even 
more interesting is that these developing societies seem to be choosing their own 
way of modernisation. The real difference between Europe and Asia is that Europe 
followed the road of modernisation while Asia kept itself to the traditional ways. 
Nowadays, however, these differences seem to be fading away thanks to the rapid 
spreading of modernisation outside of Europe. In agreement with Francis Fukuyama, 
the author points out that nowadays countries around the world are following 
different paths towards the development of modern society and even their vision 
about such a modern society is quite different.
The author argues that when Russia and China developed their joint megaproject – 
the One Belt One Road initiative – one of their main intentions was to prove to the 
European Union that the European integration ambition is not sufficient. Namely, 
while Europe follows an exercise of power based on the ecclesial model, Russia 
and China more or less believe in universality. The Eurasian supercontinent jointly 
envisaged by Russia and China would have three determining players: one in the 
West, one in the East and one in the centre. But the three central players cannot 
be construed without one another and their position relative to one another is 
also continuously changing. In the current case, for example, Moscow is politically 
closer to Beijing than to Berlin. These developments clearly benefit China as China 
may gain access to Russian raw materials and is able to represent a greater political 
power in Central Asia and even in Russia. According to the author the turning point 
for China to become a leading power is the ultimate resolution of the Russian issue. 
But he argues that the Eurasian integration means something different for China, 
Russia and the European Union. From the perspective of the European Union, 
the author considers the Eurasian concept as a possible solution because small 
European states which are currently unable to cooperate will have an incentive 
to reinforce their integration as they acknowledge that they will not be able to 
compete with countries such as China or India on their own.
In the second part of the book, the author paints a geopolitical picture of Eurasia 
through his own overland journey. During his trip he visited several less known 
countries and cities and talked to locals. With the help of this accumulated 
knowledge, through the eyes of the locals the author attempts to present the given 
regions and underpin the view that in the future the emergence of the Eurasian 
supercontinent may override the current positions of power. The author devoted 
separate chapters to China and Russia, which according to Maçães may provide the 
political and economic foundation of the supercontinent.
The first stop of the author was Azerbaijan where, according to the insight of 
a local architect, Baku is the only true Eurasian city on the world map, not only 
geopolitically but also in terms of architecture. European and Asian architectural 
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styles are mixed which influenced and still influences the city’s culture and social life. 
In his view Europe and Asia represent a real paradox: two separate worlds on one 
joint continent. But East and West have to meet somewhere; the only question is 
where to find this connection point. The next stop was a Western province of China, 
the autonomous region of Xinjiang inhabited by the Uighur people. Despite all of its 
internal political problems, this province plays a huge role in the implementation of 
the One Belt One Road project. The next chapter takes us to China where we can 
read about the realisation of the Chinese dream. The author sees the key to Chinese 
success mainly in that the country has already reached such a developed level of 
Internet usage where the digital and the physical worlds are almost completely 
connected. This, however, also raises the question whether China will be able to 
catch up with the Western world and if the answer is yes, whether it will stop 
there when it reaches the Western level, or whether it will surpass it through new 
developments and exert strong influence on the Chinese society, on China’s politics 
and practically even on all of humanity.
Maçães then guides us to the Big Ussuri Island presenting the island’s current 
situation and then takes us to Russia where he discusses the issue of Russian 
identity. After visiting various parts and cities of the country, he reaches the 
conclusion in the light of historical and cultural differences that Russia cannot 
be considered as a European country. He argues that because Russia was always 
positioned between Europe and Asia, it is no wonder that it is so interested in the 
Eurasian concept. Next, he presents the “Eurasian tunnel”, that is, Turkey. First, he 
describes some historical aspects and then covers the country’s current situation. 
The foreign policy of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is covered extensively 
as well as Turkey’s relationship with NATO and Russia. He closes this chapter with 
the description of the Syrian and Afghan situation.
He then takes us to Europe. The author considers Europe’s prospects within the 
Eurasian concept as critical. In his view, Europe still considers itself as one of the 
most developed continents of modern times. But when comparing it with the rest of 
the world (mainly with Asia) all he sees is underdevelopment. Maçães believes that 
we are witnessing great transformation in today’s Europe which he mainly attributes 
to external changes. In his opinion, EU countries must certainly also be aware of 
these changes. Over the past decades, the European Union did not really care about 
the underdeveloped world outside of Europe. But today the winds of change come 
as a huge shock for Europe and for the time being the current European system is 
unable to give an appropriate response to these recent developments. This system – 
that has worked automatically and smoothly so far – has been suddenly overturned 
and Europe is desperately trying to find a solution. Not so much a political one, but 
rather one of an “engineering” aspect to make it functional once again. But the 
question is will this be the appropriate solution in the long run?
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In the opinion of the author, the solution lies in that Europe should also bear in 
mind the Eurasian concept. His first argument is the two superpowers, Russia and 
China. Maçães lists some foreign policy facts as an additional argument, such as 
the issues surrounding Ukraine, energy and trade and the refugee crisis. In his view, 
the refugee crisis cannot be handled successfully without the coordinated efforts of 
Europe and Asia. His third argument consists of the significant security threats that 
should be construed and managed within a Eurasian context. The author believes 
that Europe, as one of the Eurasian powers, should put its complex of superiority 
aside and learn how to pursue its interests towards the East. He argues that to be 
Eurasian as a European means that when choosing the common European strategy 
and direction, not only Europe but eastern regions should also be considered. His 
last compelling argument as to why Europe would be better off with a Eurasian 
union is that this would enable Europe to overcome the centrifugal forces currently 
observable within Europe and to preserve European unity.
The author starts the epilogue with the election of Donald Trump as president 
of the United States and the impact thereof on international relations. He then 
analyses the current situation of the Muslim world and China and the difficulties 
they may face in the future. According to the author, these difficulties mainly reside 
in that these societies chose a new direction of civilisation on the road leading 
to modernisation. He finally analyses some future challenges facing America and 
Europe deriving firstly from their democratic systems. In his view, changes within 
the international balance of power have a much faster and deeper spill-over effect 
into these countries. The author identifies the second main challenge to be the 
emerging new global order. In his view there will be no specific centres in the 
new global order, instead the balance will be created among the poles. Brexit is 
yet another proof in the eyes of the author that our current global order is going 
through momentous shifts. Maçães concludes that a new superpower is emerging 
and the global power is unstoppably shifting towards Asia. The question is how 
Europe reacts to these developments.
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Etikus közgazdaságtan (Ethical Economics)
Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2019, p. 370.
ISBN: 978-615-5318-22-1
The latest volume of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) book series deals with 
a core paradox in global financial context. Entitled Ethical Economics (2019), the 
work explores whether a normative, value-based order governed by community 
rules can be legitimised through institutional practices and what motivates the 
renewed demand for such in economic theories. The twelve authors take different 
perspectives in tracing ethical principles in economic practices. There is, however, 
one thing, that they definitely have in common: in weighing the recent effects of 
financial and capital market imbalances (by means of social sciences), they all urge 
a paradigm shift in mainstream thinking. The twelve assiduously prepared, yet 
comprehensible essays do not simply address the community of professionals: they 
are of interest to a much broader audience, even as additional reading material in 
academic courses.
Not all that seems ethical is in fact ethical. On the other hand, a hidden ethical 
dimension might be capable of restructuring the processes of economics. No 
member of society is unaffected by ethos and oikos, as the economy is a sub-system 
of society (that operates inseparably from our basic human relations, cultural code 
systems, material, technological and environmental conditions). The overt or covert 
ethical implications behind economic decisions/business activities can lead to 
grave financial outcomes, just as the lack of institutional norms and ethics can 
generate negative consequences. The authors use a variety of examples to illustrate 
the stabilising or destructive effects exerted by underlying value system(s) on 
economies. In his study, Géza Sebestyén assigns qualitative indicators to distinctive 
religious preferences (using databases of about 20 countries), analysing their impact 
on GDP and displaying how denominational commitment demonstrably contributes 
to the maintenance of macro-level stability.
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Gábor Gyura points to marginal “security gains” deriving from fair banking practices 
and to the additional business benefits generated by ethical capital. He thus justifies 
the way financial regulatory authorities tend to move from sanction policies towards 
positive incentives. The study by Judit Hidasi points out how cultural behaviour 
and value preferences (such as employees’ “organisational loyalty” or “culturally 
coded” commitment to quality standards) can enhance the economic position of 
a country or a particular business, but in the same way can also be restrictive 
in certain production contexts (e.g. when budgetary rationality is superseded by 
corporate or national reputational pressures or is subordinated to the network of 
personal relations).
One of the most impressive things about the book is that it examines the concept 
and manifestations of ethics from a wide range of perspectives. The conceptual 
definitions, the normative principles laid down by different schools of economic 
philosophy, the explanations offered by competing economic theories and the 
maxims derived from the considerations of current economic policies are issues 
which would all deserve examination in their own right. The essays published in the 
first part of the book (Chapters 1–6) discuss the expectations of ethical operations 
regarding individuals, regions, states and the supranational level, the benefits 
thereof and the associated long-term and short-term costs, with varying levels of 
detail and from the perspective of a variety of disciplines.
The collection of theoretical and historical analyses begins with a comprehensive, 
introductory study by György Kocziszky. The essay addresses the essential 
questions of economics and draws the reader’s attention to their constant social 
embeddedness. According to Kocziszky, economic thinking is deeply dependent on 
the context and values involved and is therefore subject to spatial and temporal 
changes. After considering the parameters of space and time, the author discusses 
the imperfections characterising the currently prevailing, mainstream trends and 
the distortions created by such in the real economy (deregulation of the financial 
market, unfair interest rate policies, corruption and bank failures, the globalisation 
of economic bubbles, the pressure of monopolistic concentration). Finally, he offers 
a suggestion for a normative, ethical approach to be (re)integrated into economic 
thinking. In his interpretation “ethical economic thinking... does not look for the 
maximum profit, but rather for a righteous, fair and sustainable version thereof […], 
its central element being a type of community behaviour that involves responsibility 
for others, but which – on the other hand – does not exclude the concepts of 
profitability, efficiency and competition” (p. 46). Kocziszky defines the objectives 
of an economic and social system operating according to such principles (an ethical 
way of distribution and redistribution, an ethical market and state), and identifies 
the tools required (e.g. dual price and interest rate ceilings, ethical taxation and 
state aid policy, fair coordination and competition rules, a fair financial institutional 
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system). He concludes that a value system favouring public good (the well-being 
of a given society) is a resource, which is capable of maintaining competitiveness 
in the long run and contributes to the country’s economic performance, while the 
lack of such a system will bring about destabilisation and damage to the budget 
and moral values even in the medium term.
The tradition of the biblical value system on which Western culture is essentially 
built, the paradigm of business ethics derived from this and the changes therein 
are analysed in an ambitious study by Norbert Varga. The essay, which also includes 
some lessons to be learnt from social theory, studies the transaction patterns of 
almost two decades in the context of a changing geopolitical order. The conclusion 
he arrives at is similar to the one outlined above: according to him, societies rooted 
in Christianity – such as the economic and political elite of the United States which 
represents a strongly Neo-Protestant context for interpretation or the practices 
aimed at the implementation of a type of governance based on Christian values – 
“should include their guidelines concerning business ethics in their monetary and 
fiscal decision-making mechanisms as well” (p. 96).
There are two other theoretical essays in the volume discussing the issues of justice, 
public good and ethical responsibility which define social and economic orders in 
the framework of the modern rule of law. József Benedek relies on the social theory 
defined by John Rawls and based on that he extends the concept of justice as 
fairness to the spatial dimension as well. His main points include: what is the degree 
of spatial disparities that can be still tolerated and/or maintained, and at what point 
exactly does the social fairness of disparities cease to exist? Although he does not 
offer a direct answer to these questions, he suggests a variety of approaches and 
provides a number of methodological instructions, which is a good example of how 
the articulation of a problem in itself can help us to arrive at a solution. 
In his essay on the responsible involvement of the state, Kolos Kardkovács places 
the central focus on the institutional-normative aspect of social justice. Following 
a brief look at the history of theories, he elaborates on the characteristics, criteria 
and positive results of the ethical rule of law. He lists a number of arguments 
to support a value-based approach committed to the idea of public good, which 
manifests itself in the daily practices of the rule of law. He offers the Scandinavian 
model to be followed mutatis mutandis: according to him, the secret of this model 
can be found in “a work-based economy in favour of the acquisition of knowledge 
capital, the great capacity and ability for innovation, the stable and scale-efficient 
institutional system, the higher incomes enabled by high productivity (added value), 
the entrepreneurial spirit, the financial awareness, the strong and large middle 
class, the less work, more private life ratio, the health awareness and the protestant 
values and ethics” which characterise this system (p. 133). He highlights the role 
of the “public servants characterised by work ethic awareness” and that of an 
147
Pillars and Prognoses – An Ethical Approach to Economics
institutional network of high integrity in the representation of the public good and 
the effective promotion thereof.
Géza Sebestény uses statistical methods to illustrate the statements set out above, 
namely, how commitment to a set of values can enhance welfare (and well-being). 
He carries out a regression analysis using the data of 58 countries over a decade to 
point out the non-linear relationship between economic prosperity and stability, and 
the intensity of a religious culture. As he puts it in his primary conclusion, “according 
to the regressions applied for economic stability, an increase both concerning the 
share of people who claim to belong to a certain denomination and the number of 
religious groups in the country will have a positive effect on the country’s economic 
stability.” Based on his insights “it seems that the stabilising effect of the religious 
culture in a certain country primarily manifests itself at the times of severe crises.” 
Relying on the results, the author even ventures to propose a new hypothesis, 
namely, that “there is a positive link between the strength of a religious culture 
and the sustainability of economic growth” (pp. 160–161).
With due regard to the fact that the regulated system for the distribution and 
redistribution of goods is one of the most fundamental principles of financial 
stability and the stability of the rule of law, the book devotes a whole chapter to 
the principle of equitable and ethical taxation. The study by György Kocziszky and 
Kolos Kardkovács, rich in data and illustrated with several diagrams, identifies and 
elaborates on 10 criteria to be fulfilled by systems of equitable taxation. These 
criteria include: the principle of legality, the principle of honest taxpayers and fair 
taxes, the principle of trust, the principle of return and solvency, balance between 
the taxation of salaries and income from capital, the principles of efficiency, 
simplicity/clarity and predictability/certainty, and the principle of horizontal 
sameness and vertical diversity. The descriptions associated with the given 
principles do not argue for specific tax policy measures, but they do emphasise 
the requirement of proportionality, the rights and obligations related to equitable 
taxation (both concerning legislators and taxpayers) and define the basic norms of 
public trust necessary for the maintenance of a functioning state (pp. 163–202).
The studies approaching the concept of “appropriateness” from the perspective 
of consumer protection, financial market supervision and bank regulation analyse 
the issue by applying another type of “microfiltration,” that of specific practices. 
As a result, the patterns of behaviour typical of the branch of investments and 
portfolio sales (e.g. the question of whether or not it is ethical for a seller to present 
a business promising a very high yield but coming from a “doubtful background” 
as an attractive investment), corporate remuneration policies (is it ethical to place 
managers under profit pressure and to provide them with incentives to generate 
short-term profits), the credit risk rating of the loan products offered by banks (is it 
ethical to cover up the associated risks; to create a competitive market environment 
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which favours a gambling institutional behaviour) and the presentation of correct/
incorrect information to the public or to consumers (whether it is ethical to shift 
all the responsibilities within a situation of informational asymmetry) are all on 
the agenda. 
Gábor Gyura refers to practices and activities which do not actually breach legal 
rules literally, nevertheless, their application results in social and/or financial 
damage, as “grey zone activities”. According to Gyura, innovative products newly 
introduced on the market and their unorthodox marketing techniques (“mis-
selling”) can be considered as examples. When referring to the idea of misconduct 
as an example of abuse he concludes that: “The issues of business are ultimately 
ethical issues,” because due to the “blind spots” in regulation, fair conduct is often 
subject to the internal control introduced by business actors (pp. 204–207). This 
aspect makes it clear that modern control practices are no longer based exclusively 
on deterrent restrictions or sanctions, but strongly emphasise the importance of 
education, the formulation of and adherence to internal codes of conduct and the 
incentives for a well-developed organisational culture.
The study by Vilmos Freisleben examines the investment sector and addresses 
similar critical questions regarding seller behaviour: “can it be considered ethical 
to offer leveraged investments to novice or common investors” or to present 
an investment vehicle “in a too favourable light” (in the hopes of receiving 
a commission)? “Will the investor understand the degree of risk he will have to 
face due to the leverage?” (p. 231). Freisleben also introduces the reader to the 
“principles for responsible and ethical investment” (UNPRI) laid down by the United 
Nations and the concept of “impact investing”, drawing attention to the fact, that 
apart from financial return, positive social/environmental effects are also worth 
considering when investing.
Bálint Dancsik and Gergely Fábián investigate compliance with normative principles 
on a systematic level, analysing the fiscal imbalances arising parallel to each other 
during the recession of 2008 (the credit market crisis in the USA and foreign 
currency household loans in Hungary). According to their conclusions, “market 
mechanisms can only achieve a result that is also desirable on a systemic level, if 
(a) economic actors (mainly on the side of supply of the financial system) possess 
the skills required to be able to completely realise the consequences of their 
decisions, and if (2) their decisions represent a less individualistic approach and 
are not only concerned with short-term gain.” The authors provide many examples 
to underline the difference between the criteria adopted by consequence ethics 
and the considerations of alternative ethics (e.g. deontological ethics, behavioural 
finance) when it comes to evaluating whether a specific monetary/financial market 
decision or activity is “good” or not. What are the things worth bearing in mind 
when we are trying to minimise transaction costs, are faced with the dilemma of 
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whether to launch securitised or risky loan products, or are applying performance 
incentives dependent on share prices and based on volume? Based on the decision-
making model, they convincingly argue that long-term structural effects should 
also be taken into account, and that the “soft instruments” aimed at influencing 
the behaviour of financial actors (e.g. education, the transfer of best practices, the 
implementation of behavioural standards, consumer awareness-raising) may be 
just as necessary as the possible application of restrictive, preventive or bridging 
state measures (e.g. the rules established by the CRD IV/CRR, the rules concerning 
debt brakes, the law on fair banking, the National Asset Management Agency) in 
order to eliminate wrong decision-making mechanisms.
The third part of the book abandons the Euro-Atlantic context and goes on to offer 
micro-perspectives from the field of Oriental theoretical tradition. This opening is 
also justified by the fact that international actors are continuously interacting with 
each other in the connected global economic space, but their cultural contexts of 
interpretation are entirely different. The studies, written by professionals in Oriental 
research, all support the settlement of this issue, when offering an explanation for 
the geo-political and geo-economic differences partly by means of case studies, and 
partly by the exploration of the customs and mentality behind social behavioural 
patterns.
In her study on Japanese business ethics, Judit Hidasi claims that the successful 
economic performance of East-Asian countries is associated with the values of 
Confucianism. She thinks that the so-called “Japanese economic miracle” is the 
result of the fact, that “out of the teachings of Confucian ethics, the principle 
concerning the acknowledgement of the existing hierarchy and that of moral 
obligations (beholdenness) in particular have provided a solid basis for the 
establishment of Japanese business and economic organisational structure in 
a country shifting towards capitalism” (p. 178). Nevertheless, this Weberian logic 
is less applicable to the social and moral shortfall which could be seen during the 
period of recession following the 1990s. Following the theory of Fukuyama, the 
author refers to the prolonged crisis, which – as the result of a series of corruption 
scandals accompanying social recession – (also) led to the weakening of the social 
identity based on a collective sense of values as the “shrinkage of social capital“ 
Her case studies provide insight into Japanese business mentality, but at the same 
time, she refrains from offering a comprehensive solution to the issues mentioned.
The two studies published by Balázs Sárvári and Viktor Eszterhai fill a gap in the 
field of studies by exploring the background of the values of Chinese economic 
policy. Their research demonstrates convincingly that just as much as it is absolutely 
necessary for the interpretation of the geo-political relations prevailing these 
days to become familiar with the way of thinking presented by Chinese power, 
none of the European nations can disregard the knowledge of the opportunities, 
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limitations and domains of inter-cultural interactions, in order to be able to develop 
an adequate position within the network of economic and financial relationships. 
Following the path of the dominant theoretical traditions of the Eastern Empire, 
the study on China by Balázs Sárvári presents three different state governance 
models and describes the possible future scenarios of the new world order of the 
21st century on the basis of these. He elaborates on the modern Chinese theories 
of globalisation, also including extremist viewpoints and a set of views offered by 
pragmatic thinkers (Tingyang Zhao, Yan Xuetong, Pan Wei), using Confucian, Taoist 
and Legalist theoretical systems as a starting point. Relying on the realist school of 
international relations, the author himself tends to take a moderate approach: he 
offers Kissinger’s concept of co-evolution as a solution. According to this theory, the 
parallel operation of the powers of the East and the West “may be considered as the 
global expansion of the harmony characterising Chinese high culture (...), in which 
the specific regions, sectors and social groups, although presenting disharmony 
in themselves, manage to form a stable whole together. Harmony in this sense 
does not refer to the lack of conflicts (…), but it is rather to be interpreted as 
an organisational level, on which differences do not pose a systemic threat” (pp. 
313–314). Sárvári sees co-evolution as a cooperative form of competition, which 
“can be a result of either the Western or the Chinese set of values, and fits into 
the technological and global economic relations prevailing in the 21st century. It is 
a kind of a power structure, in which China – on the highest level of security policy 
[…] – opts for the stability of the world order and a cooperative participation in the 
reallocation of the mandates entitling global intervention” (pp. 319–320).
Viktor Eszterhai’s study on guanxi (Chinese 关系 means relation) supports the 
idea that a predefined set of values lies behind decision-making mechanisms. The 
author introduces a unique perspective, applying the guanxi model to the operation 
of China’s entire economic and social structure, including institutionalised forms 
of behaviour. According to Eszterhai, “the importance of guanxi lies in the fact, 
that, as a primary form of social relations, it pervades the operating principles of 
Chinese society and controls the everyday lives of its members (e.g. the allocation of 
resources, economic operations, information flows, decision-making mechanisms, 
cultural roles, social status and the tasks of individuals)” (p. 324). Eszterhai gives 
a fine description of the intricate structure of Chinese society: besides drawing 
a map of relationship networks, he also elaborates on their distinctive nature. 
Compared to Western transactional schemes, the guanxi-driven exchange of goods 
and values is not merely instrumental, but associated with specific emotional 
motifs, normative aspects, gestures and inherent values. The defined order 
thereof designates the place of the individual in this formal and informal system of 
relationships. We might draw a parallel between his conclusions and the insights of 
“network theory”, hence Eszterhai’s observations can be considered complementary 
151
Pillars and Prognoses – An Ethical Approach to Economics
to the European concepts of “social capital” and “relationship capital,” with due 
highlights on semantic differences.
The final study of the volume discusses trading and banking strategies from the 
perspective of Muslim communities, while also providing information on the cultural 
history of Islam. It serves as a contrastive tool to the Judeo-Christian paradigm of 
business ethics, the former’s encounter with the highly developed mathematical 
and financial culture of the Arab world in the early Middle Ages. The latter already 
involved the concept of monetisation, anticipated marginal utility calculations 
(based on the role of money as a medium of exchange) and managed to maintain 
a stable banking system. Today, one main contradictions of Islamic economic 
theory may be that the doctrines concerning appropriate behaviour associated 
with community beliefs – that reveal themselves in monetary transactions as well 
– preserve an archaic social structure unable to successfully adapt to changed 
circumstances. At least, that is claimed by Judit Balázs and József Varga’s study 
(relying on empirical evidence).
As illustrated by the variety of topics outlined above, this collection discusses 
possible conditions of (more) ethical economics and opens up a broad scope of 
analysis, both historically and in disciplinary terms. The representative hardback 
volume published by MNB does not aim – nor even attempt – to cover all of the 
relevant issues. Yet, by opening up new directions of thinking, the authors attempt 
to reformulate the so-far unanswered question of the 21st century: what is the way 
to a globally sustainable economic paradigm?
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A növekedés terhe. Krízisek – Csődök – Ciklusok (The Burden of Growth. Crises – 
Bankruptcies – Cycles)
Osiris Publishing Company, Budapest, 2018, p. 311
ISBN: 978-963-276-317-0
In the ten years since 2008, interest in the subject of crisis has increased worldwide, 
both among economists and historians. Economic theories were not able to forecast 
the most recent the global economic crisis, and the packages of measures based 
on economic science did not produce the expected results in many cases. Critics 
started to question the predictive power of theories and the applicability of theories 
to reality. However, it has become an increasingly widespread notion that the 
historical analysis of market structures, concepts and human behaviour patterns 
may add something to the explanatory power and practical applicability of theories. 
This is precisely the goal that György Kövér set for himself in his recently released 
work. Many have outlined that the history of crises is a history of amnesia and 
misunderstandings, and a historian can best help to improve the understanding of 
current developments by discussing the process of forgetting and the memories of 
crises. It is not the duty of a historian to offer new recipes for recovery, but it is to 
rethink the old ones drawing on the experience of current crises.
This is not the first time the author has dealt with this issue. In 1986, he published 
a monograph on the crisis of 1873, and later, in the context of the history of the 
Hungarian government debt in the age of the dual monarchy, he wrote about 
periodically returning financial crises. Between 2012 and 2017, he researched the 
economic, social and mentality history of the 19-20th century crises, in the MTA-
ELTE Crisis History Research Group as its leader. The book is the author’s own 
selection of studies, including previously published studies and studies written for 
this occasion, and pays tribute to this joint research encompassing a broad spectrum 
of crises from famine, floods and epidemics to agricultural, industrial, financial and 
commercial crises.
*  The papers in this issue contain the views of the authors which are not necessarily the same as the official 
views of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Gábor Tamás is Managing Consultant at IFUA Horváth & Partners Kft, and a PhD Student at the Doctoral 
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The idea behind this selection, as the cohesive force of the book, is primarily 
the examination of Hungary’s 19th and 20th century crises from macro- and 
microeconomic perspectives. The first two introductory studies set the theoretical 
framework and are followed by seven papers described by the author as crisis 
stories with multiple scales of observation. The book ends with another two studies 
presenting perceptions and memories of crises.
The first part includes two essays which were published 30 years apart. The more 
recent study from 2015 entitled Crisis history as a discipline presents, in particular, 
the spread of the concept of crisis and crisis phenomena borrowed from medical 
terminology, and the approach of international (Max Wirth, Clément Juglar, 
Joseph Schumpeter) and Hungarian (Jakab Pólya, Tivadar Surányi-Unger) classical 
representatives of crisis history and crisis theory. The older work deals with the 
history of the Kondratiev cycle. The key conclusion of the study is that although 
long-term economic cycles have been construed and defined in many different ways 
throughout time, and a number of explanations, mainly monocausal explanations 
have been and are still being provided, their existence seems justified at least since 
the 18th century. Even though – in contrast to shorter commercial cycles – people 
cannot directly perceive them, they leave indelible memories which come to life 
over and over again.
The crisis stories are introduced by a macro-level analysis (“Nothing but crises”) 
presenting the existential and financial crises of the 19th century and their 
fluctuations: short-term financial and commercial cycles (Juglar), long-term economic 
cycles (Kondratiev), and century-long trends (Braudel’s secular trend-cycles). Standing 
at their intersection, the crisis of 1873 was exceptionally severe because it was 
interconnected with crises of various types (famine, cholera, financial-commercial, 
budgetary). However, the reason why it became known as the “Great Crash” by 
future generations is primarily the fact that it was followed by price drops for two 
decades in the descending phase of a long economic cycle. The study titled “From 
famine to stock market crash” also focuses on interconnected crises, highlighting 
the second half of the 1840s and the first half of the 1870s. The author illustrates 
the combined effect of cholera, famine and financial crisis using an extremely 
broad range of sources. The historian’s narrative is supported by demographic data, 
price trends, industrial production indexes in addition to bankruptcy statistics and 
contemporaneous commemorations. In respect of the famine of 1863, in an essay 
titled “Poverty around the corner” the author leads the reader from the perspective 
of global climate events through measures at different levels of Hungarian authorities 
into the personal fate of the local population of Tiszaeszlár. From the remaining 
data collection of national, county and local authorities, we gain an understanding 
not only of the crisis management process, but also the specific circumstances and 
intentions which led to the creation of historic sources.
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The Small Crisis ((1869) in the Shadow of the Great Crash (1873) points out that the 
historical judgement of the crisis of 1869 was dominated by the crisis four years 
later: most authors regarded the crisis of 1869 as a prelude and highlighted that 
actors did not learn from the mistakes. This is the image of the crisis in historical 
memory despite the fact that it showed completely different characteristics than the 
crisis of 1873: it was not international, and only hit the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
more specifically, Vienna and Budapest. It had no particular impact on the real 
economy in Hungary, and rural areas were hardly touched upon. The crisis was 
definitely due to foundation fever in the preceding years and excessive stock market 
speculation. Additionally, through a macro analysis and contemporary perceptions 
of the crisis, we can understand the financial crisis at micro level through the failure 
of private banker I. I. Kohner. The study “From fiscal crisis to gold annuity bond.” 
provides an insight into the secrets of the fiscal consolidation after the Great Crash. 
Kálmán Széll, as the speaker of the National Assembly’s financial committee and 
later as the secretary of the committee aiming at restoring the balance of budget 
and finally as Minister of Finance between 1875 and 1878, played a significant role 
in the preparation of state budgets before, during and after the crisis. From the 
sources related to his activity, we get to know the financial government’s objectives 
and their limited room for manoeuvre, while, in respect of debt consolidation, we 
learn that – independently from the constitutional system of the empire – financial 
markets assessed the two states as a whole.
In a study co-written with Károly Halmos (“Bankruptcy cases in Pest”), the 
author draws the attention to the importance of bankruptcy statistics as sources 
for economic history, and he emphasises that data can equally reflect changes 
in economic activity, statutory regulation and culture. For the 1850s, Austrian 
bankruptcy statistics are only available. For the 1860s and 1870s, the statistics of 
the municipal court of Pest called Pesti Városi Törvényszék (individual entrepreneurs 
and companies with industrial licenses) and the commercial court of Budapest 
called Budapesti Kereskedelmi és Váltótörvényszék (companies under commercial 
law), while from the 1880s, official statistics on companies deleted from the 
company registry provide sources for research. When assessing sources, it should 
be considered that the number of liquidations significantly surpassed the number 
of bankruptcies. Data show financial cycles with a certain time lag, however they 
reveal that individual and commercial companies were more strongly hit by the 
crisis than others, and in the second half of the 19th century, some 40 per cent 
of the companies were terminated within 30 years. The subject and title of the 
paper closing the work on crisis events is “The bankruptcy of a Lutheran wholesale 
trader in Pest”. Although Frigyes Frölich applied for bankruptcy protection in 1865, 
finally he reached a settlement with his creditors. Contemporary Menyhért Lónyay 
and a 20th-century historian, Vera Bácskai arrived at two different assessments of 
Frölich’s carrier and failure. According to the former, on the one hand, a Jew is only 
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able to survive among merchants in Pest, on the other hand, Frölich should have 
stuck to what he was professional in. According to the latter, the second generation 
of merchant families in Pest was characterised by a stronger entrepreneurial 
mindset and greater flexibility as against that of their fathers. Following a detailed 
presentation of the history of the family and their business, the author draws the 
conclusion based on an analysis of the bankruptcy proceeding and lists of assets 
and liabilities identified in the proceeding that Frölich’s failure was explicitly 
interconfessional: all major confessions were represented by the victims, and the 
“excessive expansion” into the field of railway construction cannot definitely be 
regarded either as the reason for bankruptcy. Maybe Frölich was just in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.
The first study of the chapter presenting the perceptions of crisis is titled Growth 
and decline in the historical memory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It 
demonstrates the memories of the economic fluctuations of the dualistic system, 
first through the eyes of contemporary actors, and then through the lens of 
economists and statisticians involved in researching history, and finally through 
historians’ constructions of the past. The author concludes that the reflections 
of contemporary scientists are not free from the impacts of personal experience 
and contemporary discourses, and historians’ retrospective constructions also have 
their own cycles. Their models reflect the prevailing approaches and concepts of 
their era. Contemporaries do not even perceive longer-term phenomena, and 
their perceptions relate to events of that time. Such contemporary perceptions 
are presented in the volume’s final study entitled Agony or resurrection? It analyses 
the failure of Simon Krausz, “Napoleon of the Pest stock exchange” in the 20th 
century, in 1929 – even before the outbreak of the Great Crisis – as well as the diary 
notes written by the failed Krausz between 1931 and 1934. From this essay, we get 
to know the resentful worldview of Krausz who was considered to be a financial 
genius by many, but a swindler and gambler by others. In this worldview, the black 
and white figures of the classes of people seen by Krausz in a positive or negative 
way are completely separated in just the same way his contemporaries saw him in 
black and white terms.
In his book, György Kövér wanted to analyse crises from economic, social and 
mentality history aspects, and the study volume perfectly achieves this aim. Both 
the structure of the volume and the various studies reflect this approach. The macro 
analysis of the economic history, the local impacts and the individual perceptions 
of the crises complement each other well in most studies, making the historian’s 
reasoning not only more easy-to-understand, but also more fascinating for the 
reader. The author’s methodological versatility, the use of extremely diverse and 
different sources make the book a highly multifaceted and readable publication in 
which meteorological, demographic and economic statistics data series, presented 
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in an understandable way, coexist comfortably, often within one study, with 
biographic, historic and mentality history parts. The title The burden of growth 
probably refers to the view that crises are always caused by preceding upturns 
during which not only do the bubbles – fittingly illustrated on the cover designed 
by Nóra Sós – blow up, but we tend to forget about the lessons learned from 
previous crises.
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Report on the Budapest Renminbi Initiative 
2019 Conference*
Tünde Mészáros 
On 29 March 2019, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary, MNB) 
hosted its annual conference in the framework of the Budapest Renminbi Initiative 
for the fifth time. 
In his opening speech, Márton Nagy, Deputy Governor of the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank, noted that the MNB supports the internationalisation of renminbi and 
reports on the relevant results annually at the conference held in the framework 
of the Budapest Renminbi Initiative. The MNB takes a wide, open approach to the 
economic and financing opportunities offered by the Chinese economy, also taking 
into consideration the global changes. In addition to having taken the first steps for 
the establishment of a regulatory environment supportive of FinTech companies, 
the MNB supports the ambitions of Hungarian financial professionals aiming to 
become leaders in the field of financial innovation.
In his speech, Levente Magyar, Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, highlighted that economic ties between Hungary and China have been 
developing dynamically, and consequently Hungary can report a number of new 
success stories. In addition to the results of the government and the central bank so 
far, the various connections between the two countries offer further opportunities 
for cooperation. The Deputy Minister emphasised the geopolitical importance of 
the influx of Chinese capital into Europe, pointing out the fact that the number of 
Chinese investments has also increased markedly over the last 10 years in Hungary.
Qui Yonghao, Vice President of Fudan University, congratulated Hungary for having 
made the Alipay, the Chinese mobile payment service available in Hungary, as 
a result of another successful initiative. He appreciated the importance of financial 
cooperation between the two countries and the “opening to the East” strategy 
of Hungary, highlighting the Bank of China Hungarian Branch as the first Chinese 
bank in the Central-Eastern European region, the currency swap agreement, the 
bond issuance on the Chinese market, as well as the accomplishments in the field 
of economy, finance, culture and education, including the double degree MBA 
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course, launched in Corvinus University of Budapest with Fudan University as the 
co-organiser, which was implemented with the professional support of the MNB.
Mihály Patai, Chairman of the Hungarian Banking Association1, highlighted that the 
banking sector had to learn several important lessons in recent years. The corporate 
sector had difficulties in accessing credit, but the Funding for Growth Scheme of the 
MNB supported it in emerging from this adverse situation. The high proportion of 
retail foreign currency loans carried significant risks, but their conversion into forint 
contributed to stabilising the Hungarian economy. The ownership structure of the 
banking sector had also changed, which led to a domestic share of 50 per cent by 
now. The vast majority of members of the domestic banking system were already 
profitable in 2018, with favourable liquidity positions and stable capital positions.
Marco Iannaccone, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of UniCredit Bank Hungary Ltd., 
mentioned that the bank is the first one to make the most common Chinese mobile 
payment solution available in Hungary. One of the focuses of their strategy is to 
provide innovative methods to their customers. The service through which Chinese 
tourists are able to pay to Hungarian merchants using their usual mobile telephone 
application fits this concept, and this innovative payment solution also provides 
several benefits to Hungarian retailers.
After that, the Alipay terminal located in the bookstore of Pallas Athéné Publishing 
House (PABOOKS) was delivered and tested by a purchase.
The professional programme continued with the lecture of Richard Werner, 
Professor of Fudan University, who analysed, among others, why only a few East 
Asian countries, namely Japan, South Korea, Singapore and China were able to 
make the transition from “developing country” status to “developed” economies. 
The spectacular economic development of China could show a good example to 
the entire world for what is possible if the right policies are adopted. The “Belt and 
Road Initiative” is a cooperation scheme through which China shares its successful 
development strategy with the cooperating states, whose economy will likely to 
benefit far more directly from this than under previous international development 
opportunities. The internationalisation of the renminbi creates enormous 
opportunities not only for China, but also for other countries.
Petra Ponevács-Pana, Deputy State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, appreciated the benefits of the diverse, strong and efficient cooperation 
between China and Hungary, highlighting, among others, the “16+1” summit and 
the Economic, Commercial and Financial Forum both held in Budapest, the first 
Chinese International Import Expo, to which the Prime Minister of Hungary was 
1  Dr Mihály Patai served as Chairman of the Hungarian Banking Association from 15 April 2011 until 21 April 
2019.
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also invited, along with the dynamic development of the trade relations between 
the two countries and the export of high quality Hungarian agricultural products. 
In the field of investments, the Hungarian government aims to establish a research, 
development and innovation hub (R&D&I hub). The fastest developing segment 
is that of cooperation in monetary policy, which is perfectly exemplified by the 
accomplishments of the MNB so far.
Rob Loewy gave a presentation on behalf of the Bank of China London Branch on the 
development of the Chinese financial markets. As a result of the gradual opening-up 
of China’s financial market the domestic financial assets held by overseas entities 
increased over fourfold in the bond market and threefold in the equity market 
between 2013 and 2018. The renminbi is an icon of an even more significant China, 
which is why the reforms must continue, in the FX market, among others. The China 
Interbank Bond Market has now become the third-largest OTC fixed income market 
in the world, with more than 1,200 overseas investors entering this market by the 
end of 2018, and the tendency of growth is also expected to continue in the future.
Dániel Palotai, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the MNB, talked about 
the global role of China in the new economic world order. He emphasised that the 
financial and economic ties of Hungary with China are developing at a fast pace and 
that the volume of commercial relations had significantly increased in recent years, 
while the growing number of Chinese citizens settling in or visiting Hungary and the 
significant deepening of the connectedness of tertiary education provide further 
significant growth potential. In addition to supporting the internationalisation of 
Chinese currency, the Renminbi Programme of the MNB and the Budapest Renminbi 
Initiative have accomplished significant results since 2015 in the Hungarian context 
as well, which is exemplified by the current presentation of the Alipay terminal.
The series of professional lectures was continued by Gergely Gabler, Director 
of the MNB, who presented Hungarian innovations and FinTech-related topics 
from a regulatory point of view. From the aspect of the central bank the aim is to 
develop a framework, which will adequately support the spread of innovations, 
while minimising risks. The MNB has implemented two solutions to resolve the 
supervisory dilemma, i.e. the choice between applying excessive restrictions or 
taking the approach of non-intervention. Through the launch and operation of 
the “innovation hub” and the “regulatory sandbox”, the central bank provides 
a regulatory support platform and regulatory test environment for participating 
FinTech companies. The next step in the innovative solutions of the MNB is the 
launch of the instant payment system.
Representing UniCredit Bank, Bence Marosi talked about the global cooperation 
between the Bank and Alipay, which made available from that date forward the 
Chinese mobile payment service for Chinese customers in Hungary as well. The 
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appearance of Alipay terminals in Hungary is beneficial for both the merchants and 
the users of the service. The number of tourists arriving from Asia and mainly from 
China in European countries has been increasing dynamically, and experiences show 
that the visitors coming here are quite willing to use their usual mobile payment 
solutions in foreign countries as well, therefore this service is expected to ramp up 
quickly in Hungary too.
Trinh Anh Tuan, Head of Corvinus FinTech Center, presented Chinese, Swiss and 
American FinTech solutions among the current developments and highlighted that 
Hungary also supports innovative start-up enterprises through more and more 
forums (for example, by the establishment of dedicated labs). Corvinus FinTech 
Center intends to coordinate and develop university education, research, the 
community of stakeholders and innovation in the field of financial technology and 
digital transformation. It focuses, among other things, on the application of artificial 
intelligence in finance, the digital wallet and blockchain.
Speaking about the Chinese shadow banking system, Qian Jun, Dean of Fudan 
University, presented what caused the fast penetration of one of the most important 
factors of the sector – the wealth management products offered by banks – and 
what the risks of these phenomena are, including rollover risks. He also highlighted 
the major differences between the relevant products of the four large banks and 
those of smaller institutions. The expansion of the shadow banking system not only 
intensified competition in the field of deposits, but also among institutions, while 
also having an effect on monetary policy decisions.
The conference was closed by the lecture of Xiaoqiong Hu, the representative of 
Alipay. She explained that the globalisation-related aims of Alibaba Group focus 
on (i) buying, in order to boost imports, (ii) selling, in order to scale out exports, 
(iii) the global digital financial platform, (iv) the establishment of a global logistic 
network and spreading the solutions worldwide, furthermore, (v) leisure, primarily 
travelling. The community of over 870 million users are able to use the payment 
and transfer service at anytime, anywhere, online and off-line. In China, the rate 
of mobile payment penetration has been increasing dynamically, not only in cities, 
but also in rural areas. The credit service provided by the company is also gradually 
expanding: the number of customers and repeated usage rate keeps increasing, as 
does the amount of the average monthly spending.
To close the conference, Dániel Palotai expressed appreciation for the speakers, the 
lectures that were provided and also for the Alipay terminal delivered as part of 
the conference, as the latest milestone in Hungarian–Chinese cooperation. He also 
expressed his hope that in the event to be held next year new accomplishments 
will be reported.
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One of Hungary’s key international conferences on finance, which has also featured 
prominent speakers from abroad, was held for the ninth time at the Corvinus 
University of Budapest. Similarly to previous years, the Annual Financial Market 
Liquidity Conference was organised by the Department of Finance at the Corvinus 
Business School, and the Game Theory Research Group of the Centre for Economic 
and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The conference, 
which took place on 15–16 November 2018, was financed by the Foundation of 
the Department of Finance, and key supporters of the event included KELER CCP, 
OTP Bank, the Institute for Training and Consulting in Banking, the CFA Society 
Hungary, the Department of Finance at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences 
of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics as well as international 
companies and associations, such as Morgan Stanley, MSCI and the European 
Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS). The programme of the two-day 
event included lectures by nine renowned foreign experts and one domestic invited 
expert, and the agenda was completed by a series of papers and posters submitted 
to the conference. The increasing prestige of the conference is reflected in the 
fact that the programme has been enlarged from year to year: at the 2019 event, 
participants could listen to a total of 47 lectures, and during the breaks they could 
see the results of another 20 research studies in poster form. The international 
character of the conference is best highlighted by the fact that its participants 
represented every continent: 170 university teachers, researchers, PhD students 
and analysts from 25 countries registered for the event. The speakers came from 21 
countries representing 28 foreign and 6 domestic universities or research institutes.
The conference was opened by Mrs Zita Zoltay-Paprika, Dean of the Corvinus 
Business School. After greeting the speakers and attendants, she highlighted 
that the conference was becoming more and more successful, and reflecting the 
improvement in the standards and international reputation of the conference, even 
more journals than last year (including Studies in Economics and Finance, Finance 
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Research Letters, Journal of Corporate Finance, Emerging Markets Review, Journal 
of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, Journal of Multinational 
Financial Management, Risk Management) had notified their wish to receive the 
papers of the participants on that occasion as well.
The keynote speaker of the opening plenary section was Edward I. Altman, the Max 
L. Heine Professor of Finance, Emeritus at New York University’s Stern School of 
Business and Associate Editor of financial journals including the Journal of Credit 
Risk and the International Journal of Banking, Accounting & Finance. He gave his 
lecture 50 years after he first published his multivariable method for evaluating 
the financial status of US manufacturing companies. In view of the experience 
gained, the speaker placed the Z-score method developed by him in the wider 
context of developments in scoring systems. According to the literature, owing to 
its simplicity, repeatability and reliability, the Z-score method is still an essential and 
very widely used model for predicting bankruptcy, and the most frequently applied 
model for comparing results. In the basic 1968 model, calculating the Z-score clearly 
identified the thresholds for determining if a company was financially healthy or 
was at risk of default. These thresholds have been widely applied, but are no longer 
relevant, as bond markets have undergone a significant change, with leveraged 
loans receiving a boost and indebted companies taking out further loans, with 
competition increasingly globalised and with the changing distribution of credit 
ratings. Therefore, an enhanced version of the Z-score model taking account of 
changed circumstances is to be applied. At the end of his lecture, Altman mentioned 
where the world stands today in the credit cycle. He is of the opinion that we 
are now in a benign credit cycle characterised by an increase in credit portfolios 
and liquidity, low interest rates, a low likelihood of bankruptcy, and high recovery 
rates. However, he advised that the Z-score results for 2017, the excessive and 
global indebtedness of several sectors, certain international processes such as the 
slowdown in economic growth in China, the high likelihood of a recession in major 
economies and last but not least the general increase in interest rates should be 
read as cautionary signs.
Following this, lectures in parallel sections were held. The main topics were market 
microstructure, derivatives, macroeconomics, risk management and quality of life, 
asset pricing and investments. Theoretical and empirical examinations of market 
liquidity were also discussed. On the first day, four invited researchers gave lectures 
in parallel sections.
In the section concerned with the theoretical aspects of liquidity, Alexander 
Szimayer, Professor at the University of Hamburg, presented the effects of a firm’s 
rating in a game theoretical model with asymmetric information. In his model, 
the informed player, i.e. the manager-owner of a firm decides whether to stay 
solvent by injecting new equity in low cash-flow states. Rating agencies as outsiders 
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learn the firm’s quality (rating) and creditworthiness in presence of a measurement 
error regarding the firm’s cash flow. All of this feeds back into the firm’s strategic 
choice of staying solvent or defaulting on its debt. The main conclusion of the 
model is that the decisions of the two players – the rating agency and the firm 
– have a mutual influence on each other: rating affects the cost of finance, the 
firm makes its decision accordingly, which again affects rating. The rating agency 
rules out more and more reactions of the firm during this interaction, however, at 
a certain point, the actual option is over the estimation of the rating agency, and 
thus the rating agency overestimates the measurement error. Under consideration 
of these measurement errors, the firm delays its default decision, and consequently 
increases the value of own funds to the expenses of debtors (lenders).
In the section discussing the empirical issues of liquidity, the first speaker, Niklas 
Wagner, Professor at the University of Passau, presented a regression model to 
explain the extra yield on US stocks, using several liquidity1 and risk2 indicators. The 
speaker’s key question was whether regression models based on these indicators 
allow better forecasting of extra yields on US stocks than the historical average 
model. The results show that in the period preceding the 2008 global financial 
crisis, models based on macroeconomic indicators and the TED spread performed 
better than historical averages. Besides the two indicators, during the financial 
crisis it was also possible to perform the forecast with the ARMA model, a method 
for time series analysis, while after the crisis all models based on the indicators 
performed better.
In the same section, Igor Loncarski, Associate Professor of Finance at the University 
of Ljubljana, examined in his lecture the features of insider trading in the foreign 
exchange market. An excellent illustration was the case of an inside trader 
prosecuted in Australia and an employee of the Australian Bureau of Statistics. In 
his presentation, he aimed at answering the question of how inside traders try to 
hide their insider information while reducing their losses from accidental market 
movements. In his study, he used spot currency pairs. He applied the CUSUM test 
(cumulative sum control chart) for identifying abnormal – insider – trading activities. 
In the period under review, the test monitors the instable movement of yields 
by tracking the cumulative sums of the error terms. He outlined that during the 
execution of their transactions, inside traders presumably try to select the trading 
dates – directly prior to the announcement of the insider information in question 
– when the direction of movements in the market is highly forecastable, and the 
risk of sudden exchange rate movements is low. The presented results confirmed 
the fact that regulatory authorities and actors interested in the surveillance of the 
1  Stock market liquidity: Amihud indicator, Roll-spread, funding liquidity: TED-spread – the difference between 
the 3-month LIBOR and the yield on the 3-month US Treasury Bill.
2  VIX index, and macroeconomic and economy policy uncertainty
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market must pay close attention to trading periods around announcement dates 
in order to be able to detect insider trading.
In the section focusing on the issue of risk management and quality of life, Md 
Hamid Uddin, Associate Professor at Taylor’s University, Malaysia, gave a lecture on 
cybersecurity risks in the banking sector, which may bring a fundamental change in 
the general perception of bank stability directly linked to global financial markets. 
The speaker examined the relation between cyber risks and risks related to the 
performance and operation of the institution. He also pointed out the impact of 
cybersecurity disclosures on the governance of banks. Risks related to cybersecurity 
can be seen as a systematic risk – the focal point was on banks that connect the 
corporations of several sectors through their operations. Banks have to continuously 
improve their IT systems and therefore have to cope with increasing operating costs. 
Vulnerable IT systems increase the vulnerability of banks as well as their operational 
risks, eventually leading to decreased profitability. In the course of improving their 
IT systems, banks are also exposed to the risk that their IT security systems, due to 
external contractors mainly involved in development, will remain in the hands of an 
external party that may have access to confidential data including critical resources. 
Overall, it can be stated that the top management of banks play an important role 
in reducing cybersecurity risks.
The first day was closed by a plenary section. In the first lecture, Seema Narayan, 
Associate Professor at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, discussed the 
indebtedness of US companies, drawing attention to the impacts of changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. The companies examined were S&P 500 non-financial 
companies. The speaker’s model analysed the period between 2000 and 2018. 
The macroeconomic indicators included GDP growth and industrial production, the 
inflation rate, the nominal interest rate, and other financial factors consistent with 
the optimisation of the financing structures of the companies. The key conclusion 
of the analysis distinguishing between corporations with strong and with weak 
balance sheet positions is that the financial crisis had a much stronger impact 
on highly indebted companies than on those that are less indebted. In addition, 
further interesting conclusions can be drawn from the results: 1) when making 
short-term debt decisions, companies ignore the level of economic activity, 2) during 
recessions, inflation does not play a role in short-term debt decisions, 3) during 
recessions, smaller-sized, less indebted companies ignore the effects of tax savings 
stemming from the level of interest rates and lending.
The last speaker of the day was Douglas Cumming, DeSantis Distinguished Professor 
at the College of Business, Florida Atlantic University, and Editor-in-Chief of the 
Journal of Corporate Finance. He has published over 150 articles in leading refereed 
academic journals in finance, management and economics. In his lecture, Cumming 
talked about the relation between stock price manipulation and corporate finance 
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businesses such as fusions and acquisitions as well as innovation. In the literature, 
this topic is exclusively discussed in terms of market microstructure. The findings 
of his research highlight that manipulation is harmful and it affects not only market 
microstructure, but also management decisions. In the case of corporate fusions, 
he found that in addition to decreasing the purchase premium, price manipulations 
significantly increase the probability of withdrawing the tender offer. In his opinion, 
this negative effect could be reduced by regulating trading in the greatest detail. 
In respect of innovation, robust empirical results indicate that enhanced liquidity 
encourages innovation, but this positive effect may be undermined by manipulation.
The second day of the conference opened with a plenary section with two lectures 
delivered by renowned foreign invited experts. Thomas Walker, Professor of 
Finance at Concordia University, Montreal, examined in his lecture the role of social 
innovation, and in particular the financing of social issues. In his introduction, he 
presented an initiative in Canada implemented with the aim of providing locally 
grown fresh vegetables at available prices, on a sustainable basis and with a lower 
environmental impact by facilitating the development of local communities in areas 
which are difficult to reach. As a possible technological solution he mentioned 
aquaponic food production in which aquaculture and media-based crop production 
is accomplished in a symbiotic ecosystem. One of the most important questions is 
certainly how we can finance these social initiatives. The second part of the lecture 
presented a range of innovative financing solutions, including community, green 
or social impact bonds, long-term “patient” capital, solidarity guarantee as well 
social funds and solidarity-based FinTech solutions. These models lend targeted 
support to socially useful initiatives by keeping short-term or even long-term yield 
expectations at moderate levels and by linking financial return to social impact.
The second lecture of the plenary section was given by Jonathan A. Batten, Professor 
of Finance at University Utara Malaysia and Managing Editor of journals Emerging 
Markets Review and Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and 
Money, and Co-editor of Finance Research Letters. He focused on the time-varying, 
dynamic co-movements among crude oil and major commodities, and their role in 
hedging market price risks. The speaker examined the relationship between West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil and five agricultural commodities (corn, wheat, 
rice, sugar and cotton) and three metals (gold, aluminium and copper) in the period 
between January 1990 and June 2017. Using the results of the correlation analyses 
of yields, first he pointed out that primarily aluminium and copper had a positive 
correlation with oil prices. Then he presented the results of examining the hedging 
error of a portfolio of two elements comprising oil and a commodity. Analysing 
the time-varying hedge ratio requires the estimation of conditional variances and 
covariances in a modelling environment taking into account the volatility of the 
time series of the two elements as well as the delayed effects and cross effects. The 
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analysis pointed to the fact that the global financial crisis had a significant impact 
on hedge ratios which tended to increase primarily for copper and corn. Testing 
the efficiency of hedging, it was concluded that aluminium and copper provided 
the highest – but very time-varying – hedging effectiveness, and it significantly 
increased in the case of corn during the global crisis. Thus, Batten’s key conclusion 
was that the time-varying co-movement among crude oil and major commodities 
allows for risk diversification by way of a portfolio that combines a long position in 
an asset with a short oil position. However, it requires continuous monitoring and 
rebalancing of the hedged position. The method can also be applied for reducing 
the exposure to the risk associated with a portfolio of non-sustainable energy assets.
On the second day, parallel sections were held where experts discussed subjects 
such as banking, social innovation, liquidity and high frequency trading, and topics 
related to corporate finance and liquidity, at both the theoretical and the empirical 
levels.
In the theoretical section, Andras Bohak, Head of Risk Management and Liquidity 
Core Research at MSCI, presented a lecture. He discussed the liquidity management 
of investment funds and its impact on investors. This subject is very topical given 
that both the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States 
of America (SEC) and the guidelines of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) on liquidity risk management are encouraging US funds to 
manage liquidity risks more efficiently. The speaker defined the two major risks 
associated with the liquidity management of funds: dilution risk and the probability 
of a future liquidity crisis. He also presented the tools suitable for managing these 
risks. He explained that dilution occurs when due to the imbalance of the buy and 
sell side, the fund’s assets are traded in the given asset market, and transaction 
costs are spread across the investors of the fund. Consequently, short-term investors 
in the fund, often traders, have a cost advantage over long-term investors.
At the end of the conference, in the name the organising committee, Barbara 
Dömötör expressed her hope that the 2018 conference had contributed to further 
increasing the professional reputation of the event. She thanked the speakers for 
their work, and the attendees for their participation. She also announced that the 
jubilee 10th Annual Financial Market Liquidity Conference to be held on 14–15 
November 2019 was open for application (http://afml.uni-corvinus.hu).
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